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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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Supreme Court Case No. 34375
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS,

I

Plaintiff-Appellant,

I

NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANUES,
a Minnesota corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
HONORABLE DARLA S. WILLIAMSON
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h Judicial District Court -Ada County

User: CCLUNDMJ

ROA Report
Case: CV-OC-2006-17112 Current Judge: Darla Williar,ison

ldaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriter vs. Northland lnsurance Companies
ldaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriter vs. Northland lnsurance Companies
Date

Code

User

NCOC

CCWOODCL

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Darla Williamson

COMP

CCWOODCL
CCWOODCL

Complaint Filed

Darla Williamson

Summons Filed

Darla Williamson

SMFl

Judae

AFOS
ANSW

CCTEELAL

Affidavit Of Service 9.21.06

Darla Williamson

CCWOODCL

Darla Williamson

RMK9

DCKORSJP

Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
(D. Farley for Northland)
Order for Scheduling Conference

HRSC

DCKORSJP

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
11/30/2006 01:15 PM)

Darla Williamson

NOTS

CCWOODCL

Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests

Darla Williamson

MOSJ
MEMO

CCCHILER
CCCHILER

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

AFFD

CCCHILER

NOHG

DCKORSJP

HRSC

DCKORSJP

STlP

MCBIEHKJ

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Memorandum in Support of Plaintift's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Lynnette McHenry in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Notice Of Hearing on Summary Judgment and
Scheduling Order
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 02/01/2007 01:30 PM)
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning

STlP

MCBIEHKJ

HRVC

DCOLSOMA

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

NOTC

DCKORSJP

HRSC

DCKORSJP

MOTN

CCMAXWSL

AFFD

CCMAXWSL

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/03/2007 09:OO Darla Williamson
AM)
Deft Northland lnsurance Companies' Rule 56 (f) Darla Williamson
Motion RE: ldaho Counties Risk Management
Program Underwriters' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Support of Motion Darla Williamson

NOTC

CCMAXWSL

Notice of Hearing (Jan 25,2007 @ 1:30pm)

Darla Williamson

HRSC

CCMAXWSL

Darla Williamson

RSPN

CCMAXWSL

AFFD

CCMAXWSL

MEMO

CCLEONCR

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment 01/25/2007 01:30 PM)
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Brian r. Martens in Support of
Response
Memorandum in Opposition To Defendant's Rule
56(f) Affidavit

Stipulation to Extend Time for Briefs on Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on
11/30/2006 01:15 PM: Hearing Vacated
Order Amending Scheduling Order on Summary
Judgment
Notice Of Trial Setting

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

.
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ldaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriter vs. Northland lnsurance Companies
Date

Code

User

MEMO

CCWATSCL

MOTN

CCCHILER

AFSM

CCCHILER

NOHG

Judse
Darla Williamson

CCCHILER

Reply Memorandum in Support of ICRMP's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Defendant Northland Insurance Companies'
Motion to Compel, and Motion for Fees and
Costs
Affidavit of Bryan A Nickels in Support of
Defendant Northland lnsurance Companies'
Motion to Compel, and Motion for Fees and
Costs
Notice Of Hearing (1125/07 @ 1:30pm)

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Darla Williamson

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Darla Williamson

NOWD

CCNAVATA

AFFD

CCAMESLC

BREF

CCAMESLC

INHD

DCKORSJP

HRVC

DCKORSJP

HRSC

DCKORSJP

MOTN

CCCHILER

MEMO

CCCHILER

AFFD

CCCHILER

AFFD

CCCHILER

MOTN

CCCHILER

AFFD

CCCHILER

Northland Insurance Company's Motion to
Shorten Time Re: Motion to Compel and Motion
for Fees and Costs
Notice Of Withdrawal of Defendant Northland
lnsurance Companies' Motion to Compel &
Motion for Fees & Costs
Affidavit in Furtherance of Motion and In
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment
Brief Re: Motion and In Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment held on 01/25/2007 01:30 PM:
Interim Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment
held on 02/01/2007 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 05/03/2007 01:30 PM)
Defendant Northland Insurance Companies'
Motion for Summary Judgment
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Northland
lnsurance Companies' Motion for Summary
Judgment
Affidavit of Brian R Martens in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Bryan A Nickels in Support of
Defendant Northland lnsurance Company's
Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant Northland Insurance Companies'
Motion for Overlength Brief and Memorandum in
Support
Affidavit of Donald J Farley in Support of
Defendant Northland lnsurance Company's
Motion for Summary Judgment
Notice Of Hearing (513107 @ 1:30pm)

CCCHILER

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
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Date

Code

User

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

STlP

CCTEELAL

ORDR

DCOLSOMA

RSPS
AFFD

CCAMESLC
CCAMESLC

HRVC

DCKORSJP

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

DCKORSJP

ORDR

DCKORSJP

MlSC

CCCHILER

HRVC

DCOLSOMA
DCOLSOMA

DEOP

DCOLSOMA

JDMT

DCKORSJP

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

OBJT

CCAMESLC

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

RPLY

CCDWONCP

MlSC
NOHG

Judoe
Order Granting Defendant Northland lnsurance
Companies' Motion for Overlength Brief and
Memeorandum in Support
Notice Of Service

Darla Williamson

Notice of Hearing re: Motion for Summary
Judgment (5/17/07 @ 1:30 pm)
Notice Of Service

Darla Williamson

Stipulation Re Summary Judgment Briefing
Deadlines
Order Granting Stipulation RE: Summary
Judgment Briefing Deadlines
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment
held on 05/03/2007 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated
Reply in Support of Defendant Northland
lnsurance Companies Motion for Summary
Judgment
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment
held on 05/17/2007 01:30 PM: Interim Hearing
Held
Order Granting Plaintiffs Partial Motion for
Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosure
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 12/03/2007
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated
Civil Disposition entered for: Northland lnsurance
Companies, Defendant; ldaho Counties Risk
Management Program Underwriter, Plaintiff.
order date: 611112007--Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment Granted
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Judgment

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

Northland lnsurance Companies Memorandum of Darla Williamson
Costs
Affidavit of Counsel
Darla Williamson
Darla
Williamson
Objection to Memo of Costs
Darla Williamson

CCTOONAL

Appealed To The Supreme Court
Defendant's Reply in Support of Northland
lnsurance Companies' Memorandum of Costs
Request for Additional Documents on Appeal

Darla ~ i l l i a m s o ~ @ g ~ ~

CCBARCCR

Notice Of Hearing

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson
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Case: CV-OC-2006-17112 Current Judge: Darla Williamson
ldaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriter vs. Northland Insurance Companies

ldaho Counties Risk Management Program Unde~lritervs. Northland Insurance Companies
Date

Code

User

Judge

711612007

HRSC

CCBARCCR

8/22/2007

HRWV

DCKORSJP

8/23/2007

AMEN

CCCHILER

HRSC

CCCHILER

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/12/2007 02:45 PM) Memo of Costs

Darla Williamson

911212007

INHD

DCKORSJP

Darla Williamson

9/20/2007

DEOP

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
09/12/2007 02:45 PM: Interim Hearing Held
Memo of Costs
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's
Objection to Costs

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
08/22/2007 02:45 PM) Def Memo of Costs
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
08/22/2007 02:45 PM: Hearing Waived Def
Memo of Costs
Amended Notice of Hearing

Darla Williamson
Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson

Darla Williamson

Phillip J. Collaer, ISB No. 3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
2 5 0 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, ldaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
(208) 344-551 0
Facsimile:
E-Mail: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

vs.

Fee Category: A1 , $ 8 8

NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES,
a Minnesota corporation,

I

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the plaintiff,

ldaho Counties Risk Management Program

Underwriters ("ICRMP), by and through its attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian and
Hull, and for a claim against the defendant Northland Insurance Company complains
and alleges as follows:

1.
Plaintiff, ICRMP, is a joint powers entity with its principal place of business in
Boise, Idaho.

Plaintiff was, at all times relevant t o this action, duly authorized to

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

-

1

conduct business relating to the sale and adjustment of insurance sold to its members
within the state of ldaho.

11.
Northland insurance Company ("Northland") is a Minnesota corporation
engaged in the business of selling casualty insurance and reinsurance in the state of
Idaho.

111.
Northland applied for and was issued a Certificate of Authority by the ldaho
Department of Insurance authorizing Northland to transact insurance within the state
of ldaho.

IV.
Northland has engaged in the business of selling insurance policies t o
individuals and entities such as ICRMP within the state of ldaho.

v.
All acts and events alleged herein have occurred in Ada County, state of ldaho.
The amount in controversy exceed $10,000.
venue pursuant to ldaho Code

§§

This Court maintains jurisdiction and

1-705 and 5-404.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
VI.
That ICRMP was formed in 1985 pursuant to a Joint Powers Resolution
executed by various governmental entities, including Kootenai County.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2

VII.
That Kootenai County has been a member of ICRMP from 1985 to the present
time.

During that time, Kootenai County had purchased insurance policies from

ICRMP. Each ICRMP policy provided comprehensive general liability and errors and
omission coverage subject to certain conditions,

exceptions,

definitions, and

limitations.

VIII.
Since its inception, and including the time the Paradis v. Kootenai County
lawsuit was filed

(See Exhibit A),

ICRMP has purchased reinsurance from Northland.

The reinsurance policies were purchased on an annual basis for the purpose of
limiting ICRMP's financial exposure for claims covered by the ICRMP policies arising
out of claims or lawsuits brought against ICRMP insureds.

IX.
That, in 2003, Kootenai County, the Kootenai County Commissioners, and
former employees of Kootenai County were named as defendants in a civil lawsuit
filed by Donald Paradis in the Federal District Court for the District of Idaho. See
Exhibit A attached hereto.

X.
In accordance with the terms and conditions of the insurance policy it had
purchased from ICRMP, Kootenai County, on behalf of itself and its current and
former employees, notified ICRMP of the lawsuit and requested that the company

-

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 3

provide a defense to the litigation and indemnify the county, its current and former
employees for all claims described in the Paradis Complaint.

XI.
In accordance with the terms and conditions of the reinsurance policies ICRMP
had purchased, ICRMP notified Northland of the Paradis lawsuit and forwarded a copy
of the Paradis Complaint to Northland at its offices in St. Paul, Minnesota.

Xll.
After reviewing the Paradis Complaint, ICRMP notified its insureds that while
certain conditions and exclusions within the ICRMP policy may be applicable, it
appeared the allegations in the Complaint created a duty to defend the lawsuit.
Kootenai County was sent a reservation of rights letter advising it of the company's
position relative to coverage and reserving all rights under the insurance contract to
later deny coverage and withdraw the defense.

See Exhibit B attached hereto.

XIII.
Northland was provided copies of the reservation of rights letter (Exhibit 9)
identified in Paragraph Xll, above.

XIV.
ICRMP retained various law firms t o defend Kootenai County, as well as its
current and former employees.

xv.
Throughout the Paradis litigation,

ICRMP routinely communicated

with

Northland providing the defendant with written reports regarding the status of the

-
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litigation, as well as the costs which were being incurred in the defense of the
insureds.

XVI.
On February 13, 2006, Northland sent ICRMP a letter stating its belief that
coverage for the Paradis lawsuit did not exist under the Northland reinsurance policy
purchased by ICRMP.

See Exhibit C attached hereto.
XVII.

Correspondence was exchanged between ICRMP and Northland regarding the
defendant's position that coverage did not exist for the Paradis lawsuit.

See Exhibits

D and E attached hereto. Despite Northland's denial of coverage, ICRMP continued
to provide regular reports advising Northland of the status of the Paradis litigation and
the costs which were being incurred defending its insureds.

XVIII.
On June 27, 2006, Northland was advised by ICRMP that settlement
discussions had commenced in the Paradis litigation and that a mediation was
scheduled.

Northland's participation in the mediation process was solicited.

See

Exhibit F attached hereto.

XIX.
On June 27,

2006,

ICRMP presented a billing t o Northland seeking

reimbursement for defense costs which had been paid by ICRMP. A t that point, the
defense costs paid by ICRMP exceeded the self insured retention (SIR) provided in the

-
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Northland policy. All defense costs or indemnity obligations exceeding the SIR were
the obligation of Northland.

XX.
Northland responded to ICRMP's request for its participation in the mediation
and the billing for reimbursement of defense costs by letter dated July 20, 2006.
Northland refused to reimburse ICRMP for defense costs and also declined to
participate in the mediation.

See Exhibit G attached hereto.
XXI.

On August 8, 2006, a mediation in the Paradis case was conducted by the
Honorable Larry M. Boyle.

During mediation, the parties were able t o reach a

settlement whereby the ICRMP insureds agreed t o pay $900,000 in return for a
complete release and dismissal of the Paradis lawsuit with prejudice.

XXII.
The settlement described in YXXI, above, was memorialized in a Mutual
Release, Indemnity, and Settlement Agreement ("Release Agreement"), which was
signed by Mr. Paradis and the ICRMP insureds. After the Release Agreement was
signed, the settlement funds were paid t o Mr. Paradis and the lawsuit against the
ICRMP insureds was dismissed.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF CONTRACT)
XXIII.
Northland, by its correspondence with ICRMP, indicated its intention to breach
the terms and conditions of the policies of reinsurance which had been purchased by
ICRMP.

XXIV.
Northland, by its refusal to reimburse ICRMP for defense costs exceeding the
SIR breached the policies of reinsurance ICRMP purchased from Northland Insurance
Company.

xxv.
Northland, by its refusal to attend mediation and participate in settlement
discussions breached the terms and conditions of the policies of reinsurance which
ICRMP had purchased from Northland Insurance Company.

XXVI.
ICRMP has suffered damages in the form of monies it has paid in excess of the
SIR, in the defense and settlement of the Paradis v. Kootenai County, et a1 litigation.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for judgment to be entered against the
defendant in an amount which exceeds the Court's jurisdictional limits of $10,000 as
will sufficiently compensate the plaintiff for its general and special damages, along
with reasonable costs, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and such other and
further relief as the Court may deem just.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7

JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff ldaho Counties Risk Management Underwriters hereby demands a
trial by jury on all issues.
DATED this

/L/

day of September, 2006.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP

BY
Phillia J. Collaer, Of the Firm Attornevs for
plainiff ldaho Counties Risk ~ a n a ~ e h e n t
Underwriters

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 8
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WIT.LTAM L. MAUK (ISR # 1825)
MAUK & BURGOYNE
5 15 South Sixth Street
Post Oflicc Box 1743
Boise, Tdaho 83701-1743
Telephone: (208) 345-2654
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FEE PA10
R#ASf@UNITED SSATRS DISTRICT COURT

DTSTRIC'S OP IDAHO

'DONALD M. P A W I S ,

)

CASE NO.

)

Plaintiff,
VS.

WILLIAM 3. BRADY, individually andin his
orlicial capacity; KOOTENAT COUNTY, u
political subdivision of the Svirte of Idaho;
GLEN E. WALKEK, it~dividuallyand in his
capacity as the formcr Kootenai County
Prosecutor; D. MARC HAWS; PEIXR C.
ERBLAND; GEORGE EI,LIOTT, individually
and in their capacities as ugents of Kootcnai
County; W ~ D O E SA through I),fictitiouslynamcd persons,

\,!.

COMES NOW thc Plaintiff, above named, and for causes of action against the
Dcfcndmts, stales, avers and allcgcs as follows:

-
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+

Case

1.

-

Document 1

Filed 041091

Thib is a civil action to redrcss various torts and the deprivation of civil rights

hrnught under the constitutions and laws of the United Statcs and the State of Idaho, as herein
more particiilarly described.

JURISDICTION A.Nn VENUE
2.

Thc jurisdiction of this Court is invoked and sccured pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

28 U.S.C. Section 1332, affording divcrsity
Section 1331, affording federal questio~~jurisdicl.ion,

jurisdiction, and 28 IJ.S.C. Scction 1343,affordingjurisdiction for violations or civil rights.

3.

Because there is a common nucleus of opcrative fwts affecting Plainliff's statc

8lld federal claims, this Court has pcndctit jurisdiclion over the stnte claims pursuant to 28 1J.S.C.
Section 1367.
4.

Venue is propcrly set in the Disttict of Idaho in that almost a11 of thc acts and

omissions which form the bilsis of this Complaint occurrcd in Idaho, Plaintiff is a citizen and
resident of Ada County, Idaho, the Dcfcndmt, Kootenai Counry is a govemmcntal subdivision of
thc State of Idaho, and all other Defendants, cxcept one, are eilizcns and resi&nLs of this state.

PARTIES
5.

Plinlirf'Donald M. Paradis ("Pilradis") resides in Roise, Ada County, Idaho and

is a citizen of thc State of Idaho. For ovcr twenty years, Lmm June 23, 1380 until April 10,2001
hc was incimrceratcd in various jails and prisons, including the Kootenai County jail and in the
Idaho State Correctional Institution at Boise, Idaho.

6.

Dcfenddnt Kootenai County (the "County") is, and tit ull times pcttinent hereto

was, a political and govcrnlnental subdivision of the State of Idaho, and included among its
govemmcntal agencies the ofiiccs of the Pwseculing Attorney of Kuotenai County and the
Sheriff of Kooteniii County.

COMB1,AINT AND DEMAND ti'OR JURYTRIAI. 2
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P
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Dcfendant William J. Brady ("Ur. Brady") is, and at all times pertinent hcrcto

was, a citizen and residcnt of the State or Oregon. Although at various titncs pertinent to this
action, Dr. Brady wirs employed by thc State of Oregon as its Chief Medical Examiner, all of his
conduct which forms the basis of ihis action was performed eithcr as. a private cili2.en or as tthc
cmployee and agent of Kootcnni County.

8.

Dcfcndant Glen E. Walker ("Walker") is, and at a11 timcs pertinent hereto was, a

ci6;lcn and resident or Kootenai County. At times most pertinent t o this aclii~n,Walker wits the
elected Prosecuting Attorney or Kootcnai County and the chief policy und decision-makcr
affecting the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by the County.
9.

Defendiint D.Marc Haws ("llaws") is, and for most of the time pwtinont hcrcto

was, a citizen and resident of thc State of Icltlhu, lormerly rcsidiug in KoaLenai County and
currently rcsiding in Ada County. At timcs inost pertinent LOthis action, Haws was employcd as
the Chief Dcputy Prosecuting Attorney of Kootenai County.
10.

Derendant Pctcr C. Erbland ("Erbland") is, and at :ill times pertincnt hereto was, a

citizen and residcnt of the State of Idaho, residing in Kooteniii County. At times most perlinetit

lo this action, Brblimd was employcd as a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County.
1I.

Defendant Cieorge Elliott is, and at till times pertincnt hcrcto was, acilixen and

resident or the Statc of Idaho, residing in Koatcnai County. At times most pertinent to this
action, Elliott wtls employed ae a dcrcctive with the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department.
12.

With rcsycct to the state torts allegcd hcrcin, Defendants Walkcr, Haws, Erbland,

Elliott and Dr. Brady iire sucd as the agents of Kootenai County, insofar ss their conduct was
within the course and scope of thcir employments m d agencies. For the purpose of Plaintiff's
claims for violations of civil rights undcr color of state law, and for thc purpose of state tort

-
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claims whcrc their conduct was in cxccss or oulsidt: of thc authorities uf'lheir agencies, these
Defendants are sucd in their individual capacities.
13.

Defendants, DOES A through D, arc fictitiously-named persons or entities, whosc

true identities are. prcsc~~ily
unknown ti) Plaintiff, but each of whom is responsible, in wholc or
part, Tor thc wroongful conduct allcgcd herein. Plainlit? rcscrves the right to amcnd this
Complaint, as furthct. infotlnatio~lbecomes available, to properly idcntify the tr& namcs of such
Dcfcndiints and the specific acts and omissions giving rise to their liability.
'14.

Certain facts allegcd hcrcin, attributable to crnployees and agents of Kootenai

County, are imputed to and thc legal responsihility of the County by virtue of the principles of
agency, the doctrine of rcsporu2eu.t supsrior and statr statutes and case law authorizing such
imputation of' re%pons~biIity.
15.

To the degree the acts and omissions of any putative agent and crnployee of

Kootenai County were outside of Lhe scopc and responsibility of his or her agency or
ernploymcnt, such persons are sticd in their individual capacities and are i n t e n d to be included
among the fictitiously namcd Defendants.
16.

prior to commenccmcnt of this action, on October 9,2001, Plaintiff served a

Notice of Tort Claim on the duly authorized agenls of Kootcnai County, in compliance with
Chapter 9, Titlc 6, Idaho C d e .
17.

To the extent this suit allcges violution of Plaintiff's civil ~ights,he seeks tcdress

from this Court and an assessnlent of liiihilily and damages agsinxt thosc Dcfcndai~tswho
deprived him of his civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C., Scctiok~s1383 and 1985.

-
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CIONTEXTUAL HISTORY
18.

Tn 1980 and 1981, Donald M. Paradis was wrongfully irccused, prosccutcd and

cot~victedin thc State of Idaho of tfie first dcpcc murder of Kimberly Ann Palmer ("Palmer")
and scntcnced to death.
19.

His wrest, incwceratiou, proi;ecution and conviction wwe the product of a

conspiracy amc>ngthc Dcfcndants, resulting in the repcaed presentation of perjurcd tcstimony
against him and, for fifteen years, ihc deliberate, wdicious w d chronic hiding of evidence of his
innocence rrom him, his attorneys, the jury that convicted him and numerous cbl~rtsand judges.
20.

h January 1996, Paradis and his attorneys discovered thc existence of

handwritten ncrtcs madc by the attorney who proswutcd his case, Haws, (hewin tho "Haws
Notcs") revealing evidence and information which contradicted and impcached the testimony
snd opinions cxptrsscd at trial by the proseculion's kcy witncss, Dr. Brady, and which was in
direct conflict with the proswution's claim that Pdlmer was killcd in Idaho and died after
aspirating watcr from a shallow creek whcre her body was found.

21.

In May 1996, thc ldaho Boud of Pardons andParolcs hcld a clemeilcy hearing on

Plaintiffs case during which Thomas Gibson ("Gibson") publicly ctnniessod that he alone killed
Pillnler in Spoknnc, Washitlgton, and that Paradis was neithcr an sccomplice nor even present.
22.

Shortly thereafter, the Cr~vctaorof ldaho commuted Paradis' scntcnce from death

to life imprisonment without the possibility 01-parolc.

23.

While in ptison, Paradis filed and pursued numerous appcals and post-conviclion

relief and habeas corpus petitions, largcly without success. However, in 1997 hc was granted an
cvidcntiary henring on the exculpatory Hdws Notcs. Purudis v. Aravc, 130 F.3d 785 (9IhCir.

1997). Tn 1999, at that hcaring, the contradictions between the Haws Notcs and Dr. Briuiy's trial
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testimi)ny wcrc fully exposed, and.on March 14,2000 U.S. Dis~rictJudgc Edward J. Lodge
found that ~laintiff's~constitutional
right to a fair trial had been violated and set aside his
conviclion: Purudi.s v. Arclve, 20 F.3d 950 (yth Cir. 2001).
24.

On April 10,2001, Bill Douglas, the currcnt Kootenai County Prosecuting

Attorney, dismissed all homicide chargcs against Paradis and hc was set free, having spent over
20 years in jail or prison, 15 years on death row.
25.

By this action, Paradis seeks to vindicate tho gross injustices committed against

him by theDeicndants, and to obtain some measurc of tnoaetary relief for the loss of his freedvm
and thc petrmanent impuirment of his capacity to lead my semblance of a normal lire.
FACTUAL SUMMARY

26.

During the early rnoining of June 21, 1980, Palmer and a I'riend, Scott Currier

("Cumer"), wcce brutally murdered at a residcncc on Dearborne Street in Spokane, Washingtonn.
27.

The Following day, thc bodies of Palmer and Curricr were discovered in a stccp,

overgrown ravine, off Mellick Road near Post Falls, Idaho. Cumer's scvcrcly beaten b d y was
found in a slccping bag on the incline of the ravinc. Palmer's body was found face down, partly
in a shallow creek at the bottom of thc ravine.
28.

That night, the bodies of the ~ w victims
o
wcre driven to Porilmd, Orcgon by two

criminal invest.igalors from the Kootcnai County Sheriff's Depann~cnt,Defendant George Elliott
t offices of forcnsic pathologist
("Elliott") and Wesley Krucger ("Krucgcr"), arriving i ~the

William J. Brady about 9:30 a.m. the next morning, where the Koolenai County Prosecutor's

Office had arrangcd for Dr. Brady to p e & m autopsies on Palmer and Cunier.
29.

Ruth Jones, who iived at thc entrance to Mellick Road, informed the police that

early the morning of Jitne 22 she had observed a van drivc up the road and, twenty to thirty

-
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minutes laler, thrcc men walked past her house coming from thc area where the bodies and
tun~cd-overvan were later found.

30.

That s:une morning a policc officer who knew nothing of the homicidcs, stopped

and briefly questioned Pwadis, Gibson w d Latry Evans ("Bvanfi") as they waited for a ridc
outsidc a conve~liencestcxe in Post Falls, Idaho.
31.

After the bodies of Palmcr .and Currier were discovered, on June 23, 1980, Pardis

and two others, Charles Amachcr ("Amacher") and Roscarirle Moline, werc nrrcsted by Spokenc
law enforcement authorities on suspicion of having committed thc homicides. Several days later
Gibson was also arrested in Califortiia md extradiied to Spoktme. Evans was also sought by
Washington anthorities but evaded law cnforcemenl until 1986.

32.

The autopsies of Currier and Pdmcr took the bet1er part of the day of June 23 and,

except for bricf periods, were attended by Elliott and Krueger. Daring the medical cxaminations
Elliott listened to Dr. Brady dictate his thoughts and obselrations m hc proceeded through thc
aulopsics. 1Ie also asked multiplc questions of the pathologist regarding his findings and
opinions and took notes.
33.

In these exchangcs, Elliott learned sevcral things which werc kcy to his

investigation ;md fundamental to the issue of whcther Idaho authoritics had any jurisdiction ovcr
rhc homicides, including (a) that in Urady's expert opinion Palmer died from manual
strangulation, and not from drowning, (b) that there was no evidence of sexual molestation, (c)
that. Palmer had a one and one-half inch cut on her labia that did not bleed, meaning it was
intlictcd a significwt time aftcr hcr death, (d) that Palmcr's body revealed sevcral other postmortem abrasions and wounds, m d (e) that despite pointed inquiry from Elliott, ths pathologist
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codd not venture an opinion on the place or time or death, and would not say Palmer was killcd
in Idaho.

34.

Elliott and Krueger departed with this infor~~iation
and drove back to Spokanc.

The next m~brningElliott presented a scport of the autopsy [indings to a meeting of Kootenai
County and Spokane County law enforcemcnt pcrsonncl in Spokane, altended by Haws (herein
the "task force meeting").

35.

The notes which Haws took of Elliott's June 24, 1980 report includcd the

following rerercnccs: (a) "no time of detttli eilher," (b) "VF (fcmale victim) strangled," (c) "voicc
box broken 2 paris," (d) "dead whcn wcnt in water," and (e) "not sexually itssaulted." In
depositians and hearing testimony acquired years latcr. Elliott confiinled these represcntations as
corning from Dr. Brady and the pathologist acknowledged them as accuratc reflections of his
June 23, 1980 autopsy findings and conclusions.

36.

At the June 24 mccting and in other subsequent exchangcs among law

cnforccment personnel involved in the casc, Haws and Eliion learned there was substantial
physical and witness evidencc connecting both homicides lo the Dcarborne Street residence in
Spokane, and no direct evidence whatsoever connecting cithcr homicide to Idaho.

37.

The past-mortern cut on Palmer's labia identified by Dr. Brady's autopsy was

extremely significant. Although it occurred in a highly vascular areaof thc body, Dr. Urady
notcd in his autopsy report that there was "no vital rcaction," explaining that the wound sirnply
did not bleed.
38.

To a forensic palhologist of Dr. Brady's considerable experience, the clinical

findings indicated conclusively that,the labia wound had 10 havc been inflicted more than a half
hour after Palrncr's hcmt stopped beating. As 1.11ejudges of the Ninth Circuit correctly observed

-
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years latcr, "[slince P a d i s , Cihst~tIandEvans were a1 the Mcllick Road site for only about 30
minutes, Palmcr's death would have to antcdate the entire episode thcrc ...," and "[a] death at
Mellick Road, ...would appear to become scvcrcly ilnplausible in the light of (Dr. Brady's) own

[I tinmng."
39.

On June 24, 1980, Pxdrfis, Gibson and Aiwdcher were charged by authorities in

Spokanc County, Washington, with thc murders of both Curricr and Palmer; however, shoi'dy
thereafter a strategic decision was ma& to proceed only on the Curricr casc, leaving prosecution
of the Palmer homictdc in abeyance.
40.

In early Septemher 1980, a Washington jury rerunled verdicts uf nut guilty

against Pwadis, Gibson and Amacher on tht; Curricr homicide. b w s ullended portions of the
trial, even attempting to sit at the vahle of thc prosecution's counsel, and took extensive notes.
41.

Only aftn' these acquitlsls, on Scptcmbcr 24, 1980, did Kootcnai County seek

arrcst wwrku~tsTor Piiradis and Gibsom~on P~almw'shomicide. Plaintiff's first appcarancc before
an Idaho court on this charge was Novemhcr 26,1980.

42.

A few months aftcr Paradis was formally chargcd, his first public defcndcr

withdrew hecausc of a potential conflict. At that point the handling district judge appointed
William Brown ("Brown"), an attorney who had only bccn practicing law for six months and had
ncvcr conducted any jury (rial in a civil or criminal cme. IJnhcknownst to Paadis until ycars
after his conviction, Brown also worked wwkcnds as a reserve pvlice officer in Coeur d'Alene.
43.

Throughout the proceedings leading 'o the trial of Paradis and Gibson in Idaho,

Walker, Haws, Erbland and Elliot~made numcrous representations to judgcs 'and the media about
the ostensible facts of the case, md ahout rhc strcngth and certainty ol such facts, which
represemitutions wcre in dircct conflict with the exculpatory cvidence obtained From Dt.. Brady at
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the autopsy, and in inany instances patently false and fttbricated. Thcse represenladons included
the following:
1)

At the four-day preliminary hearings of Pttradis and Gibson in December

1980, the prosecution hypothesized t h a ~Palmcr was killed at Mellick Road in Id&o, offering
tangential, circulnstilntid and remotcly inferential evidence about the elal alive locations where the
Currier and Paltncr bodies had been found, but holding secret from thc coutz and deranse counsel
the forensic evicloncc from Dr. Brady demonstrating that Palmer died clscwhere;
b)

At a bail hearing for Paradis in April 1981, Haws told the court that there

was "water in Palmer's lungs caused by her last instinctive gulp as she lay facc down in the
creek," an opinion never previously exprcsscd by Dr. Brtdy or anyone and, again, the
prosecution withheld froom the court and clcfcnsc counsel the contrary forcnsic evidence;
c)

Jn opposing Plaintiff's motion to dismiss based on the ahscnce of probable

cause to believe Palmer died in Iduho, Haws misrepresented the pnst-mortcm wound to Palmer's
labia as "a superficial cut" in "her groin" area which, without a shrcd of evidentiary support, he
described as consistent with a cut from u barb wirc fence as Palmer ran down the Mellick Road
ravinc fleeing frum Paradis, Gibson and Evans; and
d)

Also opposing dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, Haws informed thc Idaho

court tililt Dr. Rtady had testified in Washingtcm that Currier had been clead longcr than Palmer,
hut omitted informing anyone that this testimony could he impcitched by what Dr. Brady told
Elliott contemporaneous to the autopsy.
44.

As Paradis and Gibson awaited t~ial,Gibson had a note delivered to thc Idaho

district court judge handling the case inforniing him that Palnler was killed in Spokanc, implying

-
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he had caused or contributed to hcr d a t h and that Paadis wau no1 prcsent and did not
participate.

45.

Baausc of this, the Gihwn and Paradis trials wcre bifurmted.

46.

As the separate trials approached, it was abundanlly clear to the Kootenai County

pmsccutors tht they had a fundanwnliil hole in their proup, namcly, the absence of any
persuasive cvidence thal Palmer was killed in Idaho and, thus, an inability to link Paradis to

anything morc thrm having helped to hide her hody.
47.

In June 1981, Dr. Brady traveled to Cncur d'Alene, ldaho and, according to him, met and

talked with Haws for the first time 10 prcparc his testimony for the Gibson and Paradis tri.als.
48.

During their coavetsations, Haws probed Dr. Rrudy: (a) on the prosecutor's

theory that Paln~erhad inhaled water into her ltmgs, thus connecting hcr hiling to the creek
where her body was found, und (b) on thc absence of bleeding from the labia cut, which
contmdictcd that theory. On thesc kcy points, Haws promoted and suborncd Dr. Urady's
adoption of opinions that would get the ckscs against Gibson and Paradis over the obvious
jurisdictional hurdle,,conncctingPcllmer's death to Idaho.
49.

Again, Haws look notcs of portions of thc pretrid exchangc with Dr. Brady

which, wheu these notea wcrc revealed 15 years Iatcr, reflect considerabic hesitancy by Brady on
committing ti) Haws' aspiration of water theo~y.At most, Dr. Brady ventured the uncczin
observation that watcr "whrve played a rolc" in Palmer's death. The notes Further highlighted
the exculpalory import of the post-mortem labia wound, with Haws raising the obvious yucstion
of whcthcr there was hlood in Palmer's Jews in the area proximate to the genital wound, and
murking lhc yncstion prominently with a star, the only such emphasis in the Haws Notcs.
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1Iours later, Dr. Brady took the stand at the Gibson trial and, with a clarity that is

in strifing contrast to what thc pathologist had just told Haws and to thc Haws Notes, offered
sworn testiniony embracing the prosccutor's aspiration of watcr theory, stating:

"I think she inhaled water, exactly, that's what T think happened,"
and "I think thcre is a very slrong likclihood that she was alivc
when she went in the water and inhaled some water, that is my
opinion."
51.

On the complex question of thc absence of bleeding from the iabia wound, Dr.

Brady admitted, upon inquiry, that there wtls nu bleeding or crusting indicated from physical
exanination ol' thc wound and "simply no blood on (the) genital area of Palmer." Nonetheless,
hc dismissed the significance of these finding with a hypotlictical recitation he and others of his
profession know to be scientiiically fdsc, stating:

"If thc wca was submerged in watcr, then the blood would have
washed away, wouldn't be there, look exactly like I saw il."
52.

Plaintiff" defense counsel, Brown, sat through poflions of thc Gibson trial and

later read the transcript of Dr. Brady's tcsrimony, never knowing of the self-contradicting
statements thc pathologist had made to Elliott at the autopsy and to Haws right before taking thc
witness stand,

53.

Although Gibson testilled that Palmer was killed in Spokane and described his

complicity, Gibson was convictcd of killing Palmer in Idaho, largely on the strength of Dr.
Brady's new found opinions.
54.

Six months later, in Dcccmher 1981, Dr. Brady again testified, thit; time against

Pal-adis. In his sworn comnienls, the theory of Palmer inhaling water through her crushed throat
bcctune more than a hypothesis; indeed, it was central to thc quesrions from Haws and thc
opinions expressed by his increasingly partisan expert.

-
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Almost parroting Haws' description to judges months before on the probable

cause inquiry, Dr. Rrady testiticd, "the aspiration of wakr playcd a role, irnot the terminal
cvent, in that girl's death after shc was stsungled." His concluding comment to thc jury w u :
"Kimberly Ann Palmcr, I believe was strangled. T hclicve she w u
strangled and shor(1y afterwards aspirated some mount of water
during her terminal, during thc lizst momenta with her last hrcath, I
think she inhaled some water."

56.

The labia woiand was dclibcrately omittcd from the examination of Dr. Brady by

Paradis' woefully inexperienced defense ct>unsclbecause, a. hc testified later, hc feared it would
raisc the specter oof scxual abuse. Tn discovery, derensc counsel had rcccived Elliou's typcwritten investigation report stating Palmer had been sexually molested, but Plaintiff's cc>unsel
ncvcr knew what Dr. Brady had told Elliott at. the autopsy, which Elliott had repealed to Haws,
or thal in his notes from the task force nieeting Haws wrot.e "not sexually assaulted."
57.

Relying directly and rcpcxedly on the wcll coached, embellished, exaggcrated

and T;llsc testimony of Dr. Brady, Haws argucd his case against Ptiri~disto thc jury and securcd
Plaintiff's conviction.
58.

In 1987, aftcr his apprehension, Evans was also tried by Kootcnai Cou~ulltyand

acquitted.
59.

Ymrs latcr, colnpilring the Haws Noles 10 Dr. Brady's numerous testimonies at

trials, a1 habcas corpus evidentiay hearings and in depositions, the Ninth Circuit concluded: (a)
that 'Dr. Rrady held too many contradictory opinions to have conlidcnce in the Paradis verdict,
(b) that tbc circunistantial evidence 011 which Paradis' conviction relied "is undermined" by ihc
Naws Notes, and (c) that quite probably "no reascmablc Juror could find from the mcdicnl
evidcnce (now) available in the record that Palmer was alive when her body entered the crcck at
Mcllick Rcvad."

COMPLAINT A N 0 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 13
P \ W ~ ~ ( I \ M A I I K \ P A K A D I.ISsulnwz
~~
( t~mpluntd u

C a s e 2:03-cv-0015

60.

Document 1

Filed 041091

On remand, followi~~g
an extensive evidcntiary healing, the 1J.S. District Courl in

ldilho ultimatcly agreed, l~oldingthat in procuring his conviciion and death sentence, Paradis'
constitutional rights had been violated. Purudis v. Aravc, 2000 WL 307458 (U.Idaho 3/14/00)

INCORPORATION
61.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates pliragraphs 1 through 60 above, as part of cach

of the counts, claims and caul;es of action stated below.

COIJNTONE
(Civil Nights-Kuotunai County and Walker)

62.

In 1963, in the case of Bra@ v. Maryhd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ("Brrrdy").the

United States Supreme Court imposed an aafmiativc constitutio~lalduty on proswutors at every
level of government throughout the TJnited States to disclose exculpatory evidence known hy thc
prosecution team to criminal defendants and thcir attorneys.

63.

Ry 1980 and 1981, when Paradis became thc subject of criminal investigation and

then prosecution by Kootenai County, Rrarly and a progeny of judicial decisions which followed
reflected a cletlrly esktblished constitutiotld right entitling Paradis to be informed by Kootcnai

County prosecutors, and law enforcement personricl assisting on their behalf, of all infoi~nation
lhey wcrc aware of which ww in any way ftworable to his Afensc and material lv his possible
innocence of the murder chage against him (herein the "Hrady di>ctrinc2').

64.

At thc times of the Cunier and Pai~ncrhomicide invauligations, Plaintiff's west,

and continuing through the pri>sccutionof Paradis without inrermption, Kootenui County
officials, particularly the Kootenai Counly Piomuting Attorney, Walker, and thc Kootend
County Sheriff, kncw or had to have known to a moral certainty that deputy prosecutors handling
criminltl cases in Kootcnai County-and

the police, detcctivcs and deputies who they rclicd

-
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hc confronted repeatedly with circumstances where thcy became aware of

information (Lirngiblc, documentary, testimonial or otherwise), that was potentially exc~llpatory
or a critninal derendant's guilt, potentially impesching of evidence or iestimony supporting
conviction, i n di~ectand pntct~tinlconflict with the prosecution's theory or explanation of the
crime, or tending ti>undermine the prosecution's case and cxonerdte the dcfcndwt oS culpability.

65.

Under these circumstances, these samc Kootenai County officials, pa'ticulwly

Walkcr, appreciatcd that pcoseculorial and ldw ennliwmcnt personnel would often he rcquired to
makc difiicult choices rcgnrding rull and prompt disclosure of potenlially exculpatory or
impeaching information to derendants and their attorneys, md ihat hesitance, evasiveness or
failure on thc part of these employees to makc a choice entirely consistent with their lawrul
duties and responsibilities would likely cavse a deprivation of constitutiond righls lo criminal
defendants, presumcd by law to be innocent.
66.

Walker and othcr Kootenai County policy-makers further appreciatcd that through

prnper and focused training, supervision and discipline of Kootenai County prosecutors and law
enforcement personnel, the choiccs these employees would be required to make regarding
cxculpatory evidcncc would be less difficult to makc and, when madc correctly, would cnsure
the preservation of a defendant's constiiutional guaranties and mitigate the prospcct of
convicting defcndrnts for crimes thcy did not commit.
67.

Kootenai County officials, patZicularly Walkcr, were made cvcn more aculely

awwe or thcsc circumstances as thcy mighl afkctcd Pamdis, given their knowledge that when
Haws ussumed rcspo~isibilityror prosecuting the casc against the Plaintiff he had only hecn
practicing law around eight months and htid never heforc tried any homicide case, let alone a
capital n~urdercase.

-

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 'I'RlAL 15
k\W)?KlWAUK\PAHAI>IS\<!ivil
Suil\O02 Ca~11plilint,dn?

Case 2:03-cv-0015

68.

Document 1

Filed 04/09/

Despite the requireinents of the B r d y doctrine and the known implications of

such quiremenls affecting thc rights of criminal ddenendanls and tlxc duties and wtivitiex of law
cnforcc~nentpersonnel, in 1980 and 1981-and, indeed, continuing for years thcrcafter-the
customs, policics and practices of Kootenai County, paiiicularly those of its Prosmuling
Attorncy and Sheriff, displayed and reflectcd a dc1iber:tte indifference lo and cotrscious disregard
for the constitutional rights of criminal defendants generally, and the Plaintiff in particular.

69.

By choicc, ncglcct or reckless indifrerence, Walkcr ,and others respon3ible for

cstahlishing, proinoting and enforcing the policics of Kooteniu County arfecting prosccutors and
law enforcement personnel, cithcr:
a)

In8d.Z it the practice, or caused it to bc the rule and practice, of Kootenai

County prosccutors and police to evade or ignore their constitutional duties of disclosure and
defendwls' rights uadcr thc Brudy doctrine; andor
h)

failed or refused to adequalely and propcrly train and instruct Koolenai

County prosecutors and police on the implications of thc Brutdy doctrine in lawfully carrying out
their employmct~tactivitics and ir?sponsibiliti,es;and/or

c)

failcd or rcfused to adequately supervise Kootenai County prosecutors and

police in fulfillment of their constitutional obligations under the Brudy doctrine; and/or
d)

failcd or refused to promptly and appropriately discipline Kootenai

Cour~typrosecutors and police who neglwtcd, cvadcd or violated the constitutional rights
criminal defendants, particularly those guaranteed by thc Brruly doctrine.
70.

As the direct and proximal result of tho forcgoing, thcre existed u climate and

policy of deliberate indiffcrcnce to the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff, rtffccting the conduct

a

of Walker, Haws, Erblwd, Elliott and others, causing thcm to:

-
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intentionally and repcatcdly disregard their duties uf disclosure undcr the

B r d y doctrine;

b)

hide and deliheratcly obscure evidence which directly or indirectly

cxoncratcd Paidis;
c)

manipulate, cncournge and conspire with Dr. Brady to g ~ v falsc,
c

exaggerited and unsupportable ~e*iimony;and,
d)

mislead the Paadis jury, olhw prosecutor, dcfcnsc counsel tmd numerous

tsial and appellatejudges, by reprcscnting as fact or informed opinion numerous, critical mattcrs
which all of somc of tllcrn knew to be contrary to established or provablc fact.
71.

These acts and (>mission8violatcd Plaintiffs rights under the Fourth, Sixth and

Fourteenth Amcndmeuts, and comparable provisions of the Idaho Cot~stitution,and caused him
to suffer substantial injury, loss and d'vnage, as more specificdly alleged herein.

COUNT TWO
(Civil Rights-Kootenai County and Walker)

72.

Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates paragraphs 62 through 71 below, us

part of thc following Count.

73.

At the lime Paradis was arrcstcd and charged by Kooten~iCounty, he had a

clearly established constitutiond right not tr) be seized and deprived of his liberty, and not to bc
held and prosecuted, absent probablc causc, fouildcd upon demonstrable facts, supporting a
reasonable conclusion (hilt he hadcommitted a crime within thc jurisdiction of the yrosecutoriill
authot.ities and courts of Idaho.
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h 1980 und 1981, Kootenai County officials, pwticularly the Kootcnai County

Prosecuting Attorney, Walkcr, and the Kootenai County Sheriff, kncw or had to have known to a
moral cc~tainty:
a)

that, in their investigation of crimcs 'and pursuit of suspects, deputy

prosecutors, police, detectives and deputies would be confronted rcycatedly with circunislances
where evidcncc of probable cause was lacking;
h)

that thesc samc pcrsonnel would he required to makc difficult choices

regarding whcther to arrest, charge or prosccutc whcrc, despite their suspicions, cvidcnce of
probable cause was lacking;
c)

Ihal if'these samc personnel acted precipitously and without justificdtion,

or wted on thc apparent authority of a court's probable eausc determinations, obtained on falsc
or incomplete premises, it would violate thc constitutional rights of those improperly accused;
and,
d)

that through propcr and focused training, supervision and discipline, the

choices thcsc personnel would he required to makc on probable cruse consideralic>nswould bc
less difficult to make and, when madc correctly :~ndlegally, would onsurc thc preservation of
constitutional gi~arat~tics
and mitigate the prospecl ol'arresting, restraining m d prosecuting thc
wrong people for crimes they did not commit.
75.

Despite the requirement that County prosecutors, police, detectivcs and deputies

conform their official conduct to comply with thc rights guaranteed by the Unibd Statcs and
Idaho constitutions, in 1980 and 1981, the customs, pulicies and practiccs of Kootenai County,
particularly those of its Prosecuting Attorncy and Sheriff, displayed and reflected a dclibcrate
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indiffcrence to and conscious disregard Tor the constit~~tional
rights of criminal suspects,
il~cludingthe Plaintiff.
76.

By choicc, neglect or rcckless indiffcrence, Walkcr and others rcsponsihlc for

cstablishing, promoting and enforcing thc policies of Kootenai County affecting prosecutors and
law cnforcement pcrsonnel, eithcr:
a)

made it the prncticc, or caused it to be the mlc and practicc, of Kootenai

County prosecutors and police ta arrcst, charge and prosecute criminal susy)ccts without probable
cause; andlor
b)

Fdililed or refused to adcquntely and properly vain and illstruct Kootenili

County prosecutors and police on thc i~nplicationsof obtdining judicial probable deterrninatiolls
based on misreprcscnted or incomplete inl'orrnation; i~nJ/or
c)

failcd or refused to adequdtely supervise Kootenai County prosecutors and

policc in fulfillment of tbeir constitutional obligations conccmi~lgprohablc cause determinations;
muor
d)

failed or refufied to promptly and appropriately discipline Kootenai

County prosecutors and police who neglected, cvaded or violatcd the constitutionlil rights of
crimninnl suspccts on prvbiiblc cause determinations.
77.

As thc direct and proximate result of the foregoing, them existcd a climate md

policy of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of thc Plilintin', affecting the conduct
of Walker, Haws, Erbland, Elliott and othcrs, and causing them to:
I)

arrest, chwgc and prosecute Paradis without probable cause and knowing

then? was inadequate cvidence to afford i d t o criminaljurisdiction over him;
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hide and deliberately obscure evidence which dircctly or indirectly

exonerated Paradis and undermined any reasonable probable cause determinillion; md,
C)

I

Document 1

mislead judges required to makcprobablc cause determinations in this

case by rcprcscrtting as fact or infoimed opinion numerous, criricai mattcia which all or some of
them knew to be conlriuy to established nt provahic fact or, at the very least, were conlridicled
by other undisclosed facts.
78.

These wts and omiaxionr:violatcd Plaintift's rights under the United SCales

Constitution, including the Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amcndmcnts, and co~npurnble
provisions of the ldaho Constitution, and caused Paradis to suffer, and cvnlinue lo suffcr,
substantial injury, loss and dmwage, as more specil'ically alleged hcrcin.

COUNTS FOUR. FIVE AND SIX
(Neligence, False Arrerl, M~lliciousPrnsecution and False
Imprisonment-Kootenai County and Its Agent$)
79.

By virtue of thc ldaho Tort Claims Act, Chapter 9, Title 6, Jdilho Code, every

political subdivision of the State of Idaho, including Kootenai County, has waived its sovereign

I
!

I

immunity Tor cerlain tort actions against it, including for claims of negligence, misrepnisenlalion,
dcccit, deflunation, PJlse arrest, false imprisc)nnientand malicious prosccution.

80.

Such waiver of imn~unityextends to claims against the individual employees and

agents of political xubdivisionr:,including Kootcnai County and the Kootenai County Prosecutor,
for the negligent or other wrongful u d s and irmissions of those employees and agents wt~ilc
wting in the course and scope of thcir crnploy~ncntor ,lgcncy duties.
81.

Much of the conduct of Walkcr, Haws, Erhland, Elliott and Brady, alleged herein,

constituted acts and omissions within the purview of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, for which they
and Kootenai County each have liability to P ~ d d i for
s money damages.
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Acting on behalf of Kootenai County, Walker, ffuws, Erhland and Elliott, or some

or them, instigated, pursued and prosecuted first dcgrcc murder charges against Paradis knowing

that (2) there was ,an absence of evidence supporting prohablc cause to believe the death of
Paimcr occurred in Idaho, (b) there warr insufficient evidence to give ldaho courts jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the criminal action and (c) there wm evidcnce, being intentionally
concealed, that undermined probable cause, jurisdiction and Plaintiff's culpability.
83.

Although wwants were st~ughtand obtained by these Defendants for thc mcst,

detention, restraint and incmration of Paridis, such warrants were not the product of
independent objective findings by a magistrate, but wcrc invalid, having been unlawfully
obtained by deceit, through the intentional, deliberate w d malicious withholding of materiirl,
exculpatory cvidence by the Defendants and lhrotigh thc presentation of infomalion which was
either knowingly falsc or fraught with a recklesr; disregard for thc truth and accuracy or such
informatiot~.
84.

At the timc of thc Plaintiff's preliminary hearing, and subsequeutly at the Xditho

clistrict coui%iudge'sreconsideration of thc magistrate's probable cause clelerminatioti on
Plainti W's motion to dismiss, there was a further intentional, deliberate and malicious
withholding ttf malerial cvidcncc by these Defendants and a representation of ittfom~ationand

arguments ostensibly supporting prc)btnhle causc which was co~npletelywithout factual support.
85.

In prosmuting thc first degree nlurder charge against Paradis, Haws intentionally

concealed or recklessly withheld evidence which was exculpatory and impeaching and cithcr
suhorncd thc perjurous testitnony of Dr. Rrady or delibcratcly clected not to report such perjury
to the Court whcn it obviously occurred.
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By these acts and omissions, Walker, Haws. Grbland, Elliott and Brady, or some

of thein, knowingly .and intentionally violatcd Idaho Code, Sections 18-2901 and 18-2902, wl~ich
makc false imprisonment a crinlinal offens% Idaho Code, Sections 18-5408,5409 and 5411,
which make pcrjury and the subornatiotl of perjury criminal offenses, and Idaho Code, Section
18-5414, whicl~make i t ncrimc to give false inlormation to any court.
87.

When, years i&r, Magstrate Craig Kosonen, wl~ohad handled thc preliminirry

hearing on Paradis, lcanied about the evidcncc which the prosecution had withheld, hc expressed
his dismay publicly, indicating that had he been liilly informed of what rhc prosecution knew hut
concealed, it is unlikcly he would have round probable cause and bound P u d i s over ooli thc
murdcr charge.
88.

011
a claimuTnegligcrmcagainst.Walker and all others who were responsible for

tile policies, practices, training and supervision affecting Koolenai County prosecutors and law
enforcement personnel, Plaintirr hereby rcalleges and incorporates the allegations of Counts One
and Two, above.

89.

As the dirwt and proximatc cause of Defendants' deceit and negligence, and the

false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecutivn or Paradis, Plaintiff htoi suffcrcd
substantial injury loss and damage, as more specifically alleged hereinbelow.

COUNT SIX

-

(Civil Higllts B r ~ d y Elliott
,
and Haws)
90.

Knowing they did not possess, and could not lawfully obtain, evidencc which

providcd proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Don Parndis murdered Kimberly Palmcr, and that
he cvmmittcd this alleged crime in Tdaho, Haws, Elliott and Dr. Brady, and perhaps Walker and
Orblcand,entered into a plan, dcsign and conspir~ylo concoct cvidence against Paradis and

-
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prcsent it as if Fact, all in violation oirighw protected by thc laws of the IJnited States, the
Fo~itTh,Sixth and Fourteenth Anlendincnts of the United States Constitution, and comparable
provisions of the Idaho Constitution.
9 1.

The theory that Pltlmer aspirated water was m idea corltrivcd by Elliol, adapted

arrd cmhellishad by Haws and promoted 11.1and adopted by Dr. Brady, who then transposed the
theory into his ostensibly informed opinion testimnony for purpose lilr the Gibson and Paradis
trials.

92.

Wheri this conspiracy arose and was first acted upon, Haws and Elliott wcrc

performing purcly investigatory fi~nctionswhich preceded the arrest and dccisicrn lo prosecute
Paradis. Ncmetheless, thesc Dcfcnctanls were acting undcr color o i state law.

93.

Whcn Dr. Brady joined this cxtra-judicial conspiracy, to give false testimony, he

was the contract agent of Kootcnai County and, as such, Irc too was acling under color of statc
law; indeed, by jointly engilging and acting in concert with state ofiicids in the deprivation of
Plaintiff's civil rights, Dr. Brady lost any pretense of acting simply a n private person.
94

The acts, conduct and o~nissiorlsof these Derendrtnts was cxtrcmc, outrageous,

willful and malicious. In their over-zcaiou8nes~to assign legal blame fot a horrible, senselcss
crime, they abzndoned evcry vestige of responsibility and authority, perpetrating a fraud and
securing the contrivcd conviction of thc Plaintiff.

5 .

But for the role each of these Defendtints contributed lo the plan and conspiracy,

Pwadis would have never bcen arrested or chargcd, and mosl certainly would not have been
prosecuted or convictcd.
96.

As lheproxi~natcresulk of these wro~xgfuland illegal acts, Plaintiff has suffered,

and continues to suffer, substanlial injury, loss and damage, as Inore specifically alleged herein.
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COUNT SEVEN
(Tort

97.

-

Ctaimn Brady)

Plaintiff hereby reallcges and incorporntcs paragraphs 80 through 96 above as if

sct foith in full bclow.
98.

If in committing the conduct allcged in Count Six, Dr. Brady was acting purely as

a private person, his conduct was at the very least negligent and mounted to an intenliona1
inflection of cmotiol~aldistress upon Paradis.

9

Dr. Brady knew the import of his role in thc criminal action pursued against

Paradis and assumed a duty and responsibility to provide objcctive, tmthful and complett:
infomi~iiot\to every participant in the criminal process at every formal and informed stage of the
judicial proceedings.
1.00. He miserably breachcd this duty, abandoned every pretcnsc of independence and

assumed the mantcl and role of eciln advocate, stretching the truth to the breaking point, devising
and promoting theoiiss lhat violated estilhiished prccepts and standards of his profession md
ignoring the: findings and scieatific principles of forensic pathology.
101.

His conduct was extreme, outrageous, maliciouc: and dcliberat.e, with tiic purpose

and effect of obtaining a conviction that hc apprecieciilted could not be oblained without his
complicit excesses.
102.

Dr. Rrirdy, perhaps more than any othcr single Defendant, caused Don Paradis to

relinquish his freedom fou over 20 ycsrs, to sufrer the scvcre er~mtionalpain of having his
cxccution scheduled rhrcc times md to permanently lose his ability to puticipeciilte in a free society

as anornlal human being, all to Plaintiffs substantial loss, injury and damage, is more
specificdly alleged hereinbelow.
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COUNT EIGHT
(Defamation - Brady)

103. Throughout the numerous and various challcngcs to Plaintiff's conviction. Dr.
Brady made repeated public stalemenis to a variety of ncws mcdia outlets, describing the
Sorensic evidcncc which ostensibly supported the conviction of Pitradio.
104.

He made and volunteered these slatements with no privilcgc or obligation to do

105.

Repeatedly, Lhe statements he madc wcrc knowingly false, perpetuated the

SO.

contrived and unsuppo~tlbletheories discussed herein, and always cast both the Pl'laintiff and his

claims of innocence in a false light.
106.

One of Dr. Bsady's most notable, defamatory versions of truth occurrcd on a news

story about ihe case prt>ducedby Northwest Rcpoits out of Portband, Oregcil~.

107.

In that story, well after the prosecution and cotrviction of Pnradis 11ad become the

subjcct of public scrutiny and Dr. Urady's role in that process had become ~uspect,hc publicly
announced for the first time that he huct iitken samples of Palmer's lung tissue during her autopsy
a microscope, revding the prefience of
and, sincc thc trial, had cxamined them u~~der
contaminanls, specificallyplankton, that hc opirrcd confirmed the aspiration of creek water into
Palmer's lungs.
108.

According to Dr. Brady, he lllade photographs of the micmscopic views and both

showed and gave them to Rrblitnd in 1387, with the expectation thcy could bc used in the trkd
against Evans and perhaps in opposing Peradis' first habeas corpus petition.

-
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No one involved in [ha Paradis case, including Erbland or lhose from the Idaho

Attorney Crenertil's office who fought Pmdis' post-conviction petitions, acknowledges any of
n gwill corroborate Dr. Brady's public statcmcnts in any way.
this o c c u ~ ~ or
110.

Other specific in$~'ance~
of Dr. Brady's liefamition of Paradis, we believe, will he

rcvcalcd and supported by discovery in this casc, and Plaintiff rcscrvcs Lcavc to anlcnd this
Coniplail~tas such information becomes available.
111.

By this coursc of defamatory conduct, Dr. Brady cootinucd to cast a false cloud of

unccrtainty ovcr PlaintiftTsclaims of innocoace and provided cover For hia own tranfigressic>nsat
the continued expense and punishment of Pzutidis.

COUNTS NINE, TEN AND ELEVEN

112.

In 1986, Paradis was granted an cvidentiiiry hearing on his i3rfit habeas carpus

petition and, in preparation for that hearing, subpoeneedHziws and his files from the 1980-81
prosecutic~nwhich, unbeknownst to Pinutit: and his at.torneys at the time, include the Haws
Notes.
113.

At the time Hawfi was living in Salt Lake City, Utah, was no longer employed as a

prosecutor and was working for a private company.
114.

On Novenlber 26,1986, anticipating whcrc thc hcaring might Icad, Haws wrcltc

Erblmd, who was still wilh the Kootewai County Prosecutor's Office, asking hiin to personaliy

find and send Haws a copy of all of his file notcs, particularly rcqucsting the notcs of the June
24,1980 task force meeting where Blliort first dcscribcd Dr. Brady's autopsy rindings.
115.

liaws' revicw of his prior notcs undoubtedly refreshed his recollection, iT not

confirmod his mcmory, that the Ale notes contained exculpatory evidence and information
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trieahle to Dr. Brady, which impeached the pathologist's trial tcstimony, which undermined the
theory uf jurisdictional proof argued by Haws to the court and jury, and which were never
rcvcaled to Pwadis or his dcfcnse counsel, prior to, during or since Plaintiff's criminal tsial.
116.

Appreciating how the revelation of these file notes in a habcas c,orpusproceedings

would likcly have vcused Tlaintiffs conviction 1.0 be set asidc, Haws not only continued to hide
the information, but promoted and assisted suppression of the notcs through a motion to quash
the subpwna, successfully made by Lynn Thomas, thc Idaho Deputy Attorncy General then
handling the state's case.
117.

No longer cloaked with the disclosure dile~milsor immunities of a prosecutorial

advocatc, kliiws clvcrl y recognized that his notes held the key to freedom for Paradis, and knew
or should have apprcciatcd that he had the responsibility of at least w ordinary and prudent.
citizen to disclo~ethe exculpatory notes to Thonias, the fedcral court, Paradis md his counsel.

I t8.

In breach of thdt duty, Haws madc a negligent, iT not dclibcrate choice, or

continued secrecy, with rccklcss and willfir1 disregard for thc consequences to Paradis and with
the outrageous and ~naliciousinlent of perpetuating the profound deprivation of PI'laintifT's
freedom, therehy inflicting severe emotional distress upon Paadis.

119. Hild Hpwp electcd and pursued the righi and prudcnt choice of disclosing his
exculpatory notcs and the evidence they retlcct, it is likely Pilradis would havc been saved the
punishmel~lof 14 more ycars irt prison, including nine years on dcath row.
120.

Ihroughout his invc>lvemcntin the Paradis and Mhron cascs, both when serving

as a prt>Becutorand ,after, IIaws made repaatcd public and extra-judicial statements to a variety of

news media outlcts.
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He nude and volunteered these sstitements kt> influence puhlic opinion and

cnhancc his own statute and sclf-imagc, without any cloak of prosecuturiui inmunity and with
no privilege or obligation to do so.
122.

Repeatedly, it i s bclicvcd and thus allcgcd, hc made statements tkut were

knowingly firlse or made with reckless disregard for the iruth, which pqetuatttcrt his contrived
and unsuppo~ttibletheories as discussed herein, : i d which consistently rust both Plaintiff and his
claims of innocence in a ralse light.
123.

Plaintiff bclicvcs that discovety in this case will further reveal the detirils and

specifics instances of Haws' defamation nf Paradis, and leave is rcscrvcd to amcnd this
Complaint when such infomution becomes available.
124.

As thc dircct and proximatc result of thc foregoing tortuol~sconduct, Plaintiff kus

suffered, and continues to suffer, loss, injury and damage, as nwre pafliculittly desmibed
hereinbelow.

DAMAGES, COSTS AND FEES
125.

Thc following paragraphs arc hcrcby incorporated as to each and every count,

claim and cause of aciion stated herein.
126.

As a result of the wrongs described herein, Paradis lost every valuabie possession

he owned. Normal life,

that phrwe has meaning lo free citi~ennsin this country, stoppcd for

Don Pwadis on June 23, 11)80.For over 20 yews he was deprived of the ability to earn income,
build a profitable career, acquire a home, marry, have children, accumulate assets, acquire the
cducation, skill and work cxpc~~cncc
csscntial to cconotnic growth and security and achievc
almost everything by which civilized societies typically measure material success.
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Sincc his rclcasc from incarceration, Paradis hicv had very little succcss obtaining

and holding jobs. He is without the skills ncccssary to participate in a modem workforce.
Despite the judicial invalidation of his conviction, the notorieiy of his casc and thc label of being
an ex-convict haunt. him at every turn. He has ncvcr obtained, and probably will never oecure,
amploymcnt wldch provides much more then a subsistence incomc. Having failcd to contribute
income withholdings for two dccadcs, hc is currently ineligible for any form of Social Sccurjty
bcncfits. Although IIOW over the age of 54, the pro8pects of rctircmcnt are virtually non-existent
for Donald Parudis.
127.

Plaintiff has susteined. and will in the future sustain, cconomic losses well in

excess of thc jurisdictionrl threshold for this Court.

128.

Plaintirf has Further sustained, and wiH in the future sustain, pain, sufl'eting, gr~cf,

menial anguish, loss of idctitity and othcr non-economic damages well in excess of thc
jurisdictional threshold for this Court.
129.

By rcason of the matters described herein?Plainliff has heen ccompcllcd to obtain

legal counsel both to secure his frcedotn from unlawful imprisonment and to pro$ecute this
action, atid has incurred, and continues to incur, enormous legal fccs and costs that are both an
economic damage caused by the Defendants' wrongdoing and an expense of this litigation.
130.

Plaint~ffis cntitled to an award of his fees and cost^ in the successful resolution of

this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and every other pn)viriion afstatc and fcdcral
law afrording such nwnrds.

131.

..

The conduct altribulllble to the Defendants herein was an cxtrcme deviation fi-om

,
d~~eplable
standards, committcd

with malicc and reckless disregard for the likely consequences,

by reason or which, Plaintiff' reserves leave to hcrcaftcr mend this Complaint, puwu~ntto Idaho

-
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Code, Section 6-l6M to add a prayer for punitivc damagcs on each Count, claim and cause of
action and against each Defendant.

W t W F O R E , PlnintiTr prays for relief as follows:

I
I

I

I
I

A.

For eco~lolnic&wages in a sum nor lcss than $5,000,000;

B.

For non-economic damages in a sum not less than $15,000,000;

C.

For prejudgment interest on all damagcs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and

cvety other provision or Federal and statc law providing for such rclicf.
D.

For awmd of his reasonable attomcy fccs and expenses; and

E.

For all othct relief, legal and equitable, appropriate to this action.

DATED tl~isp&Y

OI ~ p " , Z ~ U .

MAUK & HUKGOYNE

urn
-.

-

Williilin L.Mauk, otthc Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DEM,ANI) KOR JURYTRIAL
Plainliffrcqucsts a jury trial on all clailns and causes triahlc by jury, pursui~~t
to Rule 38,
Federal Rules or Civil Pmcsdr~re.

-
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L Y N N m E L. MCHENRY, J.D.
CLAIMS
MANAGER

June 30.2003

Kootenai County
Erika Ellingson
501 Government Way
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83816
RE:

CLAIM NUMBER:
INSURED:
CLAIMANT:
DOL:

2001019301
Kootenai County
Donald Paradis
0411012001

Dear Ms. Ellingson:
This will acknowledge receipt of the Complaint filed by Donald M. Paradis against
Kootenai County and its current: and former employees. Glenn Walker, D. Marc Haws,
Peter Erbland, and George Elliott, filed in the United States District Court for the District
of Idaho under case number CIV-03-150-S-LMB.
In reviewing the allegations of the Complaint, it is noted that the actions which give rise
to this controversy surround Mr. Paradis' arrest and conviction in 1980 and 1981.
According to the Complaint, Kootenai County emplovees Haws. Erbland and Elliott
withheld exculpatory hvidence, and conspired with forensic pathologist Dr. William
Bradv
false testimonv and evidence to a local maaistrate durina the
- to present
.
preliminary hearing, and, ultim&ely, to the jury, resulting in hk conviction."~ccording
- to
the Complaint, these actions violated Mr. Paradis' con&tutional rights and were
undertaken in direct contravention of the United States Supreme Court's rulinas in
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). According to t h a ~ o m ~ l a i nthe
t, ~oitenai
County ProsecutingAttorney and the Sheriff displayed and reflected a deliberate
indifference and conscious disregard to the Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Further, the
Complaint alleges that, in 1996, handwritten notes authored by Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney Marc Haws were discovered which contained exculpatory evidence which
could have been utilized at the criminal trial to impeach the testimony of Dr. Brady.
According to the Complaint, this information would have materially aitered the ouicome
of the criminal case. The Comolaint alleaes Kootenai Countv failed to adeauatelv
supervise or train its employees, and, bydoing so, demonstrated a deliberate
indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional righis secured by the Brady v, Maryland
decision. The Complaint further contends that Kootenai County employees Haws,

-
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Erbland, and Elliott continued their conspiracy with Dr. William Brady to defeat Plaintiff's
efforts to obtain post-conviction relief. It is alleged the actions of the County and its
employees were intentional, deliberate, malicious, and negligent.
According to the Complaint, the alleged wrongful conduct of the County and its
employees was fully exposed through an evidentiary hearing before Federal Judge
Edward J. Lodge. Through those proceedings, on March 14,2000, Judge Lodge found
that Mr. Paradis' constitutional rights to a fair trial had been violated, and, for that
reason, his conviction was set aside. Judge Lodge's ruling was appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and affirmed on March 5, 2001. See Paradis v. Arave, 240
F.3d 1109 (gthCir. 2001). Thereafter, on April 10, 2001, the Kootenai County
Prosecuting ~ d o m e ydismissed all homicide charges and Mr. Paradis was released.
Thereafter, on October 9,2001, a notice of tort claim was filed alleging various
violations of state and federal law. The present Complaint was filed April 9, 2003.
I direct your attention to the definitions, coverage, and exclusions sections of the 2001
ICRMP policy, where, at 5 11, Comprehensive General Liability and Law Enforcement
Liability coverage is provided. The policy reads:

COVERAGE A. Comprehensive General Liability. We
agree, subject to the terms and conditions of this Coverage,
to pay on your behalf those sums which you become legally
obligated to pay as damages for personal injury or
property damage which arise out of an occurrence during
the Policy Period.

COVERAGE C. Law Enforcement Liability. We agree,
subject to the terms and conditions of this Coverage, to pay
on your behalf all sums which you become obligated to pay
by reason of errors, omissions, or negligent acts arising out
of the performance of your duties while providing law
enforcement services or the administration of first aid
resulting in personal injury or property damage during the
Policy Period.
The policy defines controlling terms as follows:

1.

8.

'

"Accident" means an unexpected happening without
intention or design.

"Occurrence" means an accident or a continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions which

result in personal injury or property
damage during the Policy Period. All
personal injuries to one or more persons
andlor property damage arising out of
an accident or a continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions shall be deemed
one occurrence.
The policy also identifies certain exclusions, which are applicable to this claim as
follows:
Liability Coverage under the Comprehensive General
Liability Insuring Agreements does not apply:

2.

3.

To personal injury or property damage
resulting from an act or omission
intended or expected from the
standpoint of any insured to
cause personal injury or
property damage. This
exclusion applies even if the
personal injury or property
damage is of a different kind or
degree, or is sustained by a
different person or property, than
that intended or expected. This
exclusion shall not apply to
personal injury resulting from
the use of reasonable force to
protect persons or property, or in
the performance of a duty of the
insured.
To personal injury or property damage
resulting from an act or omission
outside the course and scope of
employment and any act
performed with malice or criminal
intent. This exclusion applies
regardless of whether any
insured is actually charged with,
or convicted of, a crime.

The ICRMP policy also provides errors and omissions coverage at § IV of the policy.
The insuring agreement reads:
COVERAGE A. We agree, subject to the terms and
conditions of this Coverage, to pay on your behalf all sums
which you shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of any claim which is first made against
you during the Policy Period, arising out of any wrongful act
by you.
The relevant definitions to E & 0 coverage read:
The following definitions are applicable to the Errors and
Omissions Insuring Agreement of this Policy:
1.

"Bodily injury" means physical injury t i dny
person, including death, and any
mental anguish or mental
suffering associated with or
arising from such physical injury.

2.

"Claim" means a demand received by
you for money damages alleging
a wrongful act by you. No claim
exists where the only monetary
damages sought or demanded
are costs of suit andtor attorney's
fees.
3.

"Damages" means
compensation awarded by
judgment or through settlement;
and costs, charges and expenses
incurred in the pursuit or defense
of a claim, if ordered by the court
or agreed to through settlement.

4.

"First Made" means the earlier
of the following times:
a.

When you first give written
notice to us that a claim
has been made against
you; or

b.

5.

When you first give written
notice to us of specific
circumstances involving a
particular person or entity
which may result in a
claim. Reports of
incidents or circumstances
made by you to us as part
of risk management or
loss control services, shall
not be considered notice
of a claim.

"Property Damagen means physical damage
to or destruction of tangible
property, including loss of use.

6.

"~rongfulAct" means the
negligent performance of or
failure to perform a legal duty or
responsibility arising out of public
office or position.

The E & 0 Coverage also provides certain exclusions, which read:
The Errors and Omissions Insuring Agreement does not
cover any claim:

2.

Arising out of any dishonest, fraudulent,
criminal, malicious, deliberate or
intended wrongful act committed
by you or at your direction.

3.

Resulting from an act or omission
outside the course and scope of
employment.

4.

For bodily injury or property damage, as
defined in this Section.

5.

Resulting from a wrongful act intended or ,
expected from the standpoint of
any insured to cause damages.
This exclusion applies even if the

'

damages claimed are of a
different kind or degree than that
intended or expected.

11.

Resulting from a continuing wrongful act
which commences prior to the
retroactive date set forth in the
Declarations of this Policy.

12.

Arising out of law enforcement activities or the
performance of law enforcement
duties.

The Plaintiff, by his Complaint, has alleged willful and intentional conduct on the part of
both Kootenai County and its employees. We recognize the Complaint also alleges the
County and its employees were negligent. As referenced above, the ICRMP policy
specifically excludes coverage for any intentional, malicious conduct, or acts taken outside
the course and scope of an insured's employment, which cause bodily injury or property
damage. Additionally, the ICRMP policy specifically excludes coverage under the Errors
and Omissions section for any claims seeking recovery for bodily injuries or law
enforcement activities. The E & 0 section also excludes coverage for acts which
commence prior to the retroactive date, which is identified in the policy declarations as
November 29, 1985. Finally, from the Complaint, it appears the Plaintiff may seek punitive
damages, which are excluded under the lCRMP policy.
Because the Complaint does include allegations of negligence, which could potentially
describe a covered claim under the Comprehensive General Liability Insuring Agreements,
ICRMP will, in accordance with the terms and conditions of its policy, defend Kootenai
County and its current and former employees, Glenn Walker, Marc Haws, Peter Erbland,
and George Elliott. By extending a defense, ICRMP does not waive, and reserves all
rights under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, and specifically reserves its
right to deny any obligation to indemnify Kootenai County, Glenn Walker, Marc Haws,
Peter Erbland, or George Elliott for any claims which are currently pled, and which do not
describe a covered claim under the terms and conditions of the ICRMP policy.
Additionally, ICRMP does not waive its right to withdraw its defense of Kootenai County,
Haws, Erbland, and Elliott, should it be determined that coverage under the ICRMP policy
does not exist for the claims set forth in the Complaint.

If you have any questions concerning the above, and our position with respect to ICRMP's
duty to defend or indemnify Kootenai County, and its former and current employees,
please advise.

Clhims Manager
cc:

.

John Goedde, Agent
John Nichols, AMS
Chris Wotton, Lloyds
Randy Robinson, Northland
Richard D. Ferguson, Director

EXHIBIT C

RECEIVED
3'85 Washington Street
Mail Code 103N
St. Paul, MN 55102

February 13,2006

CERTIFIED MAIL

Ms. Lynnette McHenry
Claim Manager
ldaho Counties Risk Management Program
3100 Vista Avenue, Suite 300
Boise, ID 83705
Re:

Our Insured:
ICRMPIKootenai County
Plaintiff:
Don Paradis
Our Claim Number: 23,AA101263-44
Date of Loss:
June 23, 2980
Claim made:
October 9,2001

Dear Ms. McHenry:
This letter acknowledges receipt of the amended Complaint in the matter of Don Paradis v.
Kootenai Count%,filed in United States District Court fpr the District of Idaho, Case No. CIV03150 on April 9, 2003.
This matter was referred to Northfield Insurance Company for consideration under Policies
M I 0 1127 and AA101263. The policies provide various excess coverages to I.C.R.M.P. as
follows:
Policy No. AA101127 provides comprehensive general liability coverage, on an occurrence
basis, with a policy period of December 31, 1994 to December 31, 1995.
Policy No. AA101263 provides errors and omissions coverage, on a claims-made basis,
with a policy period of October I,
2000 to October I,2001, and a retroactive date of
November 29, 1985.
Both coverages are subject to a self insured retention of $150,000.
That facts and important dates are as follows;

e

June 23, 1980, Don Paradis was arrested and incarcerated on a charge of murder.
1981, Paradis was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
1996 his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment following claims that investigators
and prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence.
April 10, 2001, following appeals, the court commuted Paradis sentence and released him
from prison.
October 9; 2001, Paradis filed a Notice of Claim against Kootenai County.

Ms. Lynnette McHenry
February 17,2006
Page 2
April 9, 2003, Paradis filed suit against Kootenai County prosecutors and deputies for false
arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and withholding exculpatory evidence in
violation of his civil rights of due process and unreasonable arrest and seizure.

1 draw your attention to the ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY (PE-OCC
JAN. 94), which states:
GENERAL INSURING AGREEMENTS
SECTION II-COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
INSURING AGREEMENTS
A - COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY: Underwriters
hereby agree, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions
hereunder mentioned, to indemnity the Assured for all sums,
including expenses, all as more fully defined by the term ultimate
net loss, which the Assured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages imposed by law because of bodily injury, property
damage, personal injury, advertising injury, products liability and or
completed operations, hosVliquor liability or incidental malpractice
which result from an occurrence and which occur during the policy
period. . . .
C - LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY: Underwriters hereby agree,
subiect to the limitations, terms and conditions hereunder
mentioned, to indemnify the Assured for all sums which the Assured
shall be obligated to pay by reason of errors, omissions or negligent
acts arising out of the performance of the Assured's duties while
acting as a law enforcement official or officer in the regular course of
public employment as hereinafter defined, arising out of any
occurrence from any cause on account of Personal Injury, Bodily
Injury, Property Damage, Violation of Civil Rights or First Aid,
happening during the period of this insurance. . .
EXCLUSIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTION I1
THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY - to any claim, whether direct
or consequential, or for any cause of action which is covered under
any other Section of this policy or
A. to personal injury or property damage which the Assured
intended or expected or reasonably could have expected.
Please refer to the ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY for

Ms. Lynnette McHenry
February 17,2006
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the definition of "occurrence."
It is our position there is no coverage for any injuries or damages claimed by Don
Paradis under SECTION II,COVERAGE A - COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
or COVERAGE C LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY of the ALL LINES
AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY, because the injuries or damages:

-

Did not arise from an occurrence during the period of this insurance; or
Were expected or intended from the standpoint of Kootenai County or their
employees.
Next, please direct your attention to SECTION IV - ERRORS AND OMISSIONS, of the
ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY, which states:
INSURING AGREEMENT
If during the Policy Period, any Claim is first made against the
Assured for a Wrongful Act, Underwriters will indemnify the
Assured, for all Loss incurred by the Assured by reason of any
Wrongful Act . . .
Please refer to Endorsement No. 14,which states:
Effective date of this endorsement is October 1, 2000. Endorsement
No. 14.. .
Section IV retroactive dates
Kootenai County - November 29,1985 for the first $1,000,000
any
one claim, December 31,1994 for the next $1,00O,OW
any one claim
any one claim. . . .
and October 1, 2000 for the remaining $4,000,000

I next refer you to EXCLUSIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTION IV, which states:
THIS SECTION SHALL NOT APPLY - to any Claim for damages,
whether direct or consequential or for any cause of action which is
covered under any other Section of this policy or to any Claim . . .

B.

brought about or contributed to by fraud, dishonesty or criminal
act of any Assured: . . .

G.

resulting from an occurrence which commences prior to the
Retroactive Date set out in Declaration 4 of November 29,

1985

H.

for bodily injury or property damage;

Ms. Lynnette McHenry
February 17,2006
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I.

arising out of law enforcement activities;

Please refer to the ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY for
the definitions of "claim first made" and "wrongful act."
It is our position that there is no coverage for Kootenai Colrnty under SECTION IV

-

ERRORS AND OMISSIONS of the ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY, for
any injuries or damages claimed by Don Paradis because:

* the clairn was not first made against the Assured during the policy period of
October 1,2000, to October 1,2001; or
the claim was brought about by fraud, dishonesty or criminal acts; or
the claim resulted from an occurrence that commenced in 1980 and 1981, prior to
the retroactive date of November 29, 1985; or
the claim arose out of bodily injury; or
the claim arose out of law enforcement activities.
Because there is no coverage for Kootenai County under the ALL LINES AGGREGATE
INSURANCE POLICY, Northfield Insurance Company is unable to consider indemnification
of I.C.R.M.P. for any damages awarded or sums incurred in the defense of Kootenai County
in this lawsuit.
. -

Should you'have any questions regarding this matter or wish to discuss this matter further,
please contact me at 651-310-4427.

Sincerely,

Erik Martensen
Technical Specialist
Northfield lnsurance

EXHIBIT D

ICMP

...mote than-jut

~

L Y N N E ~ L.
E MCHENRY

ASSOCIATE GENERALCOUNSEL
&CLAIMS
MANAGER

March 2.2003

Erik Martensen
Technical Specialist, Specialty Claims
Northfield Insurance Company
385 Washington Street
Mail Code 103 N
St. Paul, MN 55109-1309
RE:

CLAIM NUMBER:
INSURED:
CLAIMANT:
DOL:

2001019301
Kootenai County
Donald Paradis
1985-2001

Dear Mr. Martensen:
We have received your letter dated Februarv 13, 2006 reaardina the above-entitled
matter. In your correspondence, Northland lnsurance combany & taking the position
that, due to various exclusions and conditions within the ICRMP and Northland
policies, that coverage does not exist in the Paradis litigation for Kootenai County
and any of that entity's present and former employees. I must advise you that I
believe your position is mistaken and should be reconsidered.
As background, I am enclosing for your file, a copy of the reservation of rights letter
which ICRMP provided to Kootenai County on November 5,2003 when this case was
first filed. As you can see from the reservation of rights letter, ICRMP took the
position that many of the claims in the Paradis Complaint were not entitled to
coverage for various reasons, including the intentional tort exclusions you have cited
as well as the operation of the retroactive date. However, as noted in the reservation
of rights letter, the Paradis Complaint is not limited to intentional torts. Instead, the
Complaint alleges the acts of Kootenai County and its employees were negligent.
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According to Mr. Paradis, this negligence caused his false imprisonment and
resultant emotional distress associated with over twenty years of imprisonment.
ICRMP took the position that, while it was questionable that a duty to indemnify
would arise, a duty to defend did exist since the torts of false imprisonment and
infliction of emotional distress are continuing torts. Because of this, the torts were
ongoing when Kootenai first became an ICRMP insured in 1985 and continued until
Paradis was released from prison in April of 2001. It is important to note that, from
1985 until Mr. Paradis was released in 2001, Kootenai County was, at all times, an
ICRMP insured.
In Idaho, an insurer's duty to defend is a separate and much broader duty than its
obligation to indemnify.
Kootenai Co. v. Western Caualty & Sur. Co., 113
ldaho 908, 750 P.2d 87 (1988). The ldaho Supreme Court has consistently ruled
that the duty to defend arises upon the filing of a Complaint whose allegations, in
whole or in part, read broadly, reveal a potential for liability that would be covered by
the insured's policy. See Amco Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur lnv. Co., 140 ldaho 733, 101
P.3d 226 (2004), Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 ldaho 367'48 P.3d 1256 (2002);
Const. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 135 ldaho 680, 23 P.3d 142
(2001). Mindful of this standard, ICRMP reviewed the Paradis complaint and,
considering the allegations of negligence and the existence of a continuing tort, came
to the conclusion that the complaint, read broadly, described a claim which was
potentially entitled to coverage under the ICRMP policy. For that reason, ICRMP has
defended this case under a reservation of rights.
ICRMP's treatment of the negligence and emotional distress claims as continuing
torts must also be considered in light of the District Court rulings in the Paradis
matter resolving various motions to dismiss.
In his September29, 2004
Memorandum Decision and Order, the Honorable 8. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge for
the United States District Court for the District of ldaho, concluded that various state
law claims, including emotional distress and false imprisonment were not entitled to
dismissal under the statute of limitations as those claims constituted continuing torts
which did not accrue until Mr. Paradis was released from prison. In light of this ruling,
it is apparent that ICRMP correctly assessed its duty to defend in this case and has
acted appropriately. This ling also demonstrates that your decision to deny
coverage under the Comprehensive General Liability Insuring Agreement is
erroneous. False imprisonment and emotional distress caused by alleged negligent
acts describe claims which are potentially entitled to coverage under the ICRMP
policy. The retroactive date does not bar coverage for these claims as they did not
accrue until April of 2001. Accordingly, I would ask that you reassess your position
and withdraw your February 13,2006 denial of coverage.

Erik Martensen
March 2,2006
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I look forward to your prompt response.

cc:

Richard D. Ferguson, Director

EXHIBIT E

RECEIVED

MAR 2 O 2006
ICRMP
385 Washington Street
Mail Code 103N
St. Paul, MN 55102

March 15, 2006

CERTIFIED MAIL

Ms. Lynnette McHenry
Claim Manager
ldaho Counties Risk Management Program
3100 Vista Avenue, Suite 300
Boise, ID 83705
Re:

Our Insured:
ICRMPIKootenai County
Plaintiff:
Don Paradis
Our Claim Number: 23,AAI 01263-44
Date of Loss:
June 23,1980
Claim made:
October 9,2001

Dear Ms. McHenry:
I am in receipt of and thank you foryour letterof March2, 2003, in which you'outline your
position that Northfield Insurance owes indemnification for the Paradis litigation. As you
requested, wehave reconsidered our position regarding coverage.
. . . . ,..
. ... . .,.;,.:. , .. .. . .- :. . .. , ..
< ,, .
.
.
.
That facts and important datesare as follows:'
,

#

".

,

,

.

* On June 23, 1980, Don Paradis was arrested and incarcerated on a charge of murder.
In 1981. Paradis was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
In 1996; his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment following claims that investigators
and prosecutors withheld excul~atowevidence.
On April 10, 2001, following appeals; the court commuted Paradis sentence and released
him from prison.
On October 9, 2001, Paradis filed a Notice of Claim against Kootenai County.
On April 9, 2003, Paradis filed suit against Kootenai County prosecutors and deputies for
false arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and withholding exculpatory
evidence in violation of his civil rights of due process and unreasonable arrest and seizure.
We are aware of the decision by Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge for the United States
District Court for the district of Idaho, for which the Judge ruled that Mr. Paridis' claims
constituted a continuing tort and were not barred by statute of limitation defenses.
Insurance law is.governed:by.:state insurance contract law, not federal law. The statute of
limitations principles do not guide d
insura~~e:cov,eragepurpmses.
., .
. .
. ... :
:.; . .. .; .. .:. . i!.:;:,.
:;. -'.;:.!.::' " ! ' . .:.' " .'.'
It is.the ~ause.,of
the Ipss..and not:th
under'the policy. Northfield Insurance is only liable under an occurrence policy for an event or
. .
,
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Ms. Lynnette McHenry
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accident which occurred during the policy period. Northfield lnsurance is not liable for claims
arising out of an event or accident which occurred prior to the effective date of the insurance
coverage, even though damages and claims continued to accrue from this cause during the later
period of coverage. Applachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty MM. Ins. Corp., 507 F. Supp. 59 (D.C. Pa.
1981).
Ne~therthe federal civil rights claims nor the state law claims under ldaho law would constitute
an occurrence during the policy period. Please direct your attention to Kootenai County v.
Western Casualty & Surety Co., 113 ldaho 908, 914-15, 750 P.2d 87, 93-94 (1988). A county
sheriff, acting upon a writ of execution, conducted a sale of property, but failed to comply with the
statutory notice requ~rements,subjecting him to civil penalties payable to the aggrieved party.
Following the six month redemption period, the sheriff issued the deed for the property to the
purchasers, as required by statute. However, during this redemption period, Kootenai County
secured an occurrence policy from Lloyd's and made a claim for coverage under the policy,
asserting that the delivery of the deed, in conjunction with the earlier improper sale, constituted a
single integrated occurrence. The ldaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the
only wrongful act and occurrence was the improperly conducted sale. The court stated:
The improper execution of the sale is not an event covered by the Llovd's
. .wolicv since it
occurred almost six months prior to the effective date of the policy. An insurer I's not liable
for claims arisinq out of an event or accident which occurred wrior to the effective date of
the insurance coveraqe, even thouqh damaaes and claims continue to accrue from this
cause durina the later weriod of coveraae.
Similarly, in City of Erie, Pa. v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156 (3'* cir. 1997), the court
concluded that a claim of malicious prosecution occurred when the underlying criminal charges
were filed, for purposes of determining insurance coverage, and not at the later time that the
action was ultimately favorably terminated to the benefit of the claimant.
After further evaluation, we have determined that our position regarding coverage, as outlined in
our February 13, 2006 letter, remains unchanged. Also should you wish to further discuss this
matter, please contact me at 651-310-4427 (direct dial line).
Sincerely,

Erik Martensen
Technical Specialist
Northfield lnsurance
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June 27,2006

Erik Martensen
Technical Specialist
Northland Insurance
385 Washington Street
Mail Code 103N
St. Paul, MN 55102
Re:

Paradis v. Kootenai County
ICRMP Claim No. 2001028381
Northland Claim No. 23,AA101263-44

Dear Erik:
As you are aware, ICRMP has throughout this litigation provided a defense to its
insureds, Kootenai County, Mark Haws, George Elliott, and Peter Erbland in the abovereferenced litigation. The defense has been extended under a reservation of rights.
Throughout the litigation, ICRMP has provided Northland with regular reports detailing
the status of the litigation and the defense costs which were being incurred.
Under the reinsurance policy purchased from Northland, ICRMP maintained a
$150,000.00 self insured retention (SIR). The SIR included defense costs. To date, the
defense costs incurred in the Paradis litigation total $423,305.33. Because the SIR has
been exhausted, Northland's obligation to reimburse ICRMP for defense costs
exceeding the SIR has now arisen. Accordingly, I am enclosing an interim billing for
reimbursement of the litigation costs paid by ICRMP through June 23, 2006.
Please be advised that pursuant to the Court's ruling on the Motions for Summary
Judgment filed on behalf of the insureds, all claims against Peter Erbland have been
dismissed. Additionally, many of the claims against Kootenai County, George Elliott,
and Mark Haws were dismissed. However, because the Court retained some of the
causes of action against the County, Mr. Elliott and Mr. Haws, the litigation is ongoing.
Trial is scheduled for October of 2006 and is expected to last an entire month.
Due to the exhaustion of the SIR, Northland's obligation to reimburse ICRMP for
defense costs will continue through trial. Additionally, should the case proceed to trial,
Northland will be obligated to indemnify ICRMP for any adverse verdict entered against
Kootenai County, Mr. Elliott, or Mr. Haws finding them liable for a covered claim.

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMEMPROGRIM.
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9 FAX(208) 336.2100

Erik Martensen
June 27,2006
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In light of the foregoing, ICRMP is inviting Northland to participate in discussions
surrounding the litigation strategy and potential settlement of the litigation. Considering
the litigation costs w e will continue to incur, it is prudent a t this time to discuss the
meriis of seeking a mediated o r negotiated settlement.
Additionally, a decision needs to be made concerning whether ICRMP and Northland
will s e e k reimbursement from the insureds for litigation costs relating to the defense of
clearly non-covered claims. As you a r e aware, ICRMP has defended the entire lawsuit,
despite the fact there are claims which are not entitled to coverage. ICRMP was
required to proceed in this fashion d u e to the well-established principle that where a
Complaint describes a potentially covered claim, the duty to defend extends to the
entire Complaint, including the excluded claims. See Primrose Operating Company
v. National American Insurance Company, 382 F3d. 546 (5" Cir. 2004); United
Sewices Automobile Association v. Morris, 154 Arizona 113, 741 P2d. (1987). A
growing numbers of courts have recognized the inequity of this requirement and have
recognized the insurer's right to seek reimbursement from its insured for defense costs
relating to clearly excluded claims.
Due to the fact the SIR h a s been exhausted, I invite Northland's input and comment
concerning whether the insured should be notified that the company intends to s e e k
reimbursement for the defense costs. described above. Additionally, in a n effort t o
protect Northland's rights in this case, I welcome your comments concerning future
defense strategy, including mediation o r settlement discussions.
I look forward to your prompt response.

& Claims Manager

Cc: Richard Ferguson, Executive Director

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
3100 Vista Avenue, Ste 300
PO Box 15116
Boise, ID 83715
208-246-8216
208-246-8200 (fax)

INTERIM
REINSURANCE BILLING STATEMENT
Date:

June 23,2006

Reinsurer:

Erik Martensen
Technical Specialist
Northland Insurance
385 Washington Street
Mail Code 103N
St. Paul, MN 55102

Adjuster:

Lynnette L. McHenry
Associate General Counsel &
Claims Manager

Claim #s:

2001028381
2001022516
2001019301
2001022524

Claimant:
Insured:

Donald Paradis
KOOTENAI COUNTY

Total Paid:
Less: SIR:
Less: Deductible:
Less: Othec

$423,305.33
($150,000.00)'
($ 5,000.00)

AMOUNT DUE:

$268,305.33

--

Please send your check to the Attention of ICRMP Accounting Department.
Thank you.
Cc: ICRMP Accounting Dept.

EXHIBIT G

P.O. Box 64805
St. Paul. MN 55164

CERTlFlED MAIL

July 20,2006
ICRMP
Lynette McHenry, Claim Manager
3100 Vista Avenue, Suite 300
Boise, ID 83705
Re:

Insured Member:
Plaintiff:
Claim Number:
Occurrence/Arrest Date:

Kootenai County
Donald Paradis
23AA101263-44
June 23,1980

Dear Ms. McHenry:

I am in receipt of and thank you for your letter dated June 27,2006 for which you cite
case law supporting your position and submit an interim reimbursement request to
Northfield lnsurance Company.
We have reviewed this matter, including the case law you cited. Our coverage
position, as outlined in our letter dated March 15, 2006, remains unchanged. Imust
therefore respectfully deny your requept for reimbursement.
Northfield lnsurance Company acknowledges that ICRMP has invited us to be involved
in the defense along with ICRMP, and to participate in the voluntary mediation.
Because there is no coverage, we have no obligation to indemnify ICRMP and we
therefore decline the opportunities extended.

!f you would like to further discuss this matter, please contact me at (651) ,3104427
(direct line).
Sincerely.

Erik Martensen, AIC
Technical Specialist
Northfield lnsurance Company
Tel: (800) 328-5972, Ext. 04427
Fax: (866) 842-9181

Donald J. Farley
ISB #I561 ; djf@hallfarley.com
Bryan A. Nickels
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W:VV-241.14\Answer.doc

Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies,
properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
I DAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 06171 12
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

VS.
(Jury Trial Demanded)

NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES,
Defendant.

COMES NOW defendant, Northland Insurance Companies, incorrectly identified in
plaintiff Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters' Complaint and Demand for
Jury Trial ("Complaint"), and whose proper name and identity herein is Northfield Insurance
Company ("Northfield"), by and through its counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht &
Blanton, P.A., in answer to such Complaint on file herein, answers, alleges, and states as follows:

&&%ER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 1

FIRST DEFENSE
Each and every allegation of the plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim for relief
against defendant Northfield.

SECOND DEFENSE
I.
Each and every allegation contained in plaintiffs Complaint, and each and every cause of
action, is denied unless specifically admitted in this defense.

11.
With respect to paragraph I1 of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits only
that it is a corporation engaged in the business of selling insurance in the State of Idaho.

111.
With respect to paragraphs I11 and IV of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield
admits that at all relevant times, it had a Certificate of Authority issued by the Idaho Department
of Insurance authorizing Northfield to transact the business of insurance in the State of Idaho,
and has engaged in the business of selling insurance policies within the State of Idaho.

IV.
With respect to paragraph IX of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits that in
April, 2003, Kootenai County and certain employees or former employees of Kootenai County
were named as defendants in a civil lawsuit filed by Donald Paradis in the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho.

v.
With respect to paragraph XI of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits that
plaintiff notified Northfield of the Paradis lawsuit and Northfield received a copy of the Paradis
Complaint.
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VI.
With respect to paragraph XI11 of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits only
that, on or about March 6, 2006, it received a copy of an unsigned letter dated June 30, 2003,
from Lynette McHenry to Erika Ellingson regarding 1 d a . Counties Risk Management
Program's defense of Kootenai County.

VII.
With respect to paragraph XVI of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits only
that Erik Martensen addressed correspondence to Lynnette McHenry by letter dated February 13,
2006; defendant Northfield further states that the document identified as Exhibit C to plaintiffs
Complaint speaks for itself.

VIII.
With respect to paragraph XVIl of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits
only that Lynnette McHe~vyaddressed correspondence to Erik Martensen by letter dated March
2, 2003 (which was a typographical error and apparently intended to be dated March 2, 2006),
and that Erik Martensen addressed correspondence to Lynnette McHenry by letter dated March
15, 2006; defendant Northfield further states that the documents identified as Exhibit D & E to
plaintiffs Complaint speak for themselves

IX.
With respect to paragraphs XVIII and XU(: of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield
admits only that that Lynnette McHenry addressed correspondence to Erik Martensen by letter
dated June 27,2006; defendant Northfield further states that the document identified as Exhibit F
to plaintiffs Complaint speaks for itself.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 3

X.
With respect to paragraph XX of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits only
that Erik Martensen addressed correspondence to Lynette McHenry by letter dated July 20,2006;
defendant Northfield further states that the document identified as Exhibit G to plaintiffs
Complaint speaks for itself.

THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintifi's claim is barred under the doctrines of laches, waiver, unclean hands, andlor
estoppel under the circumstances asserted in the Complaint.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages, if any.

FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has not complied with all conditions precedent to bringing this action or to make
a claim for benefits under any policy of insurance.

SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff, through its own acts or omissions, has breached the cooperation clause under
any applicable policy of insurance.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs alleged damages and the claims and causes of action against the Kootenai
County defendants in the Paradis lawsuit are and were not covered, or are otherwise excluded,
under the insurance policy issued to plaintiff by defendant Northfield.
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EIGHTH DEFENSE
Defendant Northfield had no contractual duty or legal obligation to defend Kootenai
County or its employees in the Paradis lawsuit or to participate in any mediation or settlement of
the Paradis lawsuit.

NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff, at various time since plaintiff be4an insuring Kootenai County and its
employees, had other policies of indemnity or reimbursement insurance than the policy or
policies issued by defendant to plaintiff herein. Such policy or policies of insurance are primary
to any policy provided to plaintiff by defendant Northfield, andlor any policy provided by
defendant Northfield is excess or shares any monetary obligation to indemnify or reimburse
plaintiff on a pro rata basis with such other insurance. In asserting this defense, defendant
Northfield does not admit that any policy or policies of insurance issued by it provide coverage
to plaintiff for the defense costs incurred in or settlement of the Paradis lawsuit.

TENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs insureds, Kootenai County and/or its employees, had liability insurance other
than liability insurance provided by plaintiff, insuring against liability for the event, events,
occurrence or occurrences which gave rise to the Paradis lawsuit. Plaintiff either had no
coverage of Kootenai County and its employees, or if it is determined there was coverage,
plaintiffs insurance of Kootenai County and its employees named in the Paradis lawsuit was
either excess to or pro rata with such other insurance.

ELEVENTHDEFENSE
Defendant's breach of contract, if any, is excused by the plaintiffs preceding material
breach of contract.
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TWELFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is barred by the par01 evidence rule andlor by the
doctrine of integrated contracts.

THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff undertook the defense of Kootenai County and its employees and settled with
Paradis without contractual obligation to do so, and was therefore a volunteer. Defendant has no
obligation to indemnify or reimburse plaintiff.

RESERVATION OF DEFENSES
Defendant, by virtue of pleading a defense above, does not admit that said defense is an
"affirmative defense" within the meaning of applicable law, and Defendant does not thereby
assume a burden of proof or production not otherwise imposed upon it as a matter of law. In
addition, in asserting any of the above defenses, Defendant does not admit any fault,
responsibility, liability or damage but, to the contrary, expressly denies the same. Discovery has
yet to commence, the results of which may disclose the existence of facts supporting further and
additional defenses. Defendant, therefore, reserves the right to seek leave of this Court to amend
its Answer as it deems appropriate.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY PEES
In order to defend this action, defendant Northfield has been required to retain the
services of Hall, Farley, Obenecht & Blanton, P.A. to defend this matter, and is entitled to
recover its attorney fees and costs incurred herein, pursuant to Idaho Code
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8s

12-120, 12-121,

and 12-123, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and any other applicable statute, rule, or
regulation.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant
Northfield hereby demands trial by jury as to all issues so triable in this matter, by a jury of not
less than twelve (12) persons.

WHEREFORE, Northfield Insurance Company prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That plaintiffs Complaint and demand for jury trial be dismissed with prejudice

and that plaintiff takes nothing thereby;
2.

For judgment against plaintiff for defendant Northfield's costs and attorney fees

incurred in the defense of this matter; and
3.

For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper under the

circumstances.
DATED this 2day of October, 2006.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

~ 6 o r n e for
~ s Defendant Northfield
Insurance Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day of October, 2006, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO ?%%PLA~NT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL,
by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Phillip J. Collaer
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700
P. 0. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-5510

/
-

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
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Phillip J. Collaer, IS6 No. 3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
2 5 0 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, ldaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0
E-Mail: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS,

Case No. CV OC 0 6 1 71 12
Plaintiff,
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES,
a Minnesota corporation,

Defendant.

1

COMES NOW plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, Anderson,
Julian & Hull, and moves this Court, pursuant t o Rule 5 6 of the ldaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the ground
. .

that there is no genuine issue as t o any material fact and that plaintiff' is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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DATED this

a

day of November, 2006.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

BY

&
- ~.k-

Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17 day of November, 2006, 1 served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT by delivering the same t o each of the following attorneys of record, by
the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

Donald J. Farley
Bryan A. Nickels
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht &
Blanton, PA
702 W. Idaho, Suite 7 0 0
PO Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701-1 271
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585

C]
C]
C]
C]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Delivery

Attorneys for Defendant

&A.

(&lo&
Phillip J. Collaer
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Donald J. Farley
ISB #1561; djf@hallfarley.com
Bryan A. Nickels
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W.V.12-241 I4MSJ-Response doc

Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies,
Properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,
Plaintiff,

CaseNo. CV OC 0617112

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.
NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES,
Defendant.
COMES NOW the defendant, Northfield Insurance Company ("Northfield"), by and
through its undersigned counsel of record, and hereby submits its response to Plaintiff Idaho
Counties Risk Management Program Underwriter's (hereinafler "ICRMP") Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment ("plaintiffs Motion"). For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs Motion
should be denied.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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INTRODUCTION
ICRMP filed its complaint in this action against Northfield alleging that Northfield had
breached an insurance contract between Northfield

and ICRMP. However, plaintiffs Motion

has nothing to do with the insurance contract between ICRMP and Northfield. Instead, ICRMP
asks this Court to, in reality, issue an advisory opinion on an issue that is irrelevant and
immaterial to whether there is or was coverage under the insurance policy issued bv Northfield
to ICRMP. Plaintiffs Motion asks the Court to rule, one way or the other, whether ICRMP had
a duty to defend Kootenai County in the

Paradis civil rights case brought against Kootenai

County. Apparently, ICRMP believes that a ruling confirming that ICRMP did, as a matter of
law or fact, have a duty to defend Kootenai County in the Paradis case, under the liability policy
ICRMP sold to Kootenai County, somehow enhances or may enhance its claim that Northfield
breached the insurance policy between Northfield and ICRMP.
But the policy issued by Northfield to ICRMP is not reinsurance, as ICRMP tries to
describe. Regardless of whether ICRMP had a duty under its policy of liability insurance issued
to Kootenai County to defend the county and its former employees and prosecutors in the
case, the policy of reimbursement insurance between Northfield and ICRMP does not contain a
duty to defend clause. The reimbursement policy issued by Northfield to ICRMP, and which
ICRMP alleges in its complaint was breached, is an 'occunence' policy, the terms of which (and
ICRMP's rights under it) stand alone, unrelated to ICRMP's liability policy insuring Kootenai
Coutlty and its employees. Only if there is coverage under the terms of the Northfield policy
issued to ICRMP does Northfield have any obligation to reimburse ICRMP for the monies
ICRMP expended in defending and settling the Paradislawsuit.

As will be demonstrated in this response, and further addressed in a motion for summary
judgment by Northfield, the reimbursement policy issued by Northfield did not, and does not,
provide coverage for the

Paradis defense costs and settlemcnt paid

by ICRMP to Mr. Paradis.

Consequently, addressing the issue of whether ICRMP had a duty to defend Kootenai County in
the

case, especially at this early stage of this case, serves no purpose to the resolution of

the issues in this lawsuit between ICRMP and Northfield.
Furthermore, Northfield has propounded extensive written discovery to ICRMP which
ICRMP has not yet answered and which may be instructive, or at least disclose facts related to
Northfield's response to plaintiffs Motion. As set forth in Northfield's Rule 56(f) Motion,
responses to Northfield's discovery to ICRMP were due on November 28, 2006. Northfield
granted to ICRMP a one-week extension to December 4, 2006 to respond, believing it would
have responses and documents from such discovery before the due date for this brief. ICRMP
has yet to respond, however.

Therefore, Northfield reserves the right to supplement this

response as may be necessary to include further argument and facts related to plaintiffs Motion
based upon ICRMP's discovery responses.
ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be denied, or, at a minimum, the
Court should defer ruling on plaintiffs Motion so that it can be addressed along with
Northfield's motion for s u a r y judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS IN DISPUTE
As an initial matter, defendant Northfield notes that, as discussed above, the issue posed
to the Court by plaintiffs Motion is irrelevant to the plaintiffs claim for breach of contract
against Northfield. As such, a vast majority of the alleged facts identified by ICRMP in support
of plaintiffs Motion have no bearing or relevancy to the claims in this action, as they primarily
focus on ICRMP's handling of the Paradis matter under its own policy. Based upon this lack of

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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relevancy - and as Northfield still seeks discovery responses from ICRMP - there are but few
material facts that Northfield disputes at this juncture.' Most importantly, plaintiff attempts to
characterize the Northfield policy as "reinsurance," which is incorrect. The particular facts
alleged by ICRMP in plaintiffs Motion, disputed by Northfield, are as follows:
1.

"Since its inception 119851 through the 2000-2001 policy year, ICRMP purchased

reinsurance from Northland Insurance Companies ('Northland)." (plaintiffs Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("plaintiffs Memo"), at 2) - As
discussed more thoroughly below, the Northfield

insurance policy issued to ICRMP, which is the

policy ICRMP alleges in its complaint was breached, is not "reinsurance."

Such a

characterization suggests that the Northfield policy "follows form" and/or "follows the fortune"
and contains such provisions. Such provisions are not present in the Notihfield Policy. To the
contrary, the Northfield policy is, instead, a reimbursement insurance policy, subject to its own
terms and conditions, isolated and separate from any provisions of the ICRMP policy. Further,
plaintiff has not identified nor otherwise provided copies of any such policies for the claimed
years. Rather, upon a review of Northfield's records, it appears that Northfield only issued the
reimbursement policies to ICRMP for 1966-88 and 1994-2001. Affidavit of Brian R. Martens in
Support of Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Martens
Aff."), at 172. A copy of the Northfield Public Entity All Lines Aggregate Insurance Policy
issued to ICRMP for the 2000 - 2001 year is attached to Mr. Martens' affidavit.
2.

"The Pavadis Complaint focused upon the circumstances surrounding Mr.

Paradis' initial arrest. conviction, and incarceration for the murder of Kimberly Ann Palmer."
(plaintiffs Memo at 3) -Notably absent from plaintiffs discussion - and exceptionally relevant

'

To the extent necessary, Northfield will address additional specific facts alleged by ICRMP following discovery,
as requested in Northfield's Rule 56(f) Motion.
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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to this action - is when the acts by Kootenai County and its law enforcement employees and
prosecutors occurred, which Mr. Paradis claimed in his complaint violated his civil rights and
resulted in his conviction for murder. Mr. Paradis was initially convicted of first degree murder
in 1981, and subsequently sentenced to death. Affidavit of Lynnette McHenry in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("plaintiffs
Memorandum Decision and Order at 2-3.

Affidavit"), Exhibit 4,

Mr. Paradis' complaint alleges that his first

appearance in an Idaho court was on November 26, 1980, and that he was incarcerated in various
places from June 23, 1980 until April 10,2001. Id., Exh. 2, at 775 & 41. The Paradis complaint
alleged the defendants failed to produce exculpatory evidence in advance of his trial which
resulted in his murder conviction. Significantly, however, the retroactive date for Northfield's
reimbursement coverage of ICRMP relating to Kootenai County

-

for Section IV coverage

(Errors or Omissions) - is November 29, 1985, approximately four years after the acts
complained of by Mr. paradis.' Plaintiff has attempted to brush these key dates aside, asserting
simply that the Paradis action alleged 'continuing torts' (plaintiffs Memo at 4-5) - essentially
arguing that the actual acts complained of have no meaning in the coverage determination. The
dates Paradis alleged that Kootenai County withheld evidence and otherwise committed the acts
giving rise to Paradis' lawsuit are crucial to the understanding of this action, and will be more
thoroughly addressed in defendant's own motion for summary judgment later in this litigation.
3.

"A copy of the reservation of rights letter was forwarded to Northland Insurance

Companies." (plaintiffs Memo at 4). Defendant Northfield was forwarded an unsigned copy of
the referenced June 30,2003, reservation of rights letter by way of correspondence from ICRMP
dated March 2, 2003 (correctly 2006, as noted by the stamp and the content of the

The ICRMP policy (McHenry Aff., Exh. I) also contains a retroactive date - for Section IV Errors and Omissions
liability - of November 29, 1985.

2
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correspondence). Martens Aff., Exh. B. Additionally, note that ICRMP did not provide notice
that it had exhausted its $150,000 self-insured retention until June 27, 2006 - after it had
incurred a total of $423,305.33 in defense costs. Martens Aff., Exh. C.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when no genuine issues of
material fact exist after the pleadings, deposition, admission and affidavits have been construed
most favorably to the non-moving party and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Johnson v. Studlev-Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 1057,812 P.2d 1216,
1218 (1991).

Additionally, the court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-

moving party and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West
Homeowner's Assoc. v. Bear Lake County, 118 Idaho 343, 346, 796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990).
Furthermore, all doubts are to be resolved against the moving party and the motion must be
denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokot, 117 Idaho 963, 966, 793
P.2d 195, 198 (1990). If the summary judgment proceeding involves the interpretation of
unambiguous legal documents, the interpretation of those documents is a question of law for the
trial court. Id If the documents are ambiguous their interpretation is a question of fact for the
trier of fact. Id.
ARGUMENT

A..

Defendant's Motion Does Not Disoense of Any "Claim, Counterclaim or Cross-Claim"
Between Northfield and ICRMP.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, in relevant part:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain
a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of twenty (20) days
from the service of process upon the adverse party or that party's appearance in
the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
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party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in that
party's favor upon all or any part thereof.
Plaintiffs Motion fails to meet the ends intended by IRCP 56. It does not dispense with any
"claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim." Rather, plaintiff simply seeks the Court's ruling that
plaintiff had its own duty to defend Kootenai County under ICRMP's own policy of liability
insurance issued to Kootenai County; if plaintiff prevails, no "claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim" is resolved, and no judgment of any kind can be entered against defendant. See
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("plaintiffs
Memo"), at 20 ("The question of whether ICRMP was obligated to defend the Paradis lawsuit
presents a clear issue of law.").
The present action relates to plaintiffs claims regarding defendant's alleged duties and
obligations under the policy defendant issued to ICRMP; to wit, a breach-of-contract claim that
defendant Northfield has failed to reimburse ICRMP under the policy between Northfield and
ICRMP. However, the issues addressed in plaintiffs Motion do not establish - nor even address

- this single claim against defendant Northfield. The plaintiff has not even filed a copy of a
Northfield policy in conjunction with its motion. To the contrary, plaintiff is asking the Court to
rule on its own obligations under its own policy ICRMP issued to Kootenai County.
Defendant's Motion fails to meet the ends posited by I.R.C.P. 56, and should be denied.

B.

Plaintiffs Motion Seeks an Advisorv O~inionof the Court.
Similar to plaintiffs Motion's failure to meet the requirements of Rule 56, plaintiffs

Motion, for the same reason, seeks an advisory opinion of the Court, is., to rule on ICRMP's
duty to defend under the policy issued by ICRMP to Kootenai County. However, under Idaho
law, advisory opinions are not favored. See, e.g., Gafford v. State, 127 Idaho 472, 477-78, 903
P.2d 61, 66-67 (1995)("Raising such a claim in the absence of a concrete dispute relating to the
release provisions would be a futile act since it would constitute a request for an advisory
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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opinion which would be denied by the courts of this state."); Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767,
133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006)("Although the Declaratory Judgment Act, Idaho Code Title 10,
chapter 12, bestows the authority to declare rights, status, or other legal relations, that authority
is circumscribed by the rule that "a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an
actual or justiciable controversy exists.")(citing Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516,
681 P.2d 988,991 (1984)). Courts are to look at the nature of the action to determine whether or
not an advisory opinion is being sought:
[A] controversy in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial
determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference
or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or
moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Where there is such a concrete case admitting of an
immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the'parties in an
adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the judicial function may be
appropriately exercised although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may
not require the award of process or the payment of damages.
State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 598, 809 P.2d 455, 459 (1991)(re: declaratory actions)(quoting
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,241-42, 57 S. Ct. 461,464,81 L.Ed. 617 (1937)).
In the present case, as discussed above, ICRMP seeks a ruling !%omthis Court as to its
duty to defend under the policy ICRMP issued to Kootenai County. However, in this action, the
question has no bearing on the breach of contract action between ICRMP and Northfield, and
does not relate to the policy between Northfield and ICRMP; Kootenai County is not even
present as a party to this litigation to respond to the allegations made by ICRMP. Thus,
plaintiffs Motion seeks an advisory ruling, and should be denied on those grounds.
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C.

Any defense obligations borne by ICRMP are the result of the ICRMP policy language,
and do not relate to the language of the Northfield policy.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that plaintiffs Motion relates only to whether

ICRMP had a duty to defend Kootenai County under the ICRMP policy, and contains no
discussion of any such duty under the Northfield policy. Under the ICRMP policy, ICRMP has
an explicit obligation to defend its insureds for covered claims:

9. Defense of Claims or Suit. We may investigate or settle any covered claim or
suit against you, following review and consultation with you. We will provide a
defense with counsel of our choice, at our expense, if you are sued for a covered
claim. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay
equals the Limits of Coverage afforded under this Policy, plus accrued costs of
defense.
McHenry Aff., ~ x h 1,. General Conditions, 79 @. 2). The ICRMPIKootenai County policy has
the standard duty to defend clause found in virtually all comprehensive general liability policies.
However, the Northfield policy is devoid of any similar duty-to-defend language, making no
provision for the defense and settlement of claims arising under the ICRMP policy (such as
Kootenai County's tender of defense to ICRMP for the

action). In fact, the Northfield

policy references only claims covered by the Northfield policy itself, and under the General
Insuring Agreements, the Northfield policy provides:
It is understood that all claims under this policy shall be serviced by 1.c.R.M.p.'~
Claims Department who shall perform the following duties:
A. Investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses - it is understood that,
when so requested, the I.C.R.M.P. Claims Department will afford Underwriters
any opportunity to be associated with them in the defense or control of any claim,
suit or proceeding.
Martens Aff., Exh. A, at p. 5 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Northfield policy provides that:
For Section 11, . . . "[u]ltimate net loss" shall also include hospital, medical and
funeral charge and all sums paid as salaries, wages, compensation, fees, expenses
for doctors and nurses, also law costs, premiums on attachment of appeal bonds,
expenses for lawyers and investigators and other persons for litigation, settlement,
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adjustment and investigation of claims or suits which are paid as a consequence of
any occurrence covered hereunder.

Id. at p. 40 (emphasis added). In fact, a review of the Northfield policy yields only a reference to
"an underlying Self-Insured Retention (S.I.R.) of $150,000 each and every loss and/or claim
and/or occurrence ultimate net loss

. . . .", and does not reference coverages under the ICRMP

policy. Id. at p. 3 (emphasis in original). Thus, lacking language mirroring the ICRMP policy's
duty-to-defend provision, or even any reference thereto, argument that ICRMP had a duty to
defend Kootenai County is irrelevant to any coverage under the Northfield reimbursement
policy, and irrelevant to the relationship between ICRMP and Northfield under the
reimbursement insurance.
Accordingly, plaintiffs Motion should be denied, as plaintiffs duty-to-defend arguments
have no bearing on whether there was coverage of ICRMP under the Northfield policy for
reimbursement of ICRMP for any of the costs to defend Kootenai County or its employees.
D.

Defendant Northfield's policy is not reinsurance.
Plaintiffs motion appears to be an attempt to set up a future summary judgment motion

(or two) regarding the breach of contract action. Implicitly, plaintiffs argument (which is
anticipated at hearing andlor in plaintiff's summzuy judgment reply) is a two-step transitive
argument: ICRMP had a duty to defend Kootenai County; ergo, Northfield had an obligation,
under its policy, to reimburse ICRMP for defense and settlement amounts in the Pavadis action.
However, this argument suffers a key logical flaw - the Northfield policy is

reinsurance.

Whether the Northfield policy covers ICRMP must be determined by interpreting the language
of Northfield's policy, not the ICRMPIKootenai County policy attached to plaintiffs Motion.
In the most general sense, "reinsurance. . . is simply insurance for insurance companies."
Continental Casualty Co. v. Stronghold Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 20 (2ndCir. 1996). Ancillary to this
principle is the principle that reinsurers have no duty to defend. See, e.g., Insurance Co..of State
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of Pennsylvania v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 516, 523 (91h Cir. 1990)("Reinsurers have
no duty to defend claims . . . ."). Importantly, reinsurance policies are typically identified by the
presence of "follow form" and/or "follow the fortune" provisions:
Reinsurance is purchased by insurance companies to insure their liability
under policies written to their insureds. Typically, an insurer who has provided
coverage against a large loss will cede all or part of that risk to other insurance
companies along with a portion of the premiums. Ceding risk increases the
insurer's capacity to insure other customers and decreases the likelihood that
insurer insolvency will result from any large claim.
There are two types of reinsurance contract: treaty and facultative. Under a
reinsurance treaty, the reinsurer agrees to accept an entire block of business from
the reinsured. Once a treaty is written, a reinsurer is bound to accept all of the
policies under the block of business, including those as yet unwritten. Because a
treaty reinsurer accepts an entire block of business, it does not assess the
individual risks being reinsured; rather, it evaluates the overall risk pool. Id.
Facultative reinsurance entails the ceding of a particular risk or policy.
Unlike a treaty reinsurer who must accept all covered business, the facultative
reinsurer assesses the unique characteristics of each policy to determine whether
to reinsure the risk, and at what price. Thus, a facultative reinsurer "retains the
faculty, or option, to accept or reject any risk."
The reinsurance relationship depends on the reinsurer and the reinsured observing
high levels of good faith. The reinsured must keep its interests aligned with those
of the reinsurer, . . . and the reinsurer must "follow the fortunes" of the
reinsured[.]
Reinsurance certificates usually employ standard forms. A reinsurance
certificate typically includes a "following forms" provision that expressly limits
the reinsurance to the terms and conditions of the underlying policy and provides
that the reinsurance certificate will cover only the kinds of liability covered in the
original policy issued to the insured. The reinsurance certificate often, as here,
also includes a "follow the fortunes" clause, which is somewhat broader than the
"following forms" clause and obligates the reinsurer to indemnify the reinsured
for any good faith payment of an insured loss.
"Follow the fortunes" clauses prevent reinsurers from second guessing
good-faith settlements and obtaining de novo review of judgments of the
reinsured's liability to its insured. But while a "follow the fortunes" clause limits a
reinsurer's defenses, it does not make a reinsurer liable for risks beyond what was
agreed upon in the reinsurance certificate. In that regard, the reinsurer retains the
right to question whether the reinsured's liability stems from an unreinsured loss.
A loss would be unreinsured if it was not contemplated by the original insurance
policy or if it was expressly excluded by terms of the certificate of reinsurance.
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North River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (3rdCir. 1995)(intemal
citations omitted). A follow-the-form clause will include language akin to: "the liability of the
Reinsurer specified in Item 4 of the said Declarations shall follow that of the Company and
except as otherwise specifically provided herein, shall be subject in all respects to all the terms
and conditions of the Company's policy." Travelers Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Ace American, 392 F.
Supp.2d 659, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Similarly, a follow-the-fortunes clause will incorporate
language similar to: "All claims involving this reinsurance, when settled by [Commercial
Union], shall be binding on [Swiss Re], which shall be bound to pay its proportion of such
settlements promptly following receipt of proof of loss." Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss
Reinsurance America, 413 F.3d 121, 124 (lS' Cir. 2005).

A "follow the fortunes" clause

encapsulates the "follow the fortunes" doctrine recognized in some jurisdictions, which generally
holds that "a reinsurer is required to indemnify for payments reasonably within the terms of the
original policy, even if technically not covered by it." Travelers Cas. And Sur. Co., 392 at 664,
n5. The "follow the fortunes" doctrine is not without its own limits:
But, "[wlhile the 'follow the fortune' clause is certainly a broad one, it is clear
that the reinsurer is liable only for 'a loss of the kind reinsured."' . . . This
protection for the reinsurer is based on principles of contractual intent: a reinsurer
cannot be held liable for a kind of loss that it did not agree to cover. This
distinction between reinsured and unreinsured risk is particularly important in
facultative reinsurance where the reinsurer accepts only specific risks.
North River, 52 F.3d at 1206-07.
Note, however, that not all jurisdictions agree that the "follow the fortunes" doctrine is
implied in any reinsurance contract. For example, in Michigan, the Court of Appeals has
rejected just such a proposition in analyzing a reinsurance policy lacking a "follow the fortunes"
clause:
The reasoning and explanation of reinsurance law provided by the

Michigan Millers Court is particularly instructive in this setting. There, our Court
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pointed to 19 Couch, Insurance, 2d, 5 80.66, pp. 673-674, to emphasize that "[tlhe
extent of the liability of the reinsurer is determined by the language of the
reinsurance contract, and the reinsurer cannot be held liable beyond the terms of
its contract merely because the original insurer has sustained a loss." Id. at 414,
452 N.W.2d 841. At another point in Michigan Millers, this Court stated:
Although it is true that parties may agree to such terms in reinsurance as
will bind the reinsurer to the settlement or adjustment of loss made between
the parties to the original insurance, 19 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 80.13, p.
631, we will not impose liability on the reinsurer for a settlement
contribution absent such an agreement.
Such statements respecting reinsurance are completely consistent with a
plethora of Michigan cases in the field of insurance law. For example, in Lehr v.
Professional Underwriters, 296 Mich. 693, 697, 296 N.W. 843 (1941), our
Supreme Court stated: "The liability was limited in the policy. To hold otherwise
would be to write a new contract for the parties. This we have no right to do."
After careful consideration, we conclude and hold that the learned trial
court erred in reading into the reinsurance contract at issue in this case a "follow
the fortunes" clause that was not agreed to by the parties.
Michigan Tp. Participating Plan v. Federal Ins. Co., 592 N.W.2d 760,764-65 (Mich:App. 1999).
This would be consistent with Idaho law, which holds that "[wlhere policy language is found to
be unambiguous, the Court is to construe the policy as written, 'and the Court by construction
cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer nor make a new contract for the parties, or
one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to the contract of insurance to either
create or avoid liability."' Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 213, -,

127 P.3d

116, 119 (2005). With respect to the Northfield policy, the policy does not provide any "followform" and/or "follow the fortunes" language, thereby lacking a key hallmark of a classic
reinsurance policy. See Martens Aff., Exh. A. To the contrary, the Northfield policy provides
specific terms and conditions, covering very particular risks. For example, for Northfield to have
any obligation to reimburse ICRMP for defense costs and indemnify above the SIR in the
Northfield policy, the coverage language in the Northfield policy must apply. Here, as explained
further below, the occurrence which gave rise to Mr. Paradis' complaint took place years before
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the Northfield policy was issued. Thus, no conclusion can be reached that Northfield's policy
constitutes classic reinsurance such that plaintiffs Motion would have any bearing on the issues
in this matter; to wit, whether the terms of Northfield's policy provide coverage of ICRMP for
the paradis defense costs and settlement amount paid.
Moreover, analysis of reinsurer status may also be had by a determination of the extent of
premium transfer from the underlying insured risks. Classic reinsurance policies typically
involve the transfer of underlying premiums as a function of the reinsurer's assumption of the
underlying insurer's risk. As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court:
In order to spread the risks on policies they have written or to reduce
required reserves, insurance companies commonly enter into reinsurance
agreements. Under these agreements, the reinsurer pays the primary insurer, or
"ceding company," a negotiated amount and agrees to assume the ceding
company's liabilities on the reinsured policies. In return, the reinsurer receives the
future income generated from the policies and their associated reserve accounts.
Reinsurance comes in two basic types, assumption reinsurance and
indemnity reinsurance. In the case of assumption reinsurance, the reinsurer steps
into the shoes of the ceding company with respect to the reinsured policy,
assuming all its liabilities and its responsibility to maintain required reserves
against potential claims. The assumption reinsurer thereafter receives all
premiums directly and becomes directly liable to the holders of the policies it has
reinsured.
In indemnity reinsurance, which is at issue in this case, it is the ceding
company that remains directly liable to its policyholders, and that continues to
pay claims and collect premiums. The indemnity reinsurer assumes no direct
liability to the policyholders. Instead, it agrees to indemnify, or reimburse, the
ceding company for a specified percentage of the claims and expenses attributable
to the risks that have been reinsured, and the ceding company turns over to it a
like percentage of the premiums generated by the insurance of those risks.
Both the assumption and the indemnity reinsurer ordinaril pay an upfront fee, known as a "ceding commission," to the ceding company.FXI

- There is a form of indemnity reinsurance known as risk-premium, or
yearly-renewable-term, reinsurance that does not involve ceding
commissions. Under risk-premium reinsurance, much like a normal
insurance policy, the ceding company typically pays an annual premium to
the reinsurer in return for which the reinsurer promises to reimburse the
ceding company should identified losses arise.
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Colonial American Life Ins. Co. v. C.I.R., 491 U.S. 244, 246-48, 109 S. Ct. 2408, 241 1-12
(1989). These categories address the means by which risk andlor premiums are transferred. In
the present action, only a premium was paid to Northfield by ICRMP, further demonstrating that
the Northfield policy is not classic reinsurance, and would only be analogous to risk-premium
reinsurance

-

which simply follows the traditional insurance payment models (payment of a

premium to insure risk).
Although lengthy discussion, as above, is required to identify the nature of the Northfield
policy, the distinction between classic reinsurance and the Northfield policy is key in this
instance, as plaintiffs fundamental argument in this action will be that Northfield must simply
write a check for whatever amounts ICRMP expended. However, the Northfield policy is not
classic reinsurance, and instead only insures those risks which are enumerated within
Northfield's own policy. It is likely this distinction that led the Montana Supreme Court to
characterize a Northfield Public Entities All Lines Aggregate Insurance Policy as a "secondary
assurance policy," rather than 'reinsurance.' Northfield Ins. Co. v. Montana Ass'n of Counties,
10 P.3d 813, 814 (Mont. 2000). Accordingly, it is the coverage provided by the Northfield
policy, not the actions taken by ICRMP or coverage under the ICRMPIKootenai County policy,
which is salient to the rights and obligations arising from the Northfield policy which is at the
center of this lawsuit.
Accordingly, a ruling on plaintiffs Motion is, again, simply an advisory opinion, as it has
no bearing on the application of the terms and conditions of Northfield's policy. The Northfield
policy is not classic reinsurance, and any obligations under ICRMP's policy do not define or
otherwise set the parameters of the coverage afforded by the Northfield policy. Accordingly,
plaintiffs Motion should be denied.
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E.

ICRMP did not have a duty to defend.
Although plaintiff's Motion addresses, only minimally, the relationship between ICRMP

and Northfield (and otherwise fails to address any component of its breach-of-contract action),
defendant Northfield responds briefly to the thrust of plaintiff's Motion herein. Despite the
defense provision provided for in the ICRMP policy, as discussed above, ICRMP did not have a
duty to defend the Kootenai County individuals in the

Paradis action.

ICRMP did not seek a

judicial ruling on whether to defend the Paradis case. It simply made its own decision, for its
own reasons, under its own policy.
1.

The duty to defend, generallv.

Plaintiff cites to Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 750 P.2d
87 (1988), in arguing that it was obligated, by the phrasing of the complaint, to provide a defense
to the Kootenai County defendants. However, the Kootenai County decision certainly did not
present an unbounded duty to defend proposition, as was explained in the later Black v.
Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. decision:
We have recognized that an insurer has a duty to defend its insured where
the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, would bring the case within the
insurance policy's coverage. The basis for this rule is simple. To allow the insurer
to avoid providing defense on questionable claims would frustrate one of the
insured's basic purposes in procuring insurance coverage--protection from the
expenses of litigation. This duty is separate, unrelated, and much broader than the
insurer's duty to pay damages. However, the insurer's duty to defend is not
absolute. This Court has recognized that an injured third-party's claims against an
insured must provide some link to the insurance agreement. Our Supreme Court
recently adopted a broad statement with regard to when an insurer must provide
coverage. In County of Kootenai v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 113 Idaho
908,750P.2d 87 (1988), the Court said:
[tlhe duty to defend arises upon the filing of a complaint whose allegations, in
whole or in part, read broadly, reveal a potential for liability that would be
covered by the insured's policy. [Emphasis original.]
These cases typify the progressive attitude of the Idaho Courts regarding claims
for breach of the duty to defend.
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115 Idaho 449, 455, 767 P.2d 824, 830 (Ct. App. 1989) 115 Idaho at 455 (internal citations
omitted)(emphasis added). This clarification, that an insurer's duty to defend is not absolute, is
important, especially in light of a more recent statement by the Idaho Supreme Court: "This
language [in Kootenai], while admittedly broad, does not require an insurance company to file a
declaratory judgment in every instance, even though it believes there is no potential for coverage,
and then tender a defense until the lack of coverage is established." Hovle v. Utica Mut. Ins.
Co., 137 Idaho 367,371,48 P.3d 1256, 1260 (2002).
2.

The ICRMP policy.

Two points not fully addressed by plaintiff with respect to the ICRMP policy are worth
noting for the purposes of additional clarification relevant to the discussion herein.
First, plaintiff asserts that "[blecause Paradis was released from prison in April of 2001,
the 2000-2001 ICRMP policy was triggered." Plaintiffs Memo at 12. Plaintiff cites no other
trigger dates for the coverage or even any authority for the proposition, although the acts that Mr.
Paradis sued upon occurred some 20 years earlier. The effect of this timing issue is discussed
below.
Additionally, plaintiff cites only to Section I1 of the ICRMP policy, the Comprehensive
~
does not appear to rely on any other Sections of the policy.
General Liability ~ e c t i o n .Plaintiff
Accordingly, as necessary, the discussion herein addresses only the language of that section.
3.

The first Paradis com~laint.~
Plaintiff claims that Counts I, IV, V, IX, X, and XI of the first )2aradis complaint

constitute "continuing torts" which, although commencing years - even decades - earlier, fall
3

Plaintiff does not, for example, cite Section IV, the Errors and Omissions provision, likely because that section is
explicitly identified as a "claims-made" section; as plaintiffs aver that Kootenai County first notified them of the
&g.&
suit in or after April 2003, plaintiff would be unable to assert that possible lCRMP coverage under an
ICRMP policy in effect in 2003 would have any bearing on the Northfield policy of 2000-2001.
4
Plaintiff identifies onlv Counts I. IV,. V.. IX.. X. and XI as the counts eivine rise to ICRMP's claimed dutv to
defend. Plaintiffs ~ e m atb 8-9 & 14-15. As such; only these counts are dkcusied.
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within the purview of the ICRMP's 2000-2001 coverage, thus requiring ICRMP to defend.
Plaintiffs Memorandum at 8-9 & 14-15. These Counts addressed the following:
Count I - Bradv violation - Mr. Paradis alleged that the subject Kootenai County
defendants failed to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence, and/or caused
a medical witness (Dr. Brady) to "give false, exaggerated and unsupportable
testimony". McHenry Aff., Exh. 1, 770. Although alleging an ongoing duty to
provide the defense with exculpatory evidence, the

complaint made clear

that the exculpatory evidence at issue was gathered prior to Mr. Paradis'
conviction, and that the testimony of Dr. Brady occurred in 1981. Id at 1732-38,
& 47-57.
o

Counts IV & V

-

Negligence, False Arrest, Malicious Prosecution, and False

Imorisonment - Again, Mr. Paradis alleged that he suffered harm as a result of the
undisclosed exculpatory evidence (7784-85), and referenced his claims in Count I
by reference (788).
Counts IX, X, & XI - Negligence, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
and Defamation - Here, the allegations made by Mr. Paradis relate to a habeas
action in 1986, wherein Mr. Paradis contends that Mr. Haws (the Chief Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney) continued to conceal the exculpatory evidence, resulting in
Mr. Paradis serving another 14 years in prison (771 14-119). Additionally, Mr.
Paradis asserted that: "[t]hroughout his involvement in the Paradis and Gibson
cases, both when serving as a prosecutor and after, Haws made repeated public
and extra-judicial statements to a variety of news media outlets" (7120), "which
perpetuated his contrived and unsupportable theories as discussed herein, and
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which consistently cast both Plaintiff and his claims of innocence in a false light."
(7122).
4.

The Paradis Amended Comdaint.
Plaintiff identifies four counts in the Amended Complaint that plaintiff asserts

warranted continuation of its claimed duty to defend: Count I, VII, IX, and X. Plaintiff's
Memo at 10-11. Again, plaintiff focuses on the asserted ongoing nature of these
violations to assert that coverage was mandated. Id.

These Counts addressed the

following:
m

Count 1 - Failure to Train re: Bradv - Although alleging ongoing deficiencies in
the training program, a reading of the Amended Complaint clearly demonstrates
that the only damages alleged related to pre-conviction failures: "100.

This

deficiency in the County's training program and its supervision was closely
related and causally linked to the constitutional injury suffered by PlaintiffParadis." (McI-Ienry Aff., Exh. 5, at 7100).
•

Count VII - Nerligent Training and Supervision - In his amended complaint, Mr.
Paradis alleged that, as a result of the claimed negligent training and supervision,
he was wrongfully arrested and convicted (7158), resulting in "physical
deterioration and injury, emotional distress and economic harm" (7159) as a result
of his confinement (77211-214).

a

Count IX - False Light Invasion of Privacy - As in the original complaint, Mr.
Paradis alleged that Mr. Haws engaged in a series of public statements regarding
plaintiff beginning in 1986 (7174), and further alleged that Dr. Brady's testimony
placed Mr. Paradis in a false light (7172).
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Count X - Negli~enceand Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress - Mr.
Paradis alleged, in this count, that "[dluring the investigatory phase Haws set into
motion a conspiracy to wrongfully convict Plaintiff-Paradis" (7181), thereafter
again relating allegations regarding Mr. Haw's failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence in 1980 and 1981, and his public statements regarding the case.
5.

The Paradis allegations do not constitute "continuing torts" covered bv the
ICRMP policy.
As described above, the claims made by Mr. Paradis all arise from the actions

made by the Kootenai County defendants relating to the investigation, prosecution, and
conviction of Mr. Paradis in 1980 and 1981. Plaintiff specifically asserts that the continuing
nature of the alleged violations created a duty to defend by ICRMP: "the Paradis Complaints
contain allegations of negligence, false imprisonment and violations of civil rights which are
described as continuing torts involving tortious activity on the part of the ICRMP insureds during
the relevant policy period", which allegations "triggered a duty to defend under Idaho law."
Plaintiffs Memo at 4-5.
In doing so, however, plaintiff attempts to blur the line between the analysis of
continuous events for statute of limitations questions, versus analysis of continuous events for
insurance purposes:
Reliance on the commencement of the statute of limitation is not
dispositive in determining when a tort occurs for insurance purposes. Statutes of
limitation and triggering dates for insurance purposes serve distinct functions and
reflect different policy concerns. Statutes of limitation function to expedite
litigation and discourage stale claims. Bigansky v. Thomas Jefferson University
Hosp., 442 Pa.Super. 69,658 A.2d 423,426 (1995). But when determining when
a tort occurs for insurance purposes, courts have generally sought to protect the
reasonable expectations of the parties to the insurance contract. Appalachian Ins.
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.1982).
Because of this fundamental difference in purpose, courts have
consistently. rejected the idea they are bound by the statutes of limitation when
seeking to determine when a tort occurs for insurance purposes. See ACandS, Inc.
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v. Aerna Cas. and Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir.1985) (statute of limitation
cases "are not particularly relevant" to determining what event triggers insurance
coverage); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1043-44
(D.C.Cir.1981) (statute of limitation cases "are not at all relevant" and "have no
bearing" in case seeking to determine when tort occurred for insurance purposes);
Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1220 (6th Cir.1980) (because of differences in underlying policies, statute of
limitation cases not relevant to determining when asbestos-related tort occurs for
insurance purposes); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Zurich American Ins.
Co., 471 F.Supp. 1011, 1015 (S.D.Ala.1979) ("cases dealing with the
determination of the date or occurrence of a continuing injury or disease for the
purpose of applying appropriate statute of limitations are not controlling for
purposes of determining insurance coverage"); Southern Maryland Agric. Ass'n v.
Bituminous Cas. Corp., 539 F.Supp. 1295, 1302-03 (D.Md.1982) (date on which
statute of limitation begins to run not determinative of date when tort of malicious
prosecution occurs); S. Freedman & Sons v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 195,
198-99 (D.C.1978) (statute of limitation "providcs little assistance" and "need not
determine" when tort of malicious prosecution occurs). For this reason, we do not
believe the date on which the statute of limitation begins to run on malicious
prosecution claims should determine when the tort occurs for insurance coverage
purposes.
City of Erie, Pa. v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156, 161-62 (31d Cir. 1997). Despite this,
plaintiff relies on Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749 (1993), for the proposition that the
"continuing tort" concept triggered a duty to defend in the

action. However, the

decision applied in .the context of statute of limitations analysis, and not in the context of
triggering insurance coverage, and is of no value to any analysis in this litigation. The same is
true of the other case law cited by plaintiff

-

Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981) &

Green v. Los Anreles County Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472 (9thCir. 1989) - both
cases relate to statute of limitations questions, and not to the triggering of coverage under
insurance policies.
However, plaintiff fails to discuss Idaho caselaw directly on point to this question:
Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 750 P.2d 87 (1988). In Western
Gas., a county sheriff, acting upon a writ of execution, conducted a sale of property. However,

in doing so, the sheriff failed to act in accord with the statutory notice periods, subjecting him to
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civil penalties payable to the aggrieved party. Following the six month redemption period, the
sheriff issued the deed to the subject property to the purchasers, as required by statute. During
the redemption period, however, Kootenai County purchased an occurrence policy from Lloyd's
and attempted to claim coverage, asserting that the delivery of the deed, in conjunction with the
earlier failure to notify in relation to the sale, constituted an occurrence under the policy.
However, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the only wrongful act was
the improperly conducted sale. The court stated:
The improper execution sale is not an event covered by the Lloyd's policy since it
occurred almost six months prior to the effective date of the policy. An insurer is
not liable "for claims arising out of an event or accident which occurred prior to
the effective date of the insurance coverage, even though damages and claims
continued to accrue from this cause during the later period of coverage."
113 Idaho at 915 (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Corn., 507 F. Supp. 59,62
(W.D. Pa. 1981), aff d 676 F.2d 56 (31d Cir. 1982))(emphasis added). Here, the acts giving rise
to the

complaint relate to actions taken by the Kootenai County defendants in the

investigation, prosecution, and conviction of Mr. Paradis in 1980 and 1981, all of which occurred
20 years prior to the effective date of the subject ICRMP policy. The damages complained of by
Mr. Paradis relate to his incarceration which commenced on June 23, 1980 (McHenry Aff., Exh.
2, at 15). As such, damages

claims that accrued after these initial events do not fall under the

coverage of liability policies that become effective at a later date (here, the ICRMP 2000-2001
policy).
Plaintiff relies on a New York decision, National Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon,
128 A.D.2d 332, 515 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1987), to argue that an allegation of false imprisonment
occurring during a policy's coverage period even if imprisonment occurred at an earlier date,
requires an insurer to defend. Plaintiffs Memo at 19-20. However, National Casualty is not
instructive or dispositive for four key reasons:
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First, National Casualty is a New York decision, which holding would conflict with the
binding decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Western Cas.
Second, the National Casualty court noted that "there is nothing in the policy which
requires, as a prerequisite to ascertaining whether there is coverage, that the injury
resulting from a causative event be reduced to a single or fixed occurrence in time." 5 15
N.Y.S.2d at 270. However, under the ICRMP policy, the definition of "occurrence"
provides, in relevant part, that "All personal injuries to one or more persons andlor
property damage arising out of an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions shall be deemed one occurrence." McHenry Aff., Exh. 1, at p. 14 (emphasis

added). This language fundamentally shifts National Casualty away from any application
in this action, as it reduces the claimed injury to a single event - Mr. Paradis' initial
conviction and incarceration.
Third, under Idaho law, false imprisonment occurs in the absence of lawful action.
Griffin v. Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 373, 42 P.2d 297, 301 (1935) ("The true test [of false
imprisonment] seems to be not the extent of the restraint, nor the means by which it is
accomplished, but the lawfulness thereof'). In the Paradis complaint, Mr. Paradis only
alluded to his arrest, prosecution, and conviction in the criminal justice system, and did
not allude to any extra-judicial actions by any of the Kootenai County defendants. See,
e.g., Mundt v. U.S., 61 1 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9'h Cir. 1980)("As Harper and James note: 'If

the imprisonment is under legal process but the action has been carried on maliciously
and without probable cause, it is malicious prosecution. If it has been extrajudicial,
without legal process, it is false imprisonment.' 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts
232 (1956).").

Moreover, even if the initial arrest could be construed as false

imprisonment, once the judiciary sanctioned Mr. Paradis' detention (e.g., through a bond
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hearing), the 'occan met the shore'

-

any false imprisonment would have ceased, and

instead have become malicious prosecution.5
4

Fourth, and finally, Mr. Paradis was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death. (McHenry Aff., EEx 2, 718) As a felon on death row, Mr. Paradis would have
been transferred to the custody of the State of Idaho - in fact, Mr. Paradis's complaint
acknowledges state custody, 15 years of which were spent on death row. See, e g., id. at
775, 21, & 24. Any 'false imprisonment' (if construed as posed by plaintiff) by the
Kootenai County defendants would have terminated once Mr. Paradis' custody
transferred to the State of Idaho (apparently in 1981). Whether Mr. Paradis was
wrongfully imprisoned by the State of Idaho is beyond the scope of the present dispute,
and would not have been covered by ICRMP.

As such, plaintiff cannot argue that the allegations made by Mr. Paradis constituted "continuing
torts" which would have been covered by the 2000-2001 ICRMP policy. To the contrary, all of
the events alleged by Mr. Paradis arose long before the commencement of the coverage provided
by the ICRMP policy, and any subsequent claims andlor damages arising therefrom cannot give
rise to coverage where none existed at the time of the original occurrence, as per the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision in Western Cas. As no potential for coverage under the ICRMP policy
was revealed by Mr. Paradis' allegations relating to actions some two decades earlier, no duty to
defend arose requiring ICRMP to provide a defense.

5

At least one court has held that, although an action (for purposes of the statute of limitations) for malicious
prosecution begins to accrue at the time of a favorable termination of a criminal proceeding, coverage under an
insurance policy is instead triggered when damage begins to accrue - that is, with malicious prosecution, almost
immediately. See Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 232 A.2d 168, 175 (N.J. Super. 1967)("In
a claim based on malicious prosecution the damage begins to flow from the very commencement of the tortious
conduct-the making of the criminal complaint."). w
r has been favorably cited in Idaho. See National Aviation
Underwriters, Inc, v. Idaho Aviation Center, 96 Idaho 663, 670,471 P.2d 55, 57 (1970) ("It is well settled that the
time of the occurrence of an 'accident,' within the meaning of a liability indemnity policy, is not the time the
wrongful act was committed but the time the complaining party was actually damaged")
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As such, plaintiff cannot be granted summary judgment on this point.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be
denied. Oral argument is requested.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

.r"day of December, 2006.

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
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MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,
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VS.

DEFENDANT NORTHLAND
INSURANCE COMPANIES'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES.
Defendant.

COMES NOW defendant, Northland Insurance Companies (whose proper name and
identity herein is Northfield Insurance Company)(hereinafter "defendant Northfield"), by and
through its undersigned counsel of record, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and
move this Court for an order dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
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("plaintiffs' Complaint") with prejudice, on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of
material fact, and that defendant Northfield is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
This motion is based upon the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Northland
Insurance Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Bryan R. Martens in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Suport of
Defendant Northland Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of
Bryan A. Nickels in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Company's Motion for Summary
Judgment, all of which are filed herewith, as well as all pleadings and papers on file in this
action.
Should the Court deny defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in whole or in part,
defendant Northfield requests, as an alternative, that the Court enter an order, pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), specifying what facts appear without substantial controversy.
Defendant Northfield requests oral argument.
DATED this

day of March, 2007.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.
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DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
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UNDERWRITERS,
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CaseNo. CV OC 0617112

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES' MOTION FOR
OVERLENGTH BRIEF AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES,
Defendant.

BASED UPON written motion and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Motion for
Overlength Brief is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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District Judge
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Phillip J. Collaer, ISB No. 3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
2 5 0 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, ldaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
(208) 344-551 0
Facsimile:
E-Mail: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com

$. DAVID NAVARHO, Qlerk
By J. EARLE
DEPUW

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS,
CaseNo. C V O C 0 6 1 7 1 1 2
Plaintiff,
vs.

NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES,
a Minnesota corporation,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD
INSURANCE COMPANIES'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 9, 2003, Donald Paradis filed a Complaint in the Federal District
Court for the District of ldaho naming as defendants Kootenai County, Glen Walker,
Marc Haws, Peter Erbland, and George Elliott as defendants.
Exhibit A.

See

Complaint,

These individuals, as well as Kootenai County, were ICRMP insureds.

When the Complaint was filed, Kootenai County was insured by ICRMP.
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forwarded a copy of the Complaint to the ICRMP Claims Department.

See Affidavit

of Richard B. Ferguson, 73.
ICRMP, upon receiving the Paradis Complaint, forwarded a copy of the suit
papers t o its reinsurer, NorthlandINorthfield Insurance Companies. See Affidavit of
Richard B. Ferguson, 73.

ICRMP also reviewed the allegations in the Paradis

Complaint for potential coverage.

A decision was made that a duty t o defend

existed. Kootenai County and the other defendants were advised of this decision
and

provided a reservation

of

rights

letter.

See

Complaint,

Exhibit B.

NorthlandINorthfield received a copy of the reservation of rights letter. Id.
Because of potential conflicts of interest, ICRMP, exercising its discretion
over the management of the litigation, retained separate attorneys for Kootenai
County, Mr. Haws, and Mr. Elliott. Again, NorthlandINorthfield was advised of this
decision.

NorthlandINorthfield did not object t o this approach.

See Affidavit

of

Richard B. Ferguson, 75.
For

the

next

two

years,

the

Paradis

litigation

developed.

NorthlandINorthfield received regular reports from ICRMP advising it of the status
of the litigation and the defense costs which were being incurred on behalf of the
ICRMP insureds.

See Affidavit

of Richard B. Ferguson, 14. The defense that was

being extended t o the insureds was a complete defense of all claims in the Paradis
Complaint. Id. Again, throughout this time, NorthlandINorthfield never voiced any
concerns or objections that multiple law firms were being used t o defend the
insureds or that a complete defense was being provided. Id., 714,5.
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On February 13, 2006,

nearly t w o years after the Paradis litigation

commenced, NorthlandlNorthfield advised ICRMP that it would be taking the
position that coverage did not exist for any of the claims described in the Paradis
Complaints.

Complaint, Exhibit C.

Correspondence was exchanged between

ICRMP and NorthlandlNorthfield addressing the coverage issues.

Through that

process, Northland/Northfield was advised that the Honorable Lynn B. Winrnill, the
federal judge assigned t o the liability case, had issued a ruling which characterized
a number of the Paradis claims as continuing torts.

It was ICRMP's position, at

that time, that the existence of a continuing tort describing negligence, false arrest,
false imprisonment, or violations of Mr. Paradis' constitutional rights described
potentially covered claims which obligated ICRMP to provide a defense.
Complaint,

Exhibit D.

NorthlandlNorthfield, through its claims handler (Eric

Martensen) summarily dismissed the legal reasoning of Judge Winmill concluding
that a continuing tort did not exist and, for that reason, coverage would not arise.

See Complaint,

Exhibit E.

Shortly after NorthlandlNorthfield made the decision to deny coverage, the
ongoing defense costs associated with the litigation caused ICRMP t o consider the
possibility of mediating a settlement.

See Affidavit of

Richard B. Ferguson, 18. A t

that point, the defense costs had reached $400,000, exceeding the self-insured
retention owed by ICRMP under the NorthlandlNorthfield policy. It was anticipated
that through trial the defense costs, which would include the expenses relating t o
expert witnesses, would exceed $2,000,000.

@.

In light of the considerable
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exposure ICRMP faced for future defense costs, coupled with the possibility of an
adverse judgment being entered against its insureds, ICRMP made the decision that
mediation should be pursued.
ICRMP solicited

Id., q9. Although it was not obligated t o do so,

Northland/Northfield's

discussions and mediation.

input and participation in settlement

Complaint, Exhibit 7. NorthIandlNorthfield ratified

its earlier breach of contract by restating its previous position that coverage did not
exist and advising ICRMP it would not participate in mediation or settlement.

See

Complaint, Exhibit G.
Thereafter, the case was mediated and a favorable settlement reached. See
Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson,

71 I.

The settlement required ICRMP t o pay

$800,000,which was less than the anticipated costs to litigate the case through
trial. ,

9

, I I . The settlement also extinguished the insureds' exposure to a

claim for attorneys' fees from the attorneys who had represented Mr. Paradis
through the habeas corpus litigation. The potential exposure for that aspect of the
constitutional claims alone exceeded $2,000,000.See Affidavit of Richard B.
Ferguson,

7 12.

ICRMP has, for many years, purchased reinsurance from Northland and its
subsidiary Northfield. See Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 72. ICRMP purchases
reinsurance in order t o reallocate a portion of the risk it assumes when it issues an
insurance policy to an insured such as Kootenai County.

Id..

By purchasing

reinsurance, ICRMP reduces the amount of reserves it is required to maintain which
allows it the financial security to issue additional insurance policies or make
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investments. Id.
Throughout its longstanding relationship with NorthlandINorthfield, ICRMP
has routinely provided a complete defense t o its insureds when they are sued for
covered and non-covered claims.

Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 73. Until

the Paradis litigation, NorthlandINorthfield has never sought t o allocate its
reimbursement obligation by refusing t o pay for attorneys' fees expended in cases
involving covered and non-covered claims.

Id. Additionally, NorthlandINorthfield

has never refused or attempted t o allocate its reimbursement obligation relating to
settlement monies paid to resolve suits where covered and non-covered claims are
pled.

- In all of these cases, once ICRMP's SIR is exhausted? a billing for
Id.

reimbursement is presented to NorthlandINorthfield.
any request for allocation or apportionment.

That billing is paid without

Id.

II.
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE NORTHFIELD AND ICRMP INSURANCE POLICIES
From the time of its formation and including the 2000-2001 policy year,
ICRMP has purchased reinsurance from Northland Insurance Companies. Northfield
Insurance Company is a subsidiary of Northland.
The Northfield policy at issue in this case identifies the named reinsured as
ICRMP. The policy reads:

NAMED REINSURED:
ICRMP COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMETN
PROGRAM,
A
JOINT
POWERS
AUTHORITY and ail Boards, Departments, Divisions,
Commissions, Authorities, and any other activities under
the supervision or control of the J.P.A. whether now or
hereafter constituted.
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See Northfield Policy, Pg. 1.
The policy extends various coverages, including comprehensive general
liability (Section II) and errors and omissions coverage (Section IV).

The policy

limits are defined at pages 2-3. Potential payments to ICRMP are described as a
component of the "ultimate net loss" and are qualified by ICRMP's self-insured
retention of $150,000.

See Northfield Policy,

Pg. 3.

The term "ultimate net loss"

is defined and includes the "total sum" ICRMP becomes obligated t o pay by reason
of personal injury or property damage claims either through adjudication or
compromise.

The definition recognizes the "total sum" owed by Northfield would

include salaries, wages, law costs, expenses for lawyers and investigators, or other
persons for litigation settlement, adjustment, and investigations or claims or suits.

See Northfield Policy,

Pg. 40.

The Northfield policy identifies the ICRMP claims department as the entity
charged with the responsibility and duty of defending and settling all claims.
Northfield Policy, Pg. 5

(111, Service

Organization).

See

In that portion of the policy,

Northfield is given the opportunity t o be associated with the defense or control of
any claim or suit.

However, the NorthlandINorthfield policy does not contain

language giving NorthiandINorthfield the right to override settlement decisions that

Id. ICRMP is also required to furnish
are made by the ICRMP Claims Department. monthly claims reports to Northfield. - !@

Northfield is required t o promptly

reimburse ICRMP for any and all payments made in excess of the SIR.

See

Northfield Policy. Pg. 39.
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Coverage under the comprehensive general liability insuring agreement of the
Northfield policy is extended as follows:
COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL
LIABILITY:
A
Underwriters hereby agree, subject to the limitations,
terms and conditions hereunder mentioned, to indemnify
the Assured for all sums, including expenses, all as more
fully defined by the term ultimate net loss, which the
Assured shall become legally obligated t o pay as damages
imposed by law because of bodily injury, property
damage, personal injury, advertising injury, products
liability andlor completed operations, hostlliquor liability
or incidental malpractice which result from an occurrence
and which occur during the policy period.

C - LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY: Underwriters
hereby agree, subject t o the limitations, terms and
conditions hereunder mentioned, to indemnify the
Assured for all sums which the assured shall be obligated
t o pay by reason of errors, omission or negligent acts
arising out of the performance of the Assured's duties
while acting as a law enforcement official or officer i n the
regular course of public employment as hereinafter
defined, arising out of any occurrence from any cause on
account of Personal Injury, Bodily Injury, Property
Damage, Violation of Civil Rights or First Aid, happening
during the period of this insurance accept as covered
under Section II A and B.

See Northfield Policy,

Pg. 13.

The term "personal injury" is defined at Page 14 of the Northfield policy as
follows:
PERSONAL INJURY - The term "personal injury"
wherever used herein, shall mean Bodily Injury, Mental
Anguish, Shock, Sickness, Disease, Disability, Wrongful
Eviction,
Malicious
Prosecution,
Discrimination,
Humiliation, Invasion of Rights of Privacy, Libel, Slander,
or Defamation of Character; also Piracy and any
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FO
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Infringement of Copyright or of Property, Erroneous
Service of
Civil Papers, Assault
and Battery,
Disparagement of
Property,
False Arrest,
False
Imprisonment, and Detention.
The term "occurrence" is defined at page 6 as follows:
For Section II, "occurrence" means an accident or a
happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure
t o conditions which result in personal injury or damage t o
property during the policy. All personal injuries to one or
more persons and/or property damage arising out of an
accident or a happening or event or a continuous or
repeated exposure t o conditions shall be deemed t o be
one occurrence.
The comprehensive general liability insuring agreement in the relevant ICRMP
policy contains very similar, if not identical, insuring language as appears in the
Northfield policy.

Under the ICRMP policy, coverage under the comprehensive

general liability insuring agreement is extended as follows:
COVERAGE A - Comprehensive General Liability. We
agree, subject to the terms and conditions of this
Coverage, to pay on your behalf those sums which you
become legally obligated t o pay as damages for personal
injury or property damage which arise out of an
occurrence during the Policy Period.

COVERAGE C - Law Enforcement Liability. We agree,
subject to the terms and conditions of this Coverage, t o
pay on your behalf all sums which you become obligated
to pay by reason of errors, omissions, or negligent acts
arising out of the performance of your duties while
providing any law enforcement services or the
administration of first aid resulting in personal injury or
property damage during the Policy Period.
See ICRMP Policy,
-

Pg. 14.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

000121

The term "occurrence" is defined at page 14, 78, of the ICRMP policy as
follows:
"Occurrence" means an accident or a continuous or
repeated exposure t o conditions which result i n personal
injury or property damage during the Policy Period. All
personal injuries to one or more persons and/or property
damage arising out of an accident or a continuous or
repeated exposure t o conditions shall be deemed one
occurrence.
The term "personal injury" is defined at page 15, 79, of the policy as
follows:
"Personal Injury" means bodily injury, mental anguish,
shock, sickness, disease, disability, wrongful eviction,
malicious
prosecution,
discrimination,
humiliation,
invasion of rights or privacy, libel, slander or defamation
of character, piracy and any infringement of copyright'or
property, erroneous service of civil papers, assault and
battery and disparagement of property. As respects t o
Coverage C only, personal injury shall also mean false
arrest, false imprisonment, detention and violation of civil
rights arising out of law enforcement activities.
Reading the t w o policies together, and focusing on the general liability
insuring agreements, Northfield has agreed t o indemnify ICRMP, its "named
reinsured", for all sums and expenses which are included i n the term "ultimate net
loss" which ICRMP becomes legally obligated t o pay because of bodily injuries or
personal injuries arising out of an occurrence during the policy period. This would
extend to claims involving the violation of civil rights, malicious prosecution,
humiliation, invasion of rights, privacy, defamation of character, false arrest, false
imprisonment, and detention.

See Northfield

Policy, Pg. 14 (definition personal

injury). Under the Northfield policy, the defendant is required t o reimburse ICRMP
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD iNSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FO
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for "law costs" which include "expenses for lawyers and investigators and other
persons for litigation, settlement, adjustment, or investigation of claims or suits".
Reimbursement must occur promptly after ICRMP exhausts its self insured
retention.
If one reviews the insuring agreement and definitions relating to the
comprehensive general liability coverages offered by the ICRMP and the Northfield
policies, it becomes very clear the insuring language is very similar, if not identical.
Both policies provide coverage for "occurrences" that cause property damage or
"personal injury". Both policies define "personal injury" t o include violations of civil
rights, malicious prosecution, defamation, false arrest, false imprisonment, and
negligence. The Northfield policy specifically contemplates reimbursing ICRMP for
"law costs" which are defined as costs ICRMP incurred defending potentially
covered claims or settlements arising under the comprehensive general liability
insuring agreement;

For the purposes of this motion, the Court must determine

whether a potentially covered claim existed.

If it did, ICRMP is entitled to the

recovery of its defense costs, as well as the settlement monies paid.

111.

DUTY TO DEFEND
In the briefing NorthlandINorthfield has provided this Court, the defendant
has advanced an interpretation of an insurer's duty t o defend that is restricted and
is inconsistent with the holdings of the Idaho appellate courts and many other
jurisdictions.

In the memorandum in opposition to ICRMP's motion for summary
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judgment, Northfield makes the generalized statement that an insurer's duty to
defend is not absolute.

See

Memorandum in Opposition, Pg. 16.

Other than

restating the general rule that an insured must establish an affirmative link t o
coverages afforded by the policy, Northfield provides no other guidance for this
proposition, other than the conclusion that it feels that coverage would not exist
because the events surrounding Mr. Paradis' conviction took place prior to the
issuance of the Northfield policies.
The ldaho Supreme Court has consistently ruled that an insurer's duty to
defend and its corresponding duty t o indemnity are separate obligations.

See City

of ldaho Falls v. Home Indemnity Co., 126 ldaho 404, 8 8 8 P2d. 3 8 3 (1995). The
duty to defend is a separate and much broader obligation.

See Hirst v. St. Paul Fire

& Marine Ins. Co., 106 ldaho 792, 683 P2d. 440 (Ct. App. 1984). The duty to

defend arises upon the filing of a complaint containing allegations that, in whole or
in part, read broadly, reveals a potential for liability that would be covered by the
insured's policy.

See

Hoyle v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 137 ldaho 367, 4 8 P3d.

1256 (2002). See also ICRMP's memorandum in support and reply memorandum
in support of its motion for summary judgment.
When there are covered and non-covered claims contained in the same
lawsuit, the insurer is obligated to provide a defense t o the entire suit.

See Annot.,

4 1 A.L.R. 2d. 434 (1955). The obligation t o provide a complete defense arises
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pled nolo contendre t o allegations involving child molestation. The insurer filed a
declaratory judgment action alleging the actions of the teacher did not fall within
the policy's coverage and were excluded as criminal or intentional acts. The trial
court agreed ruling that all of the teacher's acts were either sexual or intentional in
nature.

On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed noting that the

allegations in the complaint "although lacking in specificity ...evidences a possibility
that Gary Lee [the teacher1 would be held liable for damages within the coverage of
the policy stemming from Lee's negligent non-sexual 'conduct in his public
relationship with Barbara."

Id. at 797.

The court rejected the insurance

company's argument that the predominant factor of the case was the non-covered
criminal and intentional acts by writing:
The argument misconceives the role of the court in
determining the duty t o defend. We look not to whether
non-covered acts predominate in the third party's action,
but rather to where there is any potential for liability
under the policy (Gray, supra, 65 Cal. 2d. at pgs. 275276). Since the insurer has a duty t o defend the entire
third party action if any claim encompassed within it
potentially may be covered (absent allocation, as noted
above), the mere fact that Horace Mann could not
indemnify Lee for the molestation did not eliminate its
duty to defend other possibly covered claims.
Id. at 797-798 (emphasis in original).
The holdings of the California Supreme Court in Horace Mann are consistent
with Hirst v. St. PaulFire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 792, 683 P2d. at 4 4 0 (Ct.
App. 1984). In Hirst, the insured (Dr. Donohue) was sued for allegedly drugging
his patient, who was a minor, and performing sexual acts upon the child against his
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will.

The insurer refused to defend on the grounds the allegations of sexual

misconduct did not involve covered claims. When the coverage issue reached the
Court of Appeals, the court concluded that St. Paul had breached its duty to
defend the doctor. The court specifically found that the original complaint alleged
the

doctor

had

"committed

various

acts

of

negligence and

professional

malpractice". The court recognized that although the allegations of negligence and
professional malpractice were later determined to not be supported by the record,
they did describe claims broad enough t o include potential liability for a covered
claim which triggered St. Paul's duty t o defend. The fact the original complaint
also contained non-covered

claims arising

from

the allegations

of

sexual

molestation did not diminish the insurer's obligation to defend the entire suit.
Although an insurer must defend all claims in a suit, it is generally recognized
that it may withdraw the defense once there is no longer any potential future
liability for a covered claim.

See Lee

v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 178 F2d.

750 (2ndCir. 1949). The timing of a withdrawl was explained by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Meadowbrook v. Tower Ins. Co., Inc., 559 NW2d. 41 1 (1997)
where the court wrote:
Although we have concluded that insurers may withdraw
from a defense once all arguably covered claims have
been dismissed, we must determine at what point the
dismissal of the defamation claims became final. An
insurer's duty to defend claims arguably within the
policy's coverage extends until it can be concluded as a
matter o f law that there is no basis on which the insurer
may be obligated t o indemnify the insured. Woida v.
North Star Mut. Ins. CO., 306 NW2d. 570, 574 (Minn.
1981). As a result, the duty t o defend extends through
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the appellate process. See F.A. Appleman Ins. Law and
Practice, Section 4688 at 200 (Burdall Ed. 1979) (the
insurer's obligation to defend the suit against the insured
does not end with a successful verdict in the trial court,
but includes the defense of any appeals that the claimant
may make). See also City of West Haven v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 894 F2d. 540, 545-46 (2d. Cir. 1990).

See 5 5 9 NW2d at 418
-

(emphasis in original). See also Commerce & Industry Ins.

Co. v. Bank of Hawaii, 73 Hawaii 322, 8 3 2 P2d. 733 (1992) (insurer may not
withdraw from its insured's defense until a final judgment has disposed of the
covered claims).
Applying these principles to the present case, the Court must examine the
legal and factual allegations in the complaints filed by Donald Paradis, treat them as
being factually true, and compare those allegations against the coverages in the
ICRMP and Northfield policies to determine whether they described potentially
covered claims.

See Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 372-372.

If there is a single allegation in

the Paradis complaints which described a potentially covered claim, ICRMP was
obligated t o defend the entire lawsuit, including the non-covered claims.

The

obligation t o defend continued until all covered claims were dismissed and any
potential appeal had expired. As outlined below, the Paradis complaint describes a
number of potentially covered claims which required ICRMP to defend the entire
lawsuit.
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THE COMPLAINTS FILED BY DONALD PARADIS DESCRIBE POTENTIALLY
COVERED CLAIMS
In the memorandum filed in support of its motion for summary judgment,
ICRMP outlined the allegations in the first Paradis complaint that described
potentially covered claims.

Memorandum in Support, Pgs. 7-8. These claims

alleged that Mr. Paradis' civil rights were violated when he was convicted of the
murder of Kimberly Palmer. Paradis also alleged the ICRMP insureds continued to
violate his civil rights for the many years following his conviction.
Complaint,

768.

See

Paradis

The alleged ongoing civil rights violations surrounded the

contention that exculpatory evidence was withheld during the time Paradis was in
prison challenging his conviction through various habeas corpus proceedings.
Paradis further alleged this course of illegal conduct constituted negligence, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment.
Counts IV and V.

Paradis Complaint,

Finally, Mr. Paradis alleged that defendant Haws made a

negligence choice to withhold evidence and thereafter continue his secrecy after
Paradis was convicted and incarcerated.

See

Paradis Complaint, 71 18. Paradis

also alleged that Haws made untrue statements t o the press up t o the time he was
See Paradis Complaint, 722.
released from prison. These allegations described potentially covered claims under both the
Northfield and ICRMP definitions of "personal injury".

In both policies, personal

injury is defined to include emotional distress or mental anguish caused by
negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, violations of civil rights, defamation,
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and invasion of privacy.

Northfield Policy, Pg. 14; ICRMP Policy, Pg. 15, 79.

The only question is whether the Paradis Complaint alleged that any of these
constitutional violations or torts occurred during the time Northfield was providing
reinsurance t o ICRMP.
The First Amended Complaint was filed by Mr. Paradis following the
resolution of various motions to dismiss filed by the ICRMP insureds. In his order
resolving these motions, Judge Winmill concluded that the claims for false arrest,
false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress accrued on April
10, 2001, the date Mr. Paradis was released from prison.

See Order, Pg. 45.

The

judge based his ruling on Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 8 5 0 P2d. 749 (1993)
writing:
The longer statute of limitations for a false arrestlfalse
imprisonment cause of action is distinguishable from the
defamation claim in Lewis v. Gupta, because false
arrestlfalse imprisonment, unlike defamation, is deemed a
"continuing tort".
See Opinion,
-

Pg. 44, N. 17

The Court did not address the negligent training or negligent supervision
claims against Kootenai County noting that Paradis had alleged a pattern and
practice of permitting Brady v. Maryland violations and other wrongful acts in the
context of his civil rights claims.

However, because of a lack of clarity i n these

allegations, rather than grant the County's Motion to Dismiss on immunity or
statute of limitations grounds, the Court directed Paradis t o amend the Complaint
See Order, Pgs. 48-49.
t o clarify his claims. -
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After Judge Winmill ruled on the Motions to Dismiss, Mr. Paradis filed the
First Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, he restated his claims for
civil rights violations, and claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.
Throughout the Amended Complaint Paradis very carefully described his claims as
continuing torts. The relevant portions of the Amended Complaint state:
92. The duty t o disclose and the duty to train in the
requirements of disclosing exculpatory evidence t o
criminal convicts under Brady is a continuing duty and
does not cease with the conviction and incarceration of
the criminal .defendant.

97. Despite the requirements of the Brady doctrine and
the known implications of such requirements affecting
the rights of criminal defendants and the duties and
activities of law enforcement personnel, in 1980 and
1981 - and indeed, continuing for years thereafter ... the
customs, policies and practices of Kootenai County,
particularly its prosecuting attorney and sheriff, displayed
and reflected a deliberate indifference t o and conscious
disregard for the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants generally, and the plaintiff in particular.
98.
Defendants Kootenai County and Walker,
respectively, failed t o provide Kootenai County police
officers and prosecuting attorneys with adequate training
or supervision in the requirements of Brady v. Maryland
and the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
See First Amended Complaint,
-

TjlJ92-98 (emphasis added).

The state law negligence claims incorporated the continuing tort allegations
and alleged an ongoing pattern and practice of negligent training and supervision.
Amended Complaint, Count VII.

Finally, at Count X, Paradis alleged ongoing
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and continuing negligence on the part of Mr. Haws surrounding his alleged failure
t o disclose evidence which would have exonerated Paradis. These allegations were
not limited to the criminal trial. Instead, according to Paradis, Haws continued to
conceal evidence while he was in prison attempting t o challenge his conviction
through the appellate and habeas corpus litigation.

See Count X,

1 188. The fact

the Paradis claims extended t o his incarceration is highlighted by the allegations in
71 9 0 of the First Amended Complaint which states: "In fact, Plaintiff Paradis was
scheduled for execution on three different occasions when Haws continued to
conceal his notes and knowledge."
These allegations, as with the first Complaint, described potentially covered
claims under the definition of "personal injury" in both the Northfield and ICRMP
policies.

The Amended Complaint also, unambiguously, alleged ongoing tortious

and unconstitutional conduct on the part of the ICRMP insureds occurring after Mr.
Paradis was incarcerated which continued until he was released from prison in April
of 2001. The legal question, for purposes of coverage, is whether the allegation of
continuing torts and continuing violations of civil rights describe an "occurrence" as
that term is defined in both the ICRMP and Northfield policies.
A.

The Amended complaint describes an occurrence which caused personal
injury during the Northfield and ICRMP policy periods.
in its motion, Northfield argues it is not obligated to reimburse or indemnify

ICRMP for any costs relating t o the defense or settlement of the Paradis litigation.
To support its position, Northfield argues that all of the constitutional and state law
claims were limited t o the events surrounding Mr. Paradis' arrest in 1 9 8 0 and his
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conviction in 1981. See Defendant's Brief, Pg. 22. Northfield argues that because
the arrest and conviction took place in the early 1980's, the "occurrence", which is
the trigger for coverage under the general liability section of both the Northfield and
ICRMP policies, took'place no later than 1981.

See

Defendant's Brief, Pg. 25.

Northfield then argues coverage would not attach t o damages that were caused by
the events that occurred in 1980 and 1981.
The flaw in this argument is Northfield's failure to consider the actual
allegations contained in the Paradis Complaints. As outlined in Section Ill, supra,
an insurer's duty t o defend is determined solely by the factual allegations and legal
theories pled in the liability complaint. See Hoyle at 371-372; see also Amco Ins.
Co. v. Tri Spur Investment Co., 1 4 0 Idaho 733, 738, 101 P2d. 226, 231 (2004).

Those allegations must be read broadly, assumed to be true, and then compared
against the coverages available in the insurance policy.

Extrinsic facts or unpled

legal theories cannot be considered to create or defeat an insurer's duty t o defend.

See

Hoyle at 373.

If the allegations in the Complaint, read broadly, create a

potential for coverage, an insurer must provide a defense. Id..
The Amended Complaint filed by Mr. Paradis specifically alleged that the
ICRMP insureds were obligated t o disclose exculpatory evidence after the time he
was convicted.

See Amended

Complaint, 792.

The Amended Complaint also

alleges this was a continuing duty that was breached during the time Paradis was
incarcerated.

Id. at

7797-98. Paradis further alleged these continued violations of

state and federal law caused him to suffer additional damages which did not end
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until he w a s released from prison.

See Amended

Complaint, t j ~ 1 0 1 ,139, 180,

198, 21 1, 21 4. These allegations, a s they apply t o the constitutional and the state

law claims for false imprisonment and false arrest were recognized by Judge
Winmill in the underlying liability case t o be continuing torts.
N. 17.

See Opinion.

Pg. 44,

Contrary t o the argument of Northfield, Mr. Paradis did not allege the

tortious actions of the ICRMP insureds ended when he w a s convicted.

Instead,

Paradis alleged the ICRMP insureds continued t o breach their legal duties and, a s a
result, he continued to suffer damage throughout his incarceration.
A continuing tort w a s described by the ldaho Supreme Court in Curtis v.
Firth, 123 ldaho 598, 850 P2d. 749 (1993) a s involving "...a series of acts over a

Id, a t
period of time, rather than a single act causing severe emotional distress." -

604

.A

plain reading' of the allegations in the amended liability complaint reveais

Mr. Paradis w a s alleging the ICRMP insureds engaged in a series of acts over a
period of time, rather than a single a c t (his conviction), which caused him severe
emotional distress. On that basis, the coverage issue must be resolved by asking
whether t h e fact a continuing tort which began in 1980 and ended in April of 2001
would meet the definition of an occurrence a s that term appears in the Northfield
and ICRMP insurance policies.
1.

Continuing torts are "occurrences" a s the term is defined in a general
liability insuring agreement.

The Northfield policy defines an occurrence a s "...an accident or a happening
or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in
personal injury or damage t o property during the policy period."

The definition
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further states that damages arising out of a continued or repeated exposure will be
deemed a single occurrence.

See

Northfield Policy, Pg. 6.

The definition of

"occurrence" in the ICRMP policy is nearly identical to the definition utilized in the
Northfield policy.

See

ICRMP Policy, Pg. 14, 78. The t w o policies are therefore

consistent and afford the same coverage.

The plain language of this definition

clearly contemplates coverage will extend t o continuing torts.

A "continuous or

repeated exposure t o conditions", i.e. ongoing tortious conduct, is consistent with
the standard for a continuing tort set forth in Curtis v. Firth, supra, where the court
held the continuing tort involves a "series of acts over a period of time". Clearly, a
continuing tort would constitute an occurrence under the Northfield and ICRMP
policies.
In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 1 4 2 Wis. 2d.

673, 4 1 9 NW2d. 255 (1987) the insured, Wisconsin Electric Power Company
(WEPCo) installed a three-phase power supply to the dairy farm of the plaintiff,
Daggett.

Shortly after its installation, the Daggetts noticed unusual behavior on

the part of their cows which resulted i n a decline in milk production, failure t o
breed, ill health, and sometimes death.

In 1981, eleven years after the power

supply was installed, it was determined the damages to the plaintiff's cattle were
caused by stray voltage from the three-phase power supply installed by WEPCo.
Suit was filed in 1983 seeking t o recover the damage caused to the Daggetts'
cows.

A t trial, the jury awarded damages in excess of $1,000,000.

Before

judgment was entered, WEPCo and the plaintiffs entered into a settlement whereby
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the power company agreed to pay slightly more than $1,000,000 over a period of
years.

WEPCo's insurance carriers, including Cal Union, approved of the

settlement. Thereafter, WEPCo and the insurers entered into discussions aimed t o
allocate the loss. A compromise was reached to allocate on a pro rata basis. Cal
Union would not agree t o the compromise because it felt it was not obligated to
provide coverage or indemnity to WEPCo. This position was based upon the fact
that Cal Union did not issue an insurance contract t o WEPCo until 1977, seven
years after the defective three-phase power supply had been installed.

On that

basis, Cal Union argued an occurrence had not happened during the policy period.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this argument writing:
We agree with the reasoning of the Keene decision. Cal
Union's policy states "[tlhe word "occurrence" ... means
... a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which
result in ... property damage neither expected or intended
by the assured. All ... exposure to ... the same general
conditions existing and/or emanating from one location or
source shall be deemed one occurrence. A perfectly
reasonable interpretation of this language, and the
interpretation advance by WEPCO, is that as long as
there is harmful exposure to dangerous conditions, the
occurrence is continuing. As in Keene, while any part of
the single injurious process continues, the occurrence
continues.
See 4 0 1 9 NW2d. at 681.
In the Wisconsin Electric Power Co. case, the tortious act, the continuing
stray voltage, was ongoing from the time the power supply was installed until the
insured, WEPCo, corrected the problem.

In other words, WEPCo continued t o

engage i n tortious activity which continued t o expose the plaintiff's cattle to stray
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voltage causing the plaintiff t o suffer ongoing property damage over an eleven-year
period.

Because of the continuing nature of the tort, tortious activity did occur

during the time WEPCo was insured by Cal Union. For that reason, the allegations
against WEPCo described an occurrence as defined by the insurance policy.
also County
-

See

of Suffolk v. Travelers Ins. Co., 267 F . Supp. 2d. 288 (E.D. N.Y.

2003) (a continuing nuisance claim triggers the duty t o indemnify and defend under
a comprehensive general liability policy defining an occurrence as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily or
property damage neither expected or intended from the standpoint of the
[county]").
The affect of a continuing tort i n the context of a claim brought under 42
U.S.C. 31983 was recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F2d. 918, 924 (gth Cir.) cert. denied. 459 U.S. 971

(1982). The court characterized the ongoing illegal actions of the defendant as a
continuing violation which arose i n the context of a continuing policy and practice
of discrimination. To prevail under a continuing violation theory, the plaintiff was
required to show a policy or practice that operated at least, in part, within the
statute of limitations time period.
In this case, according t o Mr. Paradis, the ICRMP insureds continued t o
engage in unconstitutional and tortious activities surrounding the withholding of
exculpatory evidence and failing t o supervise employees long after he was
incarcerated.

According to Paradis, this tortious activity continued until he was
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released from prison. These allegations describe a continuing tort and a continuing
constitutional violation which would meet the definition of an occurrence as
defined by the Northfield insurance policy.

Based upon the allegations in the

Paradis Complaint, the entire pattern of tortious activity from 1 9 8 0 until Mr.
Paradis was released from prison constituted a single occurrence.

Because the

occurrence took place, in part, during the Northfield policy period, coverage exists.
In Unigard Ins. Co. v. USF&G, 1 1 1 Idaho 891,728 P2d 7 8 0 (Ct. App. 19861,
the court was asked to decide whether a series of repetitive events causing
multiple incidences of damage could constitute a single occurrence under a general
liability insurance policy. The case involved damage caused t o various units at a
mini storage facility located i n Pocatello, Idaho. The insured's employee performed
snow clearing services at the property.

During a four-hour period where the

employee was plowing snow, he damaged the overhead doors on 9 8 separate
storage units. The insurance company took the position that each damaged door
was the result of a separate occurrence which triggered a separate $500
deductible for each event.

Because of the amount of damage t o each door was

less than the $500 deductible, Unigard refused to pay.
On appeal, the court recognized the various approaches taken by courts in
cases involving multiple occurrences.

The court concluded the most useful

approach has been the "continuous process" test which focuses upon the
underlying cause rather than the individual events damage. The critical inquiry was
described as being whether or not the damage causing process was continuous and
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repetitive.

See1 11 ldaho at 893.

This caused the court to write:

The question remains whether the damage was caused
by a single occurrence. We hold that it was. The cause
of damage - the negligence of Campbell's employee was continuous and repetitive. He inflicted 98 similar
injuries during the four-hour course of snow clearing
activity. Under the continuous process test, there was
but one "occurrence". Campbell was responsible for only
one deductible. See 1 1 1 ldaho at 894.
The fact the ldaho courts have adopted the continuous process analysis is
critical in this case. It is consistent with the holdings in Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of
North America, 667 F2d. 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) cert. denied. 455 U.S. 1007

(1982) involving asbestos litigation.

In that case, the court concluded that the

asbestos exposure and resultant disease was a continuous process which
constituted a single occurrence triggering coverage on all liability policies which
were in place throughout the occurrence.

The court concluded that once the

insurer's policy was triggered, it was required t o defend and indemnify its
policyholder to the extent of its entire policy limits even though part of the injury
may have occurred outside its policy period.

A similar analysis was utilized in Dioceses of Winona v. Interstate Fire &

(athCir.

1996) involving longstanding and repeated

sexual abuse by a pedophilic priest.

The Dioceses was sued for its negligent

Casualty Co., 89 F3d. 1386

supervision of the priest. The abuse of the plaintiff began i n October of 1979 and
continued until February of 1987. The court described the occurrence as "the
continuous and repeated exposure of Mrozka [liability plaintiff1 t o the negligent
supervision of Father Adamson by both the Diocese and the Archdiocese. Because
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the negligence of the insured took place, at least in part, during the policy period
causing the plaintiff t o suffer injury, coverage existed.
A similar conclusion was. reached in National Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Mt.
Vernon, 128 AD2d. 332, 51 5 NYS2d. 267 ( 1 987) involving a claim for false
imprisonment where the plaintiff was wrongfully incarcerated for t w o years. The
insurer refused to defend the action arguing the arrest occurred before the effective
date of the policy. This argument was rejected with the court writing:
Contrary t o National's contentions, the language of the
occurrence clause herein ascribes no temporal relevance
t o the cause of the event preceding the covered injury,
but rather premises coverage exclusively upon the
sustaining of specified injuries during the policy period.
Thus, the pertinent policy provision provides coverage for
an "occurrence"
and, thereafter, states that an
occurrence means "an event ... which results in personal
injury ... sustained during rhe policy period ." (emphasis
added).
Indeed, as one commentator has stated i n
discussing a similar provision, "[the] policy will not
depend upon the cause of event of occurrence, but will
be based upon the injuries or damage which result from
such an event and which happened during the policy
period. It will not be material where the cause of the
event happened during "before the policy period".
Obriest, New Comprehensive Liability Insurance Policy,
General Liability Insurance: 1973 Revisions a t 39;
& Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 6 7 6
F2d. 56, 61-62; Bartholomew v. Ins. Co. of North
America, 502 F. Supp. 246, 252 aff'd Bartholomew v.
Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F2d. 27; American Motorists
Ins. Co. v. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d. 222;
Deodato v. Hartford Ins. Co., 143 NJ, super, 396, 3 6 3
A2d. 361 affirmed 1 5 4 NJ supra 263, 81 A2d. 354;
Acorn Ponds v. Hartford Ins. Co., 105 A2d. 723, 724;
Annot. 27 ALR 4th 382). We note, moreover, that there
is nothing in the policy which requires, as a prerequisite
to ascertain whether there is coverage, that the injury
resulting from a causative event be reduced t o a single or

see

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 27

fixed occurrence in time. Nor does the policy distinguish,
in terms of coverage, between compensable injuries
which are continuous in nature and those whose
occurrence is discrete and noncontinuous or requires that
a personal injury take place in its entirety during the
policy period. These omissions are particularly significant
in that the policy specifically recognizes that an injury can
be caused by "continuous or repeated exposure t o
- Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co., 667 F2d.
conditions" (see
1034, 1049, cert denied, 455 U.S. 1007). Accordingly,
the operating event triggering the exposure, and thus
resulting in coverage under the policy, is the sustaining of
a specified injury during the policy period.
See 51 5 NYS2d. at 270.
-

In this case, the allegations in the Paradis Complaints described continuing
and

repeated events

surrounding

Mr.

Paradis'

conviction

and subsequent

incarceration all of which caused him t o suffer personal injuries throughout the time
he was incarcerated.

Consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in

Unigard Ins. Co., this continuing process describes a single occurrence which

began in 1 9 8 0 and ended in April of 2001 when Paradis was released from prison.
As alleged by Mr. Paradis, the occurrence was ongoing and he was suffering bodily
injuries during the ICRMP and Northfield policy periods. For that reason, a potential
for coverage arose. ICRMP recognized this fact, honored its obligation t o defend
its insureds, and is now entitled to reimbursement from its reinsurer, Northfield.
Accordingly, Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied

THE NORTHFIELD POLICY IS A POLICY OF REINSURANCE
In its brief, Northfield argues the policy of insurance it sold t o ICRMP was
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not reinsurance.

It bases this argument on the lack of a "follow the form" or a

"follow the fortunes" clause in the policy.

See

Memorandum in Support of

Summary Judgment, Pgs. 47-49.
The initial 'flaw in this argument is the fact the

Northfield policy

unambiguously describes its relationship with ICRMP as being based upon
reinsurance. On the first page of the policy, Northfield identifies ICRMP as:
N A M E D REINSURED:
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM,
a
JOINT
POWERS
AUTHORITY, and all Boards, Departments, Divisions,
Commissions, Authorities, and any other activities under
the supervision or control of the JPA whether now or
hereafter constituted.
Northfield Policy, Pg. 1.
To the extent Northfield is now suggesting ICRMP is not its reinsured, it has
conceded its policy is ambiguous as, it has shown the policy is subject to more
than one interpretation.

See Purdy

v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 1 3 8 ldaho 443,

6 5 P3d. 1 8 4 (2003). Any ambiguity must be strictly construed against Northfield
and in favor of its assured, ICRMP.

See

Farmers Inc. Co. v. Talbot, 133 ldaho

428, 987 P2d. 1043 (1999); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 1 0 2 ldaho 138, 627
P2d. 317 (1981) ("...insurance policies are t o be construed most liberally in favor
of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved in favor of the insured").
Northfield's argument also fails to appreciate the purpose of reinsurance and
fails t o recognize its policy accomplishes the traditional goals of reinsurance. The
Northfield policy accepts a substantial portion of the risk ICRMP assumed when it
underwrote the policy that was issued t o Kootenai County and its other insureds.
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Purchasing reinsurance insulates ICRMP from exposure for a large loss, allows it t o
lower its reserves and be financially capable of writing other insurance policies or
making investments.

See Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson,

72.

Reinsurance is a contractual arrangement whereby one insurer transfers all or
a portion of the risk it underwrites by purchasing an insurance policy from another
insurer. See Colonial American Life Ins. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 491

U.S. 2 4 4 (1989). The purpose of reinsurance is its function as a mechanism for
the reallocation of risk from the insurer that originally underwrites a risk to another
insurer.

Kemper Reinsurance Co. v. Corcoran (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 7 9 NY2d.

253, 5 9 0 NE2d. 1186 (1992). The availability of reinsurance enables an insurer,
such as ICRMP, to accept risks that would otherwise be beyond its underwriting
capacity by allowing it to "lay off" on a reinsurer a portion of the risk of loss. On
that basis, reinsurance enables insurers to spread the risk of catastrophic losses
among a larger pool of insurers.

See Excess and Casualty Reinsurance Assoc.

v.

Ins. Commissioner of Cal., 656 F2d. 491 (9'h Cir. 1981). Reinsurance also permits
an insurer to reduce the amount of reserves it would otherwise be required t o
maintain. Kemper Reinsurance Co. v. Corcoran fin re Midland Ins. Go.), 79 NY3d.
253, 582 NYS 58, 590 NE2d. 1188 (1992) (reinsurance "permits a primary insurer
t o reduce the amount of the legally required reserve held for the protection of
policyholders and to increase the company's ability t o underwrite other policies or
make other investments).
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Under an indemnity reinsurance agreement, once the ceding insurer pays a
claim, the reinsurer becomes obligated t o indemnify the ceding insurer in
accordance with the reinsurance contract.

See

China Union Lines, Ltd. v.

American Marine Underwriters, inc., 755 F2d. 2 6 (2"d Cir. 1985). The reinsurer is
not obligated to pay for losses that are not covered by the underlying policy.

See

American Ins. Co. v. North American Company for Property and Casualty Ins., 697
F2d. 7 9 (2"d Cir. 1982). However, a reinsurer cannot second guess the good faith
liability determinations made by its reinsured or the reinsured's good faith decision
t o waive defenses t o which it may be entitled.

Christiania General ins. Corp. v.

Great American Ins. Co., 979 F2d. 268 (2nd
Cir. 1992). The "follow the fortunes"
doctrine will compel the reinsurer "to indemnify for payments reasonably within the

Id.
terms of the original [underlying] policy, even i f technically not covered by it." at 280.

A.

Follow the form clauses

Excess insurers and reinsurers typically agree to provide coverage under the
same terms and conditions of the underlying liability policy.

In order to assure

consistency or what is termed "concurrency" between the coverages afforded by
the primary and reinsured policy, the reinsurance certificate frequently contains
language which is referred t o as a "following the form" clause.

In that instance,

the reinsurance contract is construed as offering the same terms, conditions and
scope of coverage as exist in the reinsured policy in the absence of explicit
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language in the policy of reinsurance to the contrary.

See Aetna

Casualty & Surety

Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 822 F. Supp. 1328, 1337 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).

The fact a follow the form clause does not exist in the Northfield policy does
not lead t o the conclusion that the policy is not one of reinsurance or that the
coverages in the Northfield policy are not the same as those provided in the ICRMP
policy. Here, as outlined in Section II, above, the insuring language in the general
liability insuring agreements in the Northfield and ICRMP policies utilize very similar
language. Despite the fact the Northfield policy does not contain a follow the form
clause, the defendant has, by virtue of the fact it utilized nearly identical language
t o that which appears in the ICRMP policy, achieved concurrency which is the
purpose of including a follow the forms clause in a reinsurance certificate.
Northfield's attempt to characterize the policy as something other than reinsurance
because it does not contain a follow the form clause ignores the plain language of
coverages afforded by its own policy.

The ICRMP and Northfield policies offer the

same coverages which has allowed ICRMP to reallocate a portion of its risk under
the policy it sold to Kootenai County to Northfield. In other words, Northfield has
reinsured the original risks ICRMP assumed when it wrote the policy Kootenai
County later purchased.

B.

Follow the fortunes doctrine.

Contrary t o the argument of Northfield, the obligation of a reinsurer t o honor
the good faith settlements of its reinsured is not dependent upon the existence of a
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"follow the fortunes" or "follow the settlements" clauses.

To the contrary, the

"follow the fortunes" doctrine arises by operation of law even in the absence of a
"loss settlements" clause in the reinsurance contract. This rule was addressed in
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. N.Y.

1995) in a case that arose out of the Dalcon Shield litigation. In the subsequent
dispute between the primary insurer, Aetna, and its reinsurer, The Home, the court
described the follow the fortunes doctrine as follows:

The purpose of the follow the settlements doctrine is t o
prevent the reinsurer from "second guessing" the
settlement decisions of the ceding company. Absent
such a rule, an insurance company would be obligated to
litigate coverage disputes with its insured before paying
any claims, lest it first settle and pay a claim, only t o risk
losing the benefit of reinsurance coverage when the
reinsurer raises i n court the same policy defenses that the
original insurer might have raised against its insured.
New York Marine Ins. Co. v. Protection Ins. Go., 1 8 F.
Cas. 160, 160-61 (CC Mass. 1841) (Story, J.). This
doctrine adjusts the incentives present in the reinsurance
relationship in order to promote good faith settlements by
the ceding company.
See 882 F. Supp. at
-

1346.

As noted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Bellefonte Reinsurance
Co. v. North American Company for Property and Casualty Ins., 903 F2d. 910 (2"d
Cir. 1990) the "follow the fortunes" doctrine "...burdens the reinsurer with those
risks which the direct insurer bears under the direct insurer's policy covering the
original insured."

at 912.

Finally, i n Mentor Ins. Co. v. Norges Brannkasse,

9 9 6 F2d. 506, 5 1 7 (2ndCir. 1993), the court wrote:
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The follow the fortunes [or follow the settlements]
principal does not change the reinsurance contract; it
simply requires payment where the cedent's good-faith
payment is at least arguably within the scope of the
insurance coverage that was reinsured.
Applying these principals, the Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. The Home Ins.
Co. court concluded that the "follow the fortunes" doctrine applied in all contracts
of reinsurance even in the absence of an explicit "loss settlements" clause writing:

The weight of authority appears
t o favor Aetna's
..
position, although the authorities admittedly do not speak
with one voice. For example, Geranthewohl opines that
the "fundamental follow-the-fortunes principal" generally
applies irrespective of whether it is expressed in the
contract of insurance, i.e. in a loss settlement clause.
See
-Geranthewohl, supra, 32.5.1 at 466. See also Henry
T. Kramer, The Nature of Reinsurance, in Reinsurance I 7 12 (Strain ed. 1980) (duty to follow fortunes "may or
may not be expressed in an agreement of reinsurance but
nevertheless exists for all").
See 882
-

F. Supp. at 1349. See also International Surplus Ins. v. Underwriters at

Lloyd, 68 F . Supp. 917, 9 2 0 (S.D. Oh. 1994) (reinsurer bound by the "follow the
fortunes" doctrine even in the absence of explicit language in the reinsurance
contract).

The obligation that NorthlandINorthfield honor the good faith settlement or
defense decisions entered into by ICRMP is consistent with the provisions i n the
Northfield policy.

A t page 5 of the policy, the ICRMP Claims Department is

charged with the responsibility of servicing all claims under the policy.

The

following duties are assigned to ICRMP:

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 34

do0147

It is understood that all claims under this policy shall be
serviced by I.C.R.M.P.'s Claims Department who
perform the following duties:

A, Investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses - it
is understood that, when so requested, the I.C.R.M.P.
Claims Department will afford Underwriters an
opportunity t o be associated with them in the defense or
control of any claim, suit or proceeding."

See Northfield Policy,

Pg. 5 (emphasis added).

The duties given ICRMP by this language are broad and mandatory.

It

requires ICRMP make decisions regarding the defense and settlement of claims.
While Northfield is given the "opportunity to be associated", the policy does not
give it the right t o second guess, after the fact, decisions made by ICRMP's Claims
Department concerning whether t o settle a claim or how to conduct the defense.
Its right to be associated with the settlement process envisions that Northfield
would have a voice in the decision, but would not have the ability t o veto
settlement decisions. The Northfield policy does not simply give ICRMP the choice
of managing the claims, it states ICRMP "shall perform the following duties" which
it then identifies as the investigation, settlement or defense of claims. Finally, and

most important, the language i n the Northfield policy is not attempting to identify
who would have the obligation t o manage claims insured solely by the ICRMP
policy.

Instead, the above quoted language is referring t o the management and

settlement of claims insured by the Northfield policy. This language unambiguously
empowers the ICRMP Claims Department to bind Northfield on issues concerning
the defense and settlement claims.

In application, this policy language requires
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Northfield t o "follow the fortunes" of reasonable settlement decisions made by the
ICRMP Claims Department.

In the present case, Northfield, like any other reinsurer, is bound by the good
faith settlements of its reinsured, ICRMP. Under the "follow the fortunes" doctrine,
so long as the settlement between ICRMP and Donald Paradis was undertaken in
good faith after a reasonable investigation and was, at least arguably, with in the
scope of the coverage that was reinsured, Northfield must honor its obligation to
indemnify ICRMP in accordance with the reinsurance policy.
As an alternative argument, Northfield appears t o suggest it is not obligated
t o reimburse or indemnify ICRMP for litigation costs associated with the defense of
any non-covered claims. Initially, it must be noted that throughout the many years
that ICRMP has purchased reinsurance from Northfield, the defendant has never
attempted to apportion its reimbursement of litigation costs based upon a decision
by ICRMP t o provide a complete defense t o a suit involving covered and noncovered claims.

See Affidavit

of Richard B. Ferguson, 53. As outlined in Section

II, above, it is a well-established legal principal that when a casualty insurer's duty

t o defend arises, it is required to defend all claims in the liability complaint including
non-covered claims.

Throughout the relationship which has existed between

ICRMP and NorthlandINorthfield, ICRMP has, on many occasions, honored this
obligation and extended a complete defense to its insureds under a reservation of
rights.

Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 93. Throughout its relationship with
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NorthlandiNorthfield, as in the present case, ICRMP provided the defendant routine
reports whereby it was apprised of the status of the litigation and the costs which
are being incurred.

&, q3.

When a case was resolved, assuming the SIR was

exhausted, NorthlandlNorthfield was presented a bill for reimbursement which has
always been paid without any question of whether the defense costs that were
being reimbursed applied t o non-covered claims.

&

at 3.

In this case,

NorthlandINorthfield was advised at the beginning of the Paradis litigation that
ICRMP would extend a complete defense pursuant t o a reservation of rights.
Complaint,

See

Exhibit B; see also Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 774, 5.

NorthlandINorthfield expressed no objections and did not take any position on
coverage until February 13, 2006, nearly t w o years after the Paradis Complaint

See Complaint, Exhibit C.
was filed. This course of dealing is consistent with the general principals of reinsurance
which requires the reinsurer to indemnify and reimburse the ceding company, such
as ICRMP, for settlements and defense costs.

See North River Ins.

Co. v. ClGNA

Reinsurance Co., 52 F3d. 119 4 (3'd Cir. 1995) (reinsurer obligated t o reimburse for

defense costs that were reasonably within the scope of the original policy's
coverage). It is also consistent with the language in the Northfield policy that vests
the ICRMP Claims Department with the discretion and obligation t o manage and
settle claims.

See Northfield Policy,

Pg. 5 (11 Service Organization).
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Reimbursement for costs associated with providing a complete defense is
also required by the express language in the Northfield policy.

Under the

comprehensive

agrees

general

liability

insuring

agreement,

Northfield

to

"...indemnify the assured [ICRMPI for all sums, including expenses, all as more fully
defined by the term ultimate net loss, which the assured [ICRMPI shall become
legally obligated t o pay as damages imposed by law ..." (emphasis added).

The

Northfield policy further defines ultimate net loss t o include reimbursement for
"...expenses for lawyers and investigators of claims or

suits..."

(emphasis added).

As outlined above, an insurer becomes legally obligated to incur defense costs
when a liability complaint or suit is filed against its insured which contains
allegations describing a potentially covered claim.

See Section II, supra. A t that

point, the insurer is obligated to defend the entire suit including covered and noncovered claims. Under the plain language of the Northfield policy, ICRMP became
legally obligated t o pay for "law costs" incurred by the insureds when Mr. Paradis
filed complaints which described potentially covered claims.

Northfield did not

include any language in its policy allowing it t o apportion its obligation t o reimburse
See
-

for defense costs which were properly incurred in defending the entire suit.

American Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. B&L Trucking and Const. Co., 1 3 4 Wn2d. 413, 951
P2d. 2 5 0 (1998) (in the absence of an allocation clause insurer is not to apportion
damages arising from a single occurrence spanning a number of years). The court
cannot add language t o the insurance policy t o either create or avoid liability.
Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 878-79, 655 P2d. 82, 85-86 (1982);
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Purvis v. ProgressiveIns. Co., 142 Idaho 213, 216, 127 P3d. 116, 119 (2005). i n

the absence of policy language allowing NorthlandINorthfield the ability t o
apportion its reimbursement, it cannot, after the fact, question the reasonable
defense costs ICRMP incurred.

In this case, the ICRMP and Northfield policies provide for the same
coverages.

Northfield, as a reinsurer, is obligated to honor the good faith

settlements of its reinsured, ICRMP. For these reasons, Northfield is required to
reimburse ICRMP for ail defense costs incurred in the defense of the ICRMP
insureds, as well as for the settlement paid t o Donald Paradis.

Accordingly,

Northfield's motion should be denied.

NORHTLAND, BY ITS DENIAL OF COVERAGE, HAS BREACHED ITS CONTRACT
WITH ICRMP AND CANNOT CONTEST THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ICRMP
HAS NEGOTIATED
The undisputed facts in this litigation establish that when the Paradis lawsuit
was first filed, NorthlandtNorthfield was notified.

See Affidavit of Richard B.

Ferguson, 74; Complaint, Exhibit B. NorthlandINorthfield was provided copies of
the Complaints and regular reports concerning the status of the litigation, as well
as the costs that were being incurred.

See Affidavit

of Richard B. Ferguson, 74.

Two years after the lawsuit was filed, NorthlandINorthfield sent ICRMP a letter
stating its position that coverage did not exist and that it would refuse t o indemnify
ICRMP under the Northfield policy. See, Complaint, Exhibit C; see also Affidavit of
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Richard B. Ferguson, 1/7. As outlined in the sections above, it is ICRMP's position
that a potential for coverage existed which triggered ICRMP's duty t o defend.
The impact of an insurer incorrectly refusing t o provide coverage and thereby
breaching the contract between itself and the insured was addressed by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Exterovich v. Burress, 139 ldaho 439, 8 0 P3d. 1 0 4 0 (2003) with
the court writing:
A liability insurer such as ICRMP has t w o duties: the
duty to defend and the duty t o indemnify. The duty to
defend arises upon the filing of a complaint containing
allegations that, in whole or in part read broadly, reveal a
potential for liability that would be covered by the
insured's policy. Hoyle v, Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 ldaho
367, 4 8 P3d. 1256 (2002). If the insurer breaches its
duty t o defend and the insured settles a claim covered by
the policy, the insurer has a duty to indemnify its insured
for the amount of that settlement so long as a potential
liability for the insured existed which resulted in a
reasonable settlement in view of the size of possible
recovery and the probability of the claimant's success
City of ldaho Falls v. Home
against the insured.
lndemnity Co., 1206 ldaho 604, 8 8 8 P2d. 3 8 3 (1995).
An insurer's duty to defend and indemnify are separate
duties. ld.

See 139 ldaho at 441.
In Exterovich, while the Supreme Court recognized that an insurer may, after
previously denying coverage, assume its duty t o defend.

However, the insurer is

bound by any admissions made by the insured which were part of a reasonable
settlement.

4 at

442. This conclusion restated the court's prior ruling in City of

ldaho Falls v. Home lndemnity Co., 126 ldaho 604, 888 P2d. 383 (1995) where

the court held that an insurer was not entitled to relitigate an underlying action
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following a settlement where the insurer had breached the contract between itself
and its insured. & a t

610.

In this case, NorthlandlNorthfield cannot relitigate nor can it dispute the
settlement reached between ICRMP and Mr. Paradis.

Prior t o the time the case

was mediated, Northfield had already breached its contract with ICRMP by taking
the position, t w o years after the litigation had been ongoing, that coverage did not
exist and that it would not reimburse or indemnify ICRMP pursuant t o the

See Complaint,

Northfield policy.

Exhibit C. The February 13, 2006 letter denying

coverage was a material breach of the Northfield policy which relieved ICRMP from
any obligation that may have existed t o obtain Northfield's consent t o future
settlements.

Despite this, ICRMP afforded Northfield the opportunity t o cure its

breach by soliciting its involvement in strategy decisions surrounding possible
mediation.

See

Complaint, Exhibit F; Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 710.

Northfield continued with its prior position refusing t o attend mediation thereby
ratifying its earlier breach of contract.

See

Complaint, Exhibit G; Affidavit of

Richard B. Ferguson, 1 10.

As outlined above, the potential coverages afforded by the ICRMP and
Northfield policies under the comprehensive general liability insuring agreements
were identical.

Additionally, as outlined above, the Paradis Complaints described

potentially covered claims which triggered ICRMP's duty t o defend and Northland1
Northfield's potential obligation t o reimburse.

It cannot be seriously questioned
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that the decision t o mediate the Paradis lawsuit was reasonable in light of the
possibility for a multi-million dollar verdict against the ICRMP insureds. The amount
of the Paradis settlement is also reasonable in light of the exposure and the fact, by
virtue of the release agreement, ICRMP was able t o shelter its insureds from the
multi-million claim which was later made by the attorneys who had represented Mr.
Affidavit of Richard 6.Ferguson, 812.

Paradis in the habeas corpus litigation.

The undisputed facts in this case establish that had the Paradis case gone to trial,
there was a potential the ICRMP insureds would be held liable for a covered claim.
Their potential exposure for covered and non-covered claims was catastrophic.
The settlement was reasonable in light of the potential exposures ICRMP and its
insureds faced.

In fact, ICRMP was able to resolve the case for less than its

anticipated cost t o continue the defense through trial.

See

Affidavit of Richard

Ferguson, 71/9, 1 1. Because Northland/Northfield breached its reinsurance contract
with ICRMP, it cannot, at this stage, dispute the reasonableness of the settlement.
Accordingly, NorthlandINorthfield's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to
absolve it from responsibility for the Paradis settlement should be denied.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

.b&

Phillio J. Collaer, Of the Firm
~ttdrne~
fors plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of April, 2007, 1 served a true and
PLAINTIFF'S
RESPONSE
TO
correct
copy
of
the
foregoing
NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by
the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Donald J. Farley
Bryan A. Nickels
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht &
Blanton, PA
702 W. Idaho, Suite 7 0 0
PO Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701 -1271

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

C]

&A.

Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Delivery

'wL--

Phillip J. Collaer
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NO.

F'LEB.~. 4-4q
MAY 0 7 2007
I

A.M

Donald J. Farley
ISB #1561; djf@hallfarley.com

Bryan A. Nickels

J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk

ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W.V\2-241 14iMSJ - Reply doc

By ATOONE
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies,
Properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-IE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,

CaseNo. CV OC 0617112

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT NORTHLAND
INSURANCE COMPANIES'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff.
VS.

NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES,
Defendant.

I

COMES NOW defendant, Northland Insurance Companies (whose proper name and
identity herein is Northfield Insurance Company) (hereinafter "defendant Northfield"), by and
through its undersigned counsel of record, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and
hereby submits this reply in support of its motion for summary judgment, seeking this Court's
order dismissing plaintiff Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters' ("ICRMP")
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("plaintiffs Complaint") with prejudice, on the grounds

0 0 15 7
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,
that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that defendant Northfield is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff has identified no genuine issues of material fact.
In the summary judgment context, "[tlhe burden of proving the absence of material facts
is upon the moving party." Baxter v. crane^, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000).
However, "[tlhe adverse party

...

'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his

pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Id. "In other words, the moving
party is entitled to a judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial." Id. '"A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element
of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Foster v. Traul,
141 Idaho 890,893, 120 P.3d 278,281 (2005).
In the present case, although outlining its own statement of facts, plaintiff does not assert
that there is any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the facts identified by Northfield.
Instead, plaintiffs facts are directed primarily to two areas: first, the actions taken by ICRMP in
defending its own policy; and second, Northfield's actions prior to ICRMP's exhaustion of its
self-insured retention ("SIR").
On the first subject, plaintiff identifies its own decisions regarding its own policy; for
example:
"ICRMP also review the allegations in the Paradis Complaint for potential coverage."
"A decision was made that a duty to defend existed."
"Kootenai County and the other defendants were advised of this decision and provided a
reservation of rights letter."
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"Because of potential conflicts of interest, ICRMP, exercising its discretion over the
management of the litigation, retained separate attorneys for Kootenai County, Mr. Haws,
and Mr. Elliott."
"It was ICRMP's position, at that time, that the existence of a continuing tort describing
negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, or violations of Mr. Paradis' constitutional
rights described potentially covered claims which obligated ICRMP to provide a
defense."
"In light of the considerable exposure ICRMP faced for future defense costs, coupled
with the possibility of an adverse judgment being entered against its insured, ICRMP
made the decision that mediation."
Plaintiffs Response to Northland/Northfield Insurance Companies' Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Plaintiff's

Memo"), at 2-4. However, none of these questions are relevant to

Northfield's motion now before the Court. ICRMP is an insurer, with its own policy, and its
own duties ancillary to such policy. See Exterovich v. City of Kellong, 139 Idaho 439, 441, 80
P.3d 1040, 1042 (2003)("A liability insurer such as ICRMP has two duties: the duty to defend,
and the duty to indemnify."). No actions or decisions taken by ICRMP relevant to its own policy
issued to Kootenai County have any bearing on questions of coverage under the Northfield
policy. Accordingly, plaintiffs identified facts do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to Northfield's policy.
Regarding the second category of facts identified by ICRMP, these apparently attempt to
establish some variety of estoppel against Northfield; for example:

0

Regarding the retention of multiple attorneys, "Northland/NorthfieId did not object to this
approach."
Regarding the use of multiple attorneys, "Again, throughout this time,
NorthlandNorthfield never voiced any concerns or objections that multiple law firms
were being used to defend the insureds or that a complete defense was being provided."
"NorthlandNorthfield ratified its earlier breach of contract by restating its previous
position that coverage did not exist and advising ICRMP it would not participate in
mediation or settlement."
"Throughout its longstanding relationship with NorthlandNorthfield, ICRMP has
routinely provided a complete defense to its insured when they are sued for covered and
non-covered claims."

0 0 15 9
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"Until the Paradis litigation, Northlandblorthfield has never sought to allocate its
reimbursement obligation by refusing to pay for attorneys' fees expended in cases
involving covered and non-covered claims."
"In all of these cases, once ICRMP's SIR is exhausted, a billing for reimbursement is
presented to Northlandblorthfield. That billing is paid without any request for allocation
or apportionment."
Plaintiffs Memo at 2-5.
None of the above factual or conclusory assertions address whether or not a particular
claim is covered under Northfield's policy, which is the subject matter of this litigation.
Northfield's handling of prior other cases or claims involve fact-specific analysis of the
particulars of such claims under the terms of the particular Northfield policy implicated by the
claim, and is not, obviously, to be construed as carte blanche for any and all claims ICRMP may
make against a Northfield policy. Moreover, until ICRMP advises Northfield that its SIR has
been exhausted (which ICRMP did not do until June 27, 2006, after it had already exceeded its
SIR layer by $273,305.33 (Complaint, Exh. F)), Northfield has no duty to reimburse, nor even
any "duty to speak" with respect to its own policy, a principle recognized in the analogous
excess insurer context. See, e.g., All City Ins. Co. v. Sioukas, 378 N.Y.S.2d 71 1 (N.Y. A.D.
1976)CAnd since it did not have a policy affording coverage to the respondent until the primary
coverage had been exhausted, it had no duty to serve a notice of disclaimer upon the respondent
or upon his highly experienced attorneys."); St. Paul Fire Ins. Co. v. Children's Hosp. Nat'l
Medical Center, 670 F. Supp. 393, 402 (D.D.C. 1987)rThe issue here, however, is whether St.
Paul had a duty to disclaim coverage or reserve rights under the excess policies at the time it
assumed the defense of the Lee claims under the primary policy, or at some other time prior to
judgment. We conclude that, prior to the time the verdict was rendered, St. Paul had no such duty
to speak with respect to the excess policies."); Richmond, "Rights and Responsibilities of Excess
Carriers," 78 Denver Univ. L.R. 29, 44-45 (2000) ("An excess carrier typically has no duty to
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defend its insured until the limits of underlying coverage are exhausted . . . the majority position
also makes sense because an insurer's duty to defend is expressly contractual, and if there is no
policy language requiring an insurer to defend, there can be no duty to do so.").
As such, the facts identified by plaintiff are not "material", such as would raise a genuine
issue of material fact sufficient to defeat Northfield's motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and, as discussed below and in
Northfield's prior briefing, summary judgment should be granted.

B. The acts for which ICRMP seeks coverage predate Northland's coverage, and Northland has
no contractual obligation to reimburse ICRMP.
The claims alleged by Mr. Paradis arise out of a single nucleus of allegations - the
investigation, arrest, and conviction of Mr. Paradis in 1980 and 1981. The crux of Mr. Paradis'
claims is the non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence by the Paradis defendants at the time of his
conviction, and that the Paradis defendants continued to withhold such evidence. All of these
allegations predate Northfield's 2000-2001 policy, and even predate Kootenai County's
participation in ICRMP, which was not even created until 1985.
The guiding Idaho case in this matter is Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co.,
113 Idaho 908,750 P.2d 87 (1988). The holding of the Idaho Supreme Court is clear:
An insurer is not liable "for claims arising out of an event or
accident which occurred prior to the effective date of the insurance
coverage, even though damages and claims continued to accrue
from this cause during the later period of coverage."

113 Idaho at 915 (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Corn., 507 F. Supp. 59,62
(W.D. Pa. 1981), aff d 676 F.2d 56 (31d Cir. 1982))(emphasis added). In its brief, Plaintiff relies
on cases that address accrual dates for the purpose of determining statute of limitations
application. These cases have no bearing on the triggering of insurance coverage, a critical
point that, for example, the Third Circuit has emphasized. City of Erie, Penns~lvaniav.
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES'
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Guarantv Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 156, 161-62 (31d Cir. 1997) ("Reliance on the commencement
of the statute of limitation is not dispositive in determining when a tort occurs for insurance
purposes. Statutes of limitation and triggering dates for insurance purposes serve distinct
functions and reflect different policy concerns."); accord, Commercial Union Assurance Co. v.
Zurich American Ins:Co.,

471 F.Supp. 1011, 1015 (S.D.Ala.1979) ("cases dealing with the

determination of the date or occurrence of a continuing injury or disease for the purpose of
applying appropriate statute of limitations are not controlling for purposes of determining
insurance coverage"),
One of the primary reasons to distinguish between insurance and statute of limitations
triggers is what is known as the "unwary insurer." As the Third Circuit explained:
The other theme is that reliance on the "time of favorable termination" to trigger
liability has unwise policy implications, for it allows tortfeasors with information
about their own potential iiability to shift the burden to unwary insurance
companies. As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted, "... a contrary
rule might well enable plaintiffs to lull an unwary insurer into extending coverage
after they perceive an impending difficulty from a suit in which they are already
engaged." Royal Indemnity, 979 F.2d at 1300. See also Royal Indem. Co. v.
Werner, 784 F.Supp. 690, 692 (E.D.Mo.1992) ("Under this interpretation an
individual who sees that his lawsuit may spawn a malicious prosecution claim
cannot pwchase insurance and shift his obligation to an unwary insurer.");
Harbor Insurance Co., 211 Ca1.Rptr. at 910 (Under minority rule, "tortfeasor
could purchase a policy such as this after committing the tort and thereby enjoy
excess coverage for its yet-to-be unfolded consequences."); Muller, 232 A.2d at
175 ("To hold that coverage existed in such a case would mean that such a
tortfeasor could purchase coverage a day before the injured person was acquitted
in the criminal proceeding and thus shift the burden of damages to an unwary
insurance company.").

...
The concerns about "the unwary insurer" are well-founded. Malicious prosecution
is an intentional tort-the plaintiff must prove malice in order to prevail. As a
theoretical matter, of course, a municipality that intends maliciously to bring
criminal charges against a person may shift the burden of liability to an unwary
insurance company even under the majority rule, by purchasing an occurrence
policy the day before charges are filed. See Roess, 383 F.Supp. at 1235.
Notwithstanding this observation, we believe it is more likely that an
unscrupulous insured would purchase insurance after rather than before the

0162
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initiation of a questionable prosecution. This counsels adoption of the majority
rule.

Id. at 160-61. This is exactly what has happened here. What plaintiff proposes is a textbook
example of the "unwary insurer": Northfield being subjected to a claim which occurred 20 years
earlier. ICRMP does not assert that Kootenai County's insurer($) prior to the formation of
ICRMP

- the insurers at the time of the alleged bad acts -are

responsible for coverage. ICRMP

does not assert that any other insurer after the formation of ICRMP - for any other policy year is responsible for coverage while Mr. Paradis remained in prison, while the allegedly responsible
individuals continued to withhold exculpatory evidence. Rather, ICRMP baldly asserts
contrary to Idaho law and the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Western Casual*/

-

- that the only

insurer responsible for the $1.2+ million in damages and defense fees and costs is the insurer
who had the misfortune to issue a policy for the time that Mr. Paradis happened to be released,
more than 20 years after he was arrested.
The allegations in the Paradis Complaint and First Amended Complaint allege acts
occurring in 1980 and 1981, acts that are intentional in nature', or acts committed by individuals

after having left the employment of Kootenai County (such as defendant Haws, who left county

1. Which, under the Northfield policy, are excluded:
TI-IIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY - to any Claim for damages, whether
direct or consequential, or for any cause of action which is covered under any
other Section of this policy or
A. to personal injury or property damage which the Assured intended or
expected or reasonably could have expected but this exciusion shall not apply to
personal injury resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or
property.
Affidavit of Brian Martens in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Martens Aff."), Exh. A, at p. 16.
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employment in 1983); or were simply in furtherance of, or justification for, the original failure
to disclose exculpatory evidence in 1980-81. None of the alleged acts fall within the coverage
provided by the 2000-2001 Northfield policy, or any prior policy. Plaintiff points to language in
the Paradis Amended Complaint which alleges violations of the duty to train and duty to
disclose (per

w)
that were "continuing for years" after 1980 and 1981. Plaintiffs Memo at

18. This argument fails for two reasons: first, these allegations, at most, assert only "damages
and claims" that continued to accrue after arising out of an event or accident which occurred
prior to Northfield's policy coverage, for which coverage is precluded by virtue of Western
Casualt.~second, any ongoing "failure to disclose/failure to train" terminated with the discovery
of the exculpatory evidence (the Haws notes) in January 1996 (Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385,
392 (9thCir. 1997)) - again, years before the Northfield policy was issued.

ICRMP undertook a gratuitous defense of the Kootenai County defendants regarding the
1980 & 1981 occurrences, and is now attempting to make Northfield pay for ICRMP's own
decision. Indeed

-

in a point not addressed by plaintiff - ICRMP itself initially denied the

Paradis claim because the acts did not occur when it insured Kootenai county:
The date of loss for this claim is June 24, 1980 (the date that Deputy Prosecutor
Hawes learned of the exculpatory evidence and did not turn it over to Paradis's
attorneys). This date could be stretched to the date of Paradis's conviction on the
murder charge, which would have occurred in 1981, but that would still be well
outside the retroactive date of the Policy.

2. Plaintiff focuses on the later allegations against defendant Haws as justification for providing a defense, such as
"continuing negligence on the part of Mr. Haws surrounding his alleged failure to disclose evidence which would
have exonerated Paradis" and as "Haws continued to conceal evidence while he [Paradis] was in prison attempting
to challenge his conviction through the appellate and habeas corpus litigation." Plaintiffs Response to
Northland/Northfield Insurance Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs Memo") at 19. However,
it is undisputed that Mr. Haws left the employment of Kootenai County in 1983 (even prior to the formation of
ICRMP), and acts alleged after that date could not have occurred while acting as an employee of the county, and
thus, he would not be an insured under an^ ICRMP policy for acts undertaken by hi after 1983. Aff~davitof
Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. DD, at 11. 121:s-7; Counsel Aff., Exh.
E,fjll3.
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Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Company's Motion
for Summary Judgment ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. K (November 20, 2001 letter from Richard
Ferguson, ICRMP, to Dennis Molenaar, Kootenai County). Plaintiff defends its defense in the

Paradis litigation with an almost absolutist view: "Northfleld makes the generalized statement
that an insurer's duty to defend is not absolute. Other than restating the general rule that an
insured must establish an affirmative link to coverages afforded by the policy, Northfield
provides no other guidance for this proposition[.]" Plaintiffs Memo at 11. More correctly, this
"generalized statement" is an express statement of law made by the Idaho Supreme Court:
"However, the insurer's duty to defend is not absolute." Black v. Fireman's Fund American Ins.
Co., 115 Idaho 449, 455, 767 P.2d 824, 830 (Ct. App. 1989). The Idaho Supreme Court later
explained that the generally broad duty to defend, under Idaho law, "clbes not require an
insurance company to file a declaratory judgment

;.:

every instance, even though it believes there

is no potential for coverage, and then tender a defense until the lack of coverage is established."
Hovle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 371, 48 P.3d 1256, 1260 (2002). An insurer is
simply not bound to defend in every instance an insured is sued. The Idaho Supreme Court has
ruled that, while a broad duty to defend exists, an insurer has the right to parse the allegations
underlying a complaint to determine whether a duty to defend exists in a specific case:
The FSI Complaint makes no express claim for negligence. Hoyle and HA11 argue
that a broad reading of the FSI complaint reveals a potential claim for negligence,
evidenced by the use of the words "including but not limited to" and the
allegations including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of statutory duties, implied contract,
and conversion.
These arguments are unpersuasive. Every claim in the FSI complaint alleges the
acts in question were committed in a "fraudulent, improper and illegal" manner.
Despite this, Hoyle and HA11 go on to argue that the word "improper" includes
negligence. This is also unpersuasive because in every instance it is used, it is
paired with the term "fraudulent." Also, the term "improper" is in no way
synonymous with the word "negligent." Hoyle and HA11 argue Idaho law, namely
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES~MOTION
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Kootenai County, requires the complaint to be read in whole or in part, and the
district court failed to follow the latter part of this disjunctive rule. While
Kootenai County does require the Complaint to be read in whole or in part, there
are no parts of the complaint that reveal any potential claims for negligence. The
use of the terms "improper", "illegal", "inconsistent with general industry
standards", and "including but not limited to", read in part, are still insufficient to
find a claim of negligence.
Hoyle and HA11 also point to paragraph 71 of the FSI complaint, citing the
language which alleges numerous "failures" to take certain actions. While this
language sounds similar to that of a claim for negligence, this "failure" language
clearly comes under a claim for breach of contract, in which Hoyle and HA11
breached the contract by their failure to act.
Hoyle and HA11 assert the claims for implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and the breach of a fiduciary duty encompass negligence. An implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim sounds in contract. When an errors
and omissions policy, such as the policy in the instant case, excludes intentional
acts from coverage, an intentional breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claim, as alleged by FSI, does not give rise to the duty to defend. See
Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 125 Idaho 182, 186, 868 P.2d
5 10, 5 14 (Ct.App. 1994). Furthermore, although the breach of a fiduciary duty
sounds in tort, and can be actionable for either intentional or negligent breaches of
such duties, it is clear from the complaint that FSI is not alleging the breach of
these duties were committed in a negligent manner. The complaint specifically
alleges these duties were breached by "fraudulent, improper and illegal business
activities and pursuits." Thus, FSI's claim for the intentional breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty does not give
rise to a duty to defend. See Id.
14oyle and HA11 assert the facts behind FSI's pleading reveal negligent acts. Even
if the facts behind the FSI complaint might disclose negligent acts, it is irrelevant.
This Court has previously rejected this argument in Construction Management v.
Assurance Company of America, 135 Idaho 680,23 P.3d 142 (2001). Pursuant to
Construction Management, an insurer does not have to look beyond the words of
the complaint to determine if a possibility of coverage exists. Id. at 684, 23 P.3d
at 146.
Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho at 372-73.
The broader, and indeed only, point with respect to defense in this case is whether
defense costs are reimbursable as covered claims under Northfeld's policy.

Under the

Northfield Policy, ICRMP was required to defend all claims that might involve the Northfield
Policy:
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It is understood that all claims under this policy shall be serviced
by I.C.R.M.P.'s Claims Department who shall perfonn the
following duties:
A. Investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses - it is
understood that, when so requested, the I.C.R.M.P. Claims
Department will afford Underwriters any opportunity to be
associated with them in the defense or control of any claim, suit or
proceeding.
Martens Aff., Exh. A, at p. 5 (emphasis added). Reference by plaintiff to the ICRMP policy in
the duty to defend context - and the election to defend under that policy by ICRMP - is simply
of no relevance to the present action. Further, plaintiffs suggestion that defendant acquiesced in
ICRMP's defense (including costs and selection of attorneys) of ICRMP's own SIR, for purposes
of application to the Northfield Policy (e.g., Ferguson Aff., 774-5), is incorrect; ICRMP elected
to defend its own policy of its own accord, which decision is of no bearing on Northfield's
obligation to reimburse for claims within the scope of Northfield's policy, and which was a
defense ICRMP intended on defending, irrespective of the Northfield's position.3
The question is whether or not the claims are covered by the Northfield policy; as
discussed above, they are not4 Accordingly, Northfield has no obligation to reimburse ICRMP
for defense costs, let alone the cost of a settlement for an occurrence which is not covered under
Northfield's policy. ICRMP's own analysis of its own policy or duties has no bearing on
Northfield's coverage. Accordingly, Northfield should be granted summary judgment because

3. Note, again, that Northfield was apparently not notified of the exhaustion of ICRMP's SIR until June 27, 2006,
aper ICRMP had expended $423,305.33 in defense costs, exceeding its SIR layer by $273,305.33. Complaint, Exh.
F.
4. In the Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Ferguson
Aff."), Mr. Ferguson suggests that Northfield acceded to the defense provided to the Paradis defendants. Ferguson
Aff., 714-5. Of course, Northfield's obligation to reimburse, if any, would have only been triggered by the
exhaustion of ICRMP's SIR of $150,000. However, Northfield was not notified of any such exhaustion until
lCRMP had expended $423,305.33 in defense costs, exceeding its SIR layer by $273,305.33. Martens Aff., Exh. C.
To the extent Northfield may have been denied an opportunity to manage defense costs upon the exhaustion of
ICRMP's SIR by virtue of the delayed notice of the potentially reimbursable costs, Northfield should not be
responsible for any such costs incurred prior to tender.
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the events, happenings, and failure to disclose evidence by the Paradis defendants were not a
covered occurrence under any Northfield policy.
C. The Northfield policy is not reinsurance
In a continuing effort to avoid the fatal effect of Kootenai Countv v. Western Casualty,
ICRMP argues that the Northfield policy provides coverage as reinsurance.
In support of its claim, plaintiff identifies a single instance in the Northfield policy where
the word "Reinsured" is used in an introductory passage. Plaintiffs Memo at 29. From this,
plaintiff asserts that an ambiguity has arisen, requiring the entire insurance contract to be
construed in ICRMP's favor, despite plaintiffs apparent concession that the Northfield policy
has no follow-the-form provision, and no follow-the-fortunes provision. This is a nonsensical
reading of the policy, and disregards Idaho law. See, e.g., Cascade Auto Glass. Inc. v. Idaho
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751, 754 (2005) ("In construing an
insurance policy, the Court must look to the plain meaning of the words to determine if there are
any ambiguities. This determination is a question of law. In resolving this question of law, the
Court must construe the policy "as a whole, not by an isolated phrase.") (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted). In the present case, the plaintiff has proposed an almost complete
evisceration of the terms of the Northfield policy, not by focusing on a single isolated phrase, but
on a single isolated word. Such a result is patently absurd, and this Court should reject plaintiffs
argument.
1.

There is nofollow-theyorms provision.

Plaintiff concedes that there is no follow-form language in the Northfield policy.
Plaintiffs Memo at 32 ("The fact a follow the form clause does not exist in the Northfield
policy. ..."). Instead, plaintiff argues that the language is "very similar," implicitly asserting that
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the net result is a rewriting of the Northfield policy, in its entirety, into a policy governed by the
language of the ICRMP policy and ICRMP's own interpretation thereof.
This disregards the language of Northfield's policy, which does not even reference the
ICRMP policy, as a traditional reinsurance (or excess) policy would do. Martens Aff., Exh. A.
Moreover, a comparison of the language of the two policies demonstrates that the coverages are,
in fact, different in key areas. For example, with respect to the definition of "occurrence" under
Section I1 coverage, the ICRMP policy provides, in relevant part, that:
All personal injuries to one or more persons and/or property damage arising out of
an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be
deemed one occurrence.
Counsel Aff., Exh. I, at p. 14 (emphasis added). The Northfield "single occurrence" provision,
however, incorporates more than just "accidents" and "continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions":
All personal injuries to one or more persons and/or property damage arising out of
an accident or a happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions shall be deemed to be one occurrence.
Martens Aff., Exh. A, at p. 6 (emphasis added). Thus, the breadth of the Northfield "single
occurrence" provision dictates that a wider swath of claims arising from a common nucleus of
facts is deemed to be a single occurrence.
Similarly, Northfield's intentional act exclusion, which is also at issue in this litigation, is
broader than that provided by ICRMP.

ICRMP's policy provides, under the Section I1

exclusions:
Liability Coverage under the Comprehensive General Liability Insuring
Agreements does not apply:

...

2. To personal injury or property damage resulting from an act or omission
intended or expected from the standpoint of any insured to cause personal
injury or property damage. This exclusion applies even if the personal injury or
property damage is of a different kind or degree, or is sustained by a different
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FOQ
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person or property, than that intended or expected. This exclusion shall not apply
to personal injury resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or
property, or in the performance of a duty of the insured.
Counsel Aff., Exh. I, at p. 16 (emphasis added). Again, the parallel Northfield policy exclusion
is broader in what is excluded:
THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY - to any Claim for damages,
whether direct or consequential, or for any cause of action which is
covered under any other Section of this policy or
A. to personal injury or property damage which the Assured
intended or expected or reasonably could have expected but this
exclusion shall not apply to personal injury resulting from the use
of reasonable force to protect persons or property.
Martens Aff., Exh. A, at p. 16 (emphasis added).
The policies may be parallel in structure and some language, but the Northfield policy is
not a duplicate of the ICRMP policy. The Northfield policy simply cannot he construed to be a
subservient echo of the ICRMP policy, especially in the absence of any follow-the-form
provision or any mention of the ICRMP policy, within the terms of the Northfield policy.5
Accordingly, plaintiff's argument on this point fails.
2.

There is no follow-the;fortunes provision, nor does the follow-theyorms doctrine
api.lv.

Plaintiff does not dispute that no follow-the-fortunes provision appears in the Northfield
policy. Rather, plaintiff asserts that it should be imputed. The Michigan Court of Appeals
addressed a similar argument and rejected it:

5. Although not expressly stated, the tenor of portions of the briefmg and Ferguson Aff. suggests a "reasonable

expectation" argument - that is, that ICRMP thought it was purchasing reinsurance, and that Northfieid is foreclosed
from disputing coverage based upon that expectation. However, Idaho does not recognize the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine. See Rvals v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 304, 1 P.3d 803, 805 (2000)
("The traditional rules o f contract construction avoid the danger of a court creating a new contract between the
parties by relying on the notion of reasonable expectations."); accord Walls v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 119 Idaho 160,
804 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991). Additionally, such an argument rings hollow, given that the plaintiff itself is an
insurer, and not an unsophisticated layman - if plaintiff had wanted a standard follow-the-form, follow-the-fortunes
reinsurance policy, it certainly could have purchased such a policy.
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Although the "follow the fortunes" doctrine is applicable in those instances where
such a clause is part of the agreement, we are confronted in this appeal with the
broad contention that such a provision is to be read into every reinsurance
contract. In advancing this proposition, the court below relied heavily on Int'l
Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters & Underwriting Syndicates at
Lloyd's of London, 868 F.Supp. 917 (S.D.Ohio, 1994), wherein a federal district
court in Ohio ruled that even in the absence of express contract language, "the
'Follow the Fortunes' doctrine applied to all reinsurance contracts." Id. at 920. As
authority to support its ruling, the federal district court cited three cases.
However, we note that in each of those cases, the reinsurance contract at issue
contained specific language indicating incorporation of the "follow the fortunes"
doctrine. See Mentor Ins. Co. (UK) Ltd. v. Brannkasse, 996 F.2d 506,516 (C.A.2,
1993) ("The parties agree that the contract contains a 'follow the fortunes'
clause."), Unigard Security Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 762 F.Supp.
566, 586 (S.D.N.Y., 1991) ("The Certificate binds Unigard to 'follow the
fortunes' of North River on the Owens-Coming risk by providing that '[all1 claims
covered by this reinsurance when settled by worth River] shall be binding on the
Reinsurers, who shall be bound to pay their proportion of such settlements.' "),
and Christiania General Ins Corp of New York, supra at 280 ("The parties'
contract states that '[tlhe reinsurance provided under this certificate shall follow
coverage of [Great American's] policy.").
FNl. Under California law, the doctrine may be implied in a contract of
reinsurance by evidence that a custom or usage exists to "follow the
settlements" of the reinsured. Nat? American Ins. Co. of Calfornia v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 93 F.3d 529,537 (C.A.9, 1996).
In this appeal, MTPP concedes that the reinsurance contract at issue "does not
contain a specific 'follow the fortunes' clause." Moreover, MTPP is unable to
point to any Michigan authority for support of its position that such a provision
should be read into the policy. Indeed, we find that Michigan guidance points in
the opposite direction. In Michigan Miners, supra, this Court addressed a dispute
between two insurance companies under a contract of reinsurance. The reasoning
and cxplanation of reinsurance law provided by the Michigan Millers Court is
particularly instructive in this setting. There, our Court pointed to 19 Couch,
Insurance, 2d, 5 80.66, pp. 673-674, to emphasize that "[tlhe extent of the liability
of the reinsurer is determined by the language of the reinsurance contract, and the
reinsurer cannot be held liable beyond the terms of its contract merely because the
original insurer has sustained a loss." Id. at 414, 452 N.W.2d 841. At another
point in Michigan Millers, this Court stated:
Although it is true that parties may agree to such terms in reinsurance as
will bind the reinsurer to the settlement or adjustment of loss made between
the parties to the original insurance, 19 Couch on Insurance 2d, 5 80.13, p.
631, we will not impose liability on the reinsurer for a settlement
contribution absent such an agreement. [ Id. at 417-4 18,452 N. W.2d 841.]
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Such statements respecting reinsurance are completely consistent with a plethora
of Michigan cases in the field of insurance law. For example, in Lehr v.
Professional Underwriters, 296 Mich. 693, 697, 296 N.W. 843 (1941), our
Supreme Court stated: "The liability was limited in the policy. To hold otherwise
would be to write a new contract for the parties. This we have no right to do." See
also Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Churchman, 440 Mich. 560, 566-567, 489 N.W.2d
431 (1992); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 438 Mich. 197, 207, 476
N.W.2d 392 (1991); Fragner v. American Community Mut. Ins. Co., 199
Mich.App. 537, 542-543, 502 N.W.2d 350 (1993); North River Ins. Co. v.
Endicott, 151 Mich.App. 707,712,391 N.W.2d 454 (1986).
After careful consideration, we conclude and hold that the learned trial court erred
in reading into the reinsurance contract at issue in this case a "follow the fortunes"
clause that was not agreed to by the parties.
Michigan TD. ~GicipatingPlan v. Federal Ins. Co., 592 N.W.2d 760,764-65 (Mich. App. 1999).
The Michigan court's refusal to rewrite an insurance agreement to disregard agreed-to
contractual terms echoes Idaho law: "Where policy language is found to be unambiguous, the
Court is to construe the policy as written, 'and the Court by construction cannot create a liability
not assumed by the insurer nor make a new contract for the parties, or one different from that
plainly intended, nor add words to the contract of insurance to either create or avoid liability."
Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 213,216, 127 P.3d 116, 119 (2005).
This is especially true where the policies lack concurrency of coverage. For example, in
applying the follow-the-fortunes doctrine, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York stressed: "Thus, assuming concurrency of coverage, when a ceding company enters
into a settlement that is grounded on a reasonable interpretation of its own policy, the reinsurer
may not avoid liability by raising policy defenses and objections that were available to the
cedent," having earlier remarked that "concurrency between the insurance and reinsurance
policies is a what makes reinsurance work[.] Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F.
Supp. 1328, 1337 & 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (also discussing the necessity of a "mirror image
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b h a n g e in the policy of reinsurance" if the underlying policy is changed; otherwise, the
"operation of concurrency breaks down.").
In the present case, there is no follow-the-fortunes provision, so Idaho law does not
permit one to be grafted in; further, the follow-the-fortunes doctrine would be otherwise
inapplicable as there is not a concurrency in coverage between the ICRMP and the Northfield
policies. Accordingly, plaintiffs argument on this point fails, and defendant should be granted
summary judgment6

D. Plaintiffs continuing. tort analysis is inavvlicable to the action at bar.
As previously explained by defendant, reliance upon continuing tort analysis in the
statute of limitations context is of no aid in an insurance coverage-trigger context. Compare

Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9" Cir. 1982) (cited by plaintiff, but noting
that "the relevant strain of continuing violation doctrine is that a systematic policy of
discrimination is actionable even if some or all of the events evidencing its inception occurred
prior to the limitations veriod.")(emphasis added) with City of Erie, Pennsvlvania v. Guarantv
Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.2d at 161-62 ("Reliance on the commencement of the statute of limitation is
not dispositive in determining when a tort occurs for insurance purposes. Statutes of limitation
and triggering dates for insurance purposes serve distinct functions and reflect different policy
concerns.").
Plaintiff maintains its argument that a continuing tort theory applies to the allegations
made in this action via reliance, in large part, upon cases premised on long-latency injuries, such

6. Plaintiff also disputes Northfield's right to reimburse for covered claims, but not for uncovered claims. Again,
the Northfield policy provides for reimbursement of expended defense costs for "claims under this policy." Martens
Aff., Exh. A, v. 5. Although
an oven auestion in Idaho. other iurisdictions allow for limitinev
- avvarentlv
..
reimbursement to only covered claims. see, e.g., Cornm\rcial Ca~ital~ k k c o w &c.
. v. St. Paul Mercurv Ins. Co.,
419 F. Supp.2d 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Lockwood Intern.. B.V. v. Volm Bag Co.. Inc., 273 F.3d 741 (7' Cir. 2001).
However, at this stage in the litigation, this question is likely premature, as it is largely a question limited solely to
an evaluation of any damages.
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as toxic torts. At least one court has explained why a claim such as malicious prosecution is not
analogous to asbestos/toxic tort-type claims:
Our Supreme Court has thus far adopted the "multiple trigger" theory to
determine the occurrence of injury for insurance coverage purposes only in cases
involving toxic torts. See J H France Refractories v. Allstate Insurance Co., 534
Pa. 29, 626 A.2d 502 (1993). The "multiple trigger" theory is applied in latent
disease cases, like asbestosis or mesothelioma, because such injuries may not
manifest themselves until a considerable time after the initial exoosure causing
,.,
injury occurs. The overriding concern in latent disease cases is that application of
the D'Auria "first manifestation" rule would allow insurance companies to
terminate coverage during the long latency period (of asbestosis); effectively
shifting the burden of future claims away from the insurer to the insured
(manufacturers of asbestos), even though the exposure causing injury occurred
during periods of insurance coverage. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. ofNorth
America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C.Cir.1981).
Here, we are not faced with a situation where the injuries, occasioned by the ton,
lay dormant for extended periods. When the allegedly wrongful suit is filed, the
injuries caused by the tort-humiliation, damage to reputation, suspense, physical
hardship and legal expenses-manifest themselves and become evident to a
reasonable defendant and, by implication, to the initiator of the wrongful
proceedings. Moreover, there is no intervening time period between the filing of
the allegedly wrongful suit and the manifestation of the injury that would allow a
risk aversive insurance company to terminate coverage.FN7
FN7. Our research has not uncovered a single jurisdiction that has adopted
the "multiple trigger" approach in a case involving inalicious prosecution.
We conclude that the "first manifestation" rule applies and now hold that the tort
of Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings occurs for the purpose of determining
insurance coverage when the allegedly wrongful suit is filed. Because neither the
INA nor Selective policies were in effect at the time the allegedly wrongful suit
was filed, neither is required to defend and indemnify appellants in the underlying
suit for Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings.
We additionally note that strong policy considerations underpin our decision to
apply the "first manifestation" rule to cases involving Wrongful Use of Civil
Proceedings. The adoption of a "multiple trigger" approach or one which triggers
insurance coverage at the "time of favorable termination" would allow a
tortfeasor with knowledge of his own potential liability to shift this burden to an
unwary insurance company. Such an outcome would contravene the wellestablished rule that a person may not insure against an injury that has already
occurred. See Appalachian Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 676
F.2d 56 (3rd Cir.1982).
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Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 710 A.2d 82, 87-88 (Pa.
Super. 1998).
Plaintiff first relies on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision in Wisconsin Electric
Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 142 Wisc. 2d 673, 419 N.W.2d 255 (1987). The facts
outlined in that matter demonstrate that it is a long-latency trespasslnuisance variety of action:
Although the facts of this case are complicated, they are not in dispute. In 1970,
WEPCo installed a three-phase power supply to the dairy farm of Wallace and
Joan Daggett (the Daggetts). Shortly after this new electrical source was installed,
the Daggetts began noticing unusual behavior on the part of their cows including
nervousness, a decline in milk production, failure to breed, ill health and
sometimes death. In 1981, the cause of these problems was determined to be
stray voltage from the new three-phase power supply. In 1982, WEPCo altered
the power system and the problems with the dairy cows ended.
419 N.W.2d at 675-76 (emphasis added). In fact, the court noted the difficulty in identifying the
precise date of injury:
The term "occurrence" as applied to the present case is ambiguous. In the usual
case, there is little dispute as to when an injury occurs when dealing with a
common injury or accident. However, with this type of injury, there is
considerable dispute as to when the injury is deemed to occur. It is therefore
our duty to determine what a reasonable person in the position of the insured
would have understood the words to mean.

Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
Such an analysis is equally true of Keene Corn. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667
F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), an asbestos case relied upon by plaintiff and by the Wisconsin
Electric court. In that case, the court discussed the difficulty in identifying a trigger date in
analyzing insurance coverage:
The language of each policy at issue in this case clearly provides that an "injury,"
and not the "occurrence" that causes the injury, must fall within a policy period
for it to be covered by the policy. Most suits brought under this type of policy
involve an injury and an occurrence that transpired simultaneously, or, at least, in
close temporal proximity to one another. In cases involving asbestos-related
disease, however, inhalation-the "occurrence" that causes the injury-takes
place substantially before the manifestation of the ultimate injury-asbestosis,
mesothetioma, or lung cancer. Furthermore, although it is not known how little

0 0 175

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION F O ~
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
- 19

exposure is required to cause disease, inhalation may occur over a long period of
time. As a result, inhalation may continue through numerous policy periods, the
disease may develop during subsequent policy periods, and manifestation may
occur in yet another policy period. For an insured such as Keene, different
insurers are likely to be on the risk at different points in the development of each
plaintiffs disease. Moreover, part of the development may occur at a time when
no insurer was on the risk. Asbestos-related diseases, which are certainly covered
by the policies, therefore differ from most injuries and hence present a difficult
problem of contractual interpretation.

667 F.2d at 1040 (emphasis added).
Nor do extrapolations of Idaho decisions assist plaintiff in this matter. Plaintiff relies, in
part, on Unigard Ins. Co. v. USF&G, 111 Idaho 891,728 P.2d 780 (Ct. App. 1986), where the
court examined whether the damaging of 98 doors in a four hour period would constitute a single
occurrence or multiple occurrences for the purposes of determining the number of deductibles
that might be applicable (whether one per door, or one for the entire incident). The court
explained:
The most recent formulation, and the approach that we find most u s e l l for cases
of the present type, has been termed the "functional event" or "continuous
process" test. It focuses not upon the individual events of damage but upon the
underlying cause. The critical inquiry is whether or not the damage-causing
process was continuous and repetitive.
111 Idaho at 893. In fact, the court's application of the continuing process test supports
defendants' position in this matter. The crux of this action is the alleged bad acts by the
defendants in the Paradis litigation in withholding exculpatory evidence from Mr. Paradis
beginning before the trial, which resulted in Mr. Paradis being wrongfully imprisoned for
approximately 20 years. The "underlying cause," the focus of any such continuous process test,
is the allegedly wrongful actions taken over 25 years ago, long before the inception of ICRMP,
and before the issuance of any Northfield policy. Moreover, the court cautioned:
We recognize, of course, that neither the continuous process approach nor any
other approach derived from case law should be applied if the insurance policy
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itself contains a dispositive definition of "occurrence" or "accident." As
mentioned earlier, the policy in this case does not contain such a definition.
111 Idaho at 894. In the present case, "occurrence" is defined in the Northfield Policy. Martens
Aff., Exh. A, at p.6. Specifically, the policy provides:
For Section 11, "occurrence" means an accident or a happening or event or a
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in personal injury or
damage to property during the policy period. All personal iniuries to one or more
persons and/or property damage arising out of an accident or a happening or event
or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one
occurrence.

Id (emphasis added). Thus, Unigard also supports Northfield's position, not plaintiffs.
Plaintiff also cryptically cites two opinions that are cross-ways with its position that the
2000-2001 Northfield policy is the policy which must cover all of the claimed damages, despite
Mr. Paradis' assertion that the wrongful acts commenced with his arrest in June 1980. In
Dioceses of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8" Cir. 1996), the court
applied Minnesota law to find that the repeated sexual abuse of a child constituted "one
continuing occurrence." Id at 1391. In doing so, the court held that multiple insurers could be
held responsible for policies covering certain portions of time during the 1979-1987 span of the
abuse. Id at 1395-96. In doing so, the court went on to note:
The parties agree that Mrozka's abuse began in October 1979 and continued until
February 1987. Thus, it is undisputed that Mrozka suffered "actual injury" in all
policy periods, tri gering the coverage of all such policy periods. See NSP, 523
N.W.2d at 663.&' We have determined, however, that there was no covered
"occurrence" for purposes of insurance coverage for the Archdiocese after
December 1980, thus, the only insurance coverage triggered are those in effect
from October 1979 through December 1980: Aetna's through August 30, 1980,
and Lloyd's and Interstate's commencing September 1, 1980.
FN11. Furthermore, as we discussed in footnote 5, supra, the court in NSP
also held that in situations in which multiple policies involved where
there was one continuous occurrence, the courts should apply one full
SIR or limit to each separate policy period. 523 N.W.2d at 664. Thus,
under the rationale set forth in NSP, the Archdiocese must assume the
retained limit with respect to each of the triggered policies.
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Under NSP, where insurers are held consecutively liable, and there is no evidence
allocating the timing of actual damages, the proper method is to allocate damages
pro rata by each insurer's "time on the risk." 523 N.W.2d at 662 (citing Insurance
Co. of N. Am, v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.1980),
amended, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct.
686, 70 L.Ed.2d 650 (1981)). Each triggered policy, therefore, bears a share of the
total damages proportionate to the time period it was on the risk relative to the
time period coverage was triggered. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1224.
The Archdiocese must bear its share of the liability risk for the period in which it
had no insurance coverage-that is, after December 1980. Id
Adamson's abuse of Mrozka lasted 89 months, from October 1979 through
February 1987. Aetna insured the Archdiocese from September 1979, through
August 1980; thus, it is "on the risk" for eleven of 89 months. Lloyd's and
Interstate insured the Archdiocese from September 1980 through December 1980,
which is the time when Adamson's abuse of Mrozka was no longer an occurrence
for the purposes of coverage. Thus, Lloyd's and Interstate are "on the risk" for
four of 89 months.
A judgment was rendered against Aetna for $41,422. This is not contested on
appeal. The math used to reach the verdict was based on the Archdiocese being
responsible for 45 percent of the state court verdict of $924,570 FN'2 resulting in
the sum of $416,056.50. When this sum is proportioned over 89 months, the
allocation per month is $4,674. When multiplied by the eleven months Aetna was
on the risk the overall liability is $51,422. Subtracting the Archdiocese's $10,000
SIR, the amount owed by Aetna is $41,422.

Id. at 1396. Thus, Dioceses actually contemplates a scenario where, if applied here, would
implicate all policies - including Kootenai County's pre-ICRMP coverage - commencing with
Mr. Paradis' damages, rather than the single policy damage assignment forwarded by plaintiff in
this action. Even assuming the application of the Minnesota "continuing occurrence theory" in
the present case, Mr. Paradis claimed damages from June 1980 (the date of his arrest) until April
2001 (the date of his release), a period of 20 years & 10 months (250 months total). The
amounts expended in defense and settlement here total approximately $1,223,305.33.
(Complaint, $XXI & Exh. F:)

The amount allocated per month would be $4,893.22; the

Northfield policy at issue would put Northiield "on risk" for 12 of the 250 months, for a total on-
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risk allocation of $58,718.64. As ICRMP's SIR ($150,000) would be triggered for that policy
period, Northfield would owe no reimbursement arn~unts.~
Despite the logic of the risk allocation found in the Dioceses case, there is nothing under
Idaho law that would suggest its rationale would or should be adopted here. Instead, in this case,
the entire controversy and the Paradis complaints go back to the failure to disclose and his
consequent conviction. He was ultimately released and exonerated of murder because of the
initial failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence.
Finally, the Curtis v. Firth decision is not as broad as plaintiff suggests, as demonstrated
by the recent McCabe v. Craven decision by the Idaho Court of Appeals.

P.3d -,

2007

WL 1229095 (Ct. App., April 19,2007). In McCabe, an inmate was held for 228 days beyond

the expiration of his sentence; he filed suit alleging a variety of claims, including cruel and
unusual punishment, and due process and equal protection, based upon his claims that he had
been wrongfully imprisoned. Id. at *l. Complicating the inmate-plaintiff s claims was the fact
that he filed two years from the last date of his incarceration; the district court held that his
claims had been barred by the statute of limitations, based upon an earlier claimed discovery
date. Id. at *2. The Court of Appeals clarified the breadth of its application of continuing tort
concepts:

7. Countv of Suffolk v. Travelers ins. Co., 267 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) appears to support a similar result.
In that matter, suit, was filed regarding alleged property damage as the result of a sea wall allegedly poorly
constructed some 35 years earlier. Id. at 290-9 1. The court ultimately found an issue of material fact with respect to
several policy years from two separate insurers, rather than a single policy to which the damage could be
attributable. Additionally, note that the policies at issue in Countv of Suffolk appear to lack the "occurrence"
definition proviso that "All personal injuries to one or more persons andlor property damage arising out of an
accident or a happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one
occurrence" as is present in the Northfield policy. Note that this was a special caveat raised by the
Casualtv Ins. Co. v. Citv of Mt. Vernon, 128 A.D.2d 332, 515 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1987) decision, wherein the court
carefully noted that ""there is nothing in the policy which requires, as a prerequisite to ascertaining whether there is
coverage, that the injury resulting from a causative event he reduced to a single or fixed occurrence in time." 515
N.Y.S.2d at 270. The other deficiencies regarding Mount Vernon have previously been addressed by defendant.
See Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed December 12,2006, at 22-24.
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As we explain, McCabe's allegedly wrongful incarceration presents tortious
conduct that is serial in nature, although a recurring wrong does not in itself
justify characterization as a continuing tort.FNSSee Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598,
603-04, 850 P.2d 749, 754-55 (1993). In continuing tort or continuing wrong
cases, it is the cumulative effect of a continuous chain of tortious activity that
causes injury, id., and the wrongful acts must be so numerous and continuous that
it is impractical to allocate damages across them. Heard, 253 F.3d at 318-19.
"Since usually no single incident in a continuous chain of tortious activity can
'fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant hann,' it seems
proper to regard the cumulative effect of the conduct as actionable." Curtis, 123
Idaho at 603, 850 P.2d at 754 (quoting Page, 729 F.2d 818, 821-22
(D.C.Cir.1984)).
FN5. The Idaho Supreme Court has characterized the doctrine of continuing
violation as a doctrine of accrual and has cited with approval to its
description by one federal court. See Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 603,
850 P.2d 749, 754 (1993) (quoting Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818,
821-22 (D.C.Cir.1984)). Our point of accrual analysis being the same under
section 1983 and the ITCA, we therefore uniformly apply the common law
doctrine of continuing violation to McCabe's federal and state claims.
The wrongful incarceration alleged here is not the type of continuing conduct
irreducible to particular wrongful acts. McCabe reasonably could have
commenced his action on the first day of wrongful imprisonment (or when he
reasonably should have discovered the injury), rather than waiting until after his
last day of imprisonment. Unlawful imprisonment is unlike the uncompleted
construction project or the intentional infliction of emotional distress justifying
application of the continuing tort doctrine in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630
P.2d 685 (1981) and Curtis. Thus, McCabe cannot bring suit for damages from
any wrongful acts occurring outside the statute of limitations period.
Our holding is in line with Cobbley v. City of Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 59 P.3d 959
(2002), which involved a series of ongoing, discrete nuisances caused by dust
from speeding cars. While the Cobbley Court recognized that a continuing
nuisance is in some ways analogous to a continuing tort, the Cobbley Court
implicitly recognized an important difference. In true continuing tort cases such as
Farber and Curtis, where the wrongful acts are not reasonably reducible to
individual causes of actions, the plaintiff can capture acts outside the filing period
so long as any portion of the cumulative conduct occurs within the statutory
limitations period. This "reach back" effect was not applied, however, to the
continuing nuisance in Cobbley and should not apply to other serial violations
consisting of fairly identifiable and actionable wrongs, each of which cause
discrete injury. Cobbley, 138 Idaho at 158-59, 59 P.3d at 963-64.
In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-121 (2002), the
United States Supreme Court similarly distinguished a series of discrete acts, such
as weekly discriminatory paychecks, from a hostile working environment in
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES*MOTION
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
- 24

FOB0 0 18 0

which the injurious employment practice cannot be said to occur on any particular
day. Under this dichotomy, the Court held that "discrete discriminatory acts are
not actionable if time barred,FN6even when they are related to acts alleged in
timely filed charges." Id. at 113.
FN6. As the Court reminded, "this time period for filing a charge is subject
to equitable doctrines such as tolling or estoppel." National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002)
For purposes of accrual, we conclude that each day of allegedly wrongful
imprisonment in the instant case was analogous to receiving a discriminatory
paycheck or enduring another day of a continuing nuisance. Each new day that
McCabe was wrongfully imprisoned represents another day on which the
statute of limitations begins to rumFN7Having waited until two years after
the last day of his imprisonment to file his complaint, McCahe's action may
proceed on his claim for damages but only for one day of wrongful
imprisonment-March 7,2003.
FN7. This is not to suggest that the wrongfully imprisoned are permitted to
sleep.on their rights while accruing damages. Because the writ of habeas
corpus for sentence miscalculation, I.C. § 19-4203(2), provides a means for
relief from wrongful imprisonment, the affirmative defense of laches may
be asserted when necessary to prevent abuse of our holding here.

Id at *3-4 (emphasis added). Thus, McCabe demonstrates that Idaho views the continuing tort
concept - in the statute of limitations context - more narrowly than proposed by plaintiff.
However, discussion of Curtis and McCabe is an academic point, as neither Curtis nor McCabe
has any application in an insurance-trigger context, unlike the more specific (and controlling)
Western Casualty decision. Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Idaho at 113 ("An
insurer is not liable 'for claims arising out of an event or accident which occurred prior to the
effective date of the insurance coverage, even though damages and claims continued to accrue
from this cause during the later period of coverage.')(emphasis added).
Accordingly, this Court should reject plaintiffs argument on this point.

E.

Northfield has not waived anv right to dispute the settlement amount, but more
imvortantlv. that claim or issue raised bv ICRMP is not material to whether there is
coverage under the Northfield policv.
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Lastly, plaintiff asserts that because Northfield has contested any obligation to reimburse
ICRMP for the Paradis matter, it has waived any right to contest the reasonableness of the

Paradis ~ettlement.~ICRMP's argument on this point is nothing more than a "red herring,"
attempting to divert attention from the issue of whether there is coverage under Northfield's
policy. If there is no coverage or obligation to reimburse ICRMP for any amount expended, an
argument that because Northfield denied coverage prohibits it from contesting the amount of
settlement is quite irrelevant.
In any event, in making such argument, plaintiff relies upon Exterovich, 139 Idaho 439
(2003), which addressed the consequences of an insurer's refusal to defend in light of an
insured's admission of liability. The applicability of the Exterovich holdings in the present
action is somewhat dubious, given that: a) Exterovich addressed only the consequence of a

failure to defend - here, Northfield has no duty to defend; b) Exterovich only addresses an
admission of liability, and not the actual money amounts expended in settlement - here, plaintiff
seeks to expand Exterovich to foreclose discussion of the settlement amounts; and c) Exterovich
still requires that a settlement be "reasonable": "The breach of the duty to defend does not
prevent the insurer from later providing a defense, although in this case ICRMP would be bound
by the City's admission of liability as long as it was potentially liable and such admission was

a reasonable settlement." Id. at 442. The right of an insurer to dispute the reasonableness of a
settlement is simply not foreclosed following a denial of coverage. See, e.g., Nova v. A.W.
Coulter Trucking, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 589-90 (Cal. App. 2006) ("We note that Zurich will not
be deprived of an opportunity to contest the amount of the settlement in a subsequent action for
bad faith. When an insurance carrier has denied coverage and a defense, 'a reasonable settlement

8. Plaintiff does not, apparently, dispute Northfield's right, if found to have breached its reimbursement duty, to
challenge the reasonableness of the defense fees and costs incurred in the defense of the Paradis action.
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made by the insured to terminate the underlying claim against him may be used as presumptive
evidence of the insured's liability on the underlying claim, and the amount of such liability."');
Connecticut Indemn. Co. v. Perrotti, 390 F. Supp. 2d 158, 170 (D. Conn. 2005)("'It is well
settled that when an insurer improperly fails to defend an insured who subsequently settles the
case with the injured party, the insurer is estopped from raising the issue of the insured's liability
as a defense to the action arising from an insurer's failure to defend.

... Nevertheless, the

[insured] is required to prove that the settlement - whether it be by stipulated judgment or
otherwise -was reasonable."'); Detroit Edison Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 301 N.W.2d 832,
836 (Mich. App. 1980) (" Because Edison did not enter into the settlement with Tocco until after
the declaratory judgment action had been decided in circuit court, Mutual has not had an
opportunity to present evidence to show that the settlement was unreasonable or made in bad
faith or that there was no liability. Before a judgment for the amount of the settlement is entered
against Mutual, -Mutual should be allowed to attempt to make such a showing. ... In view of the
ambiguity in the complaint against Edison as to whether supervisory or non-supervisory
negligence was being alleged, Mutual should also be permitted to attempt to show that, even
though Edison was liable to Tocco, Edison's liability was not covered by the policy issued by
Mutual."). As further explained by the Third Circuit, in the reinsurance context:
But while a 'follow the fortunes' clause limits a reinsurer's defenses, it does not
make a reinsurer liable for risks beyond what was agreed upon in the reinsurance
certificate. In that regard, the reinsurer retains the right to question whether the
reinsured's liability stems from an unreinsured loss. A loss would be unreinsured
if it was not contemplated by the original insurance policy or if it was expressly
excluded by terms of the certificate of reinsurance.
North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (31d Cir. 1995).
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For an analogous Idaho example, although this action does not involve any breach of the
duty to defend by Northfield, Idaho has been loath to impose estoppel as a punitive measure to
grant fees and costs where an insurer has refused to defend:
The Hirsts urge that we should adopt an alternative to the Afcan approach.
They cite what might be characterized as the "Illinois rule." That rule holds that
where the insurer violates its duty to defend, the insurer is estopped to deny
coverage-thereby invoking the following broad measure of damages to the
insured: (1) the costs of defending the suit; (2) the amount recovered from the
insured, either by way of judgment or settlement; and (3) any additional damages
caused by the insurer's breach of contract. See, for a recitation of the elements of
the Illinois rule, Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 at 1184 (7th
Cir. 1980).
We decline to adopt the Illinois rule. We question the propriety of utilizing
a form of estoppel as a punitive measure against an insurer for breach of a
contractual duty to defend. Rather, we believe the sanctions for that breach should
be governed by ordinary principles of contract law. In Idaho, the purpose of
awarding damages for breach of contract is to fully recompense the non-breaching
party for its losses sustained because of the breach, not to punish the breaching
party. Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796,606 P.2d 90 (1980).
Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 792,799,683 P.2d 440,447 (Ct. App. 1984)
In Mr. Ferguson's affidavit, plaintiff attempts to make an initial showing of the
reasonableness of the settlement. However, as previously explained to the Court, plaintiff has
not provided defendant with a number of long-outstanding discovery items related to the
litigation and settlement of the Paradis matter, including:
1)

All exhibits to the depositions taken in the Paradis matter;

2)

A fully executed copy of the Paradis settlement agreement between
Kootenai County and Mr. Paradis;

3)

Copies of correspondence between the parties to the Paradis matter
relating to such settlement;

4)

Copies of the settlement agreement(s) in the Paradis action relating to Mr.
Haws and Mr. Elliott; and
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5)

Mediation statements from the Paradis matter.

See also Memorandum in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Motion for
Summary Judgment, at pp. 49-50. Although plaintiff wishes to demonstrate the reasonableness
of the settlement at this juncture, plaintiff has withheld documents necessary to analyze that
issue, rendering defendant unable to fully and fairly respond to such assertions. Further, based
upon the documents currently in hand, there is a suggestion that the settlement was unreasonable:
although Paradis was settled for $800,000 under the 2000-2001 ICRMP policy, such policy only
provides for $500,000 each loss/occurrence combined single limit for Section IIA & C (and
Secton IV) coverages "for claims brought pursuant to Title 6, Ch. 9, Idaho Code" (the Idaho Tort
claims act -Mr. Paradis filed a Notice of Tort Claim with Kootenai County on October 9, 2001
(Counsel Aff., Exh. D, at 117)), potentially reflecting a payment by ICRMP in excess of its own
limits, especially where, as here, ICRMP asserts that all damages are attributable to a single
"occurrence" during the ICRMPINorthfield coverage period (2000-2001). Counsel Aff., EEx I,
at D-2. Additionally, as discussed earlier, Northfield's obligation to reimburse, if any, would
have been triggered by the exhaustion of ICRMP's SIR of $150,000 - however, Northfield was
not notified of any such exhaustion until on or about June 27,2006, after ICRMP had expended
$423,305.33 in defense costs, exceeding its SIR layer by $273,305.33. Complaint, Exh. F.
Moreover, these issues are not salient to the scope of defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and should be ignored at the summary judgment stage of proceedings. See, e.g.,
Proeressive Ins. Co. v. Universal Cas. Co., 807 N.E.2d 577, 589-90 (Ill. App. 2004) ("However,
the considerations affecting the voluntariness of a settlement, such as whether an excess insurer's
anticipation of liability was reasonable and whether the settlement was arrived at in good faith,
are, like the issue of notice, questions of fact not appropriately determined at the summary
judgment stage of the proceedings.").
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES~MOTION FOQ
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As such, the Court should disregard plaintiffs arguments on this point, and grant
defendant's motion for summary judgment

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant Northfield should be granted summary judgment,
and plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Northfield's policy simply does
not provide coverage of ICRMP for the Paradis action, ICRMP's costs of defense, or any
amount above its SIR which ICRMP paid.
DATED this

e day of May, 2007.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANTON. P.A.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS,
Case No. CV OC 0 6 1 7 1 12
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTlNG PLAINTIFF'S
PARTIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

VS.

NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES,
a Minnesota corporation,
Defendant.

The Court having heard oral arguments regarding the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, and having considered the stipulations of the parties during
oral arguments, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1)

That ICRMP was obligated, pursuant to the policy of insurance it sold

t o Kootenai County, to provide a defense t o its insureds for the lawsuit filed by
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Donald Paradis filed in the Federal Court for the District of Idaho described as
Paradis v. Brady, et a/, Case No. CIV-03-01-50-N-BLW; for that reason:

2)

The plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment IS GRANTED.

DATED t h i s 2 2 day of

& , 2007.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,

I

Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. CV-OC-Obi-) P la
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES
Defendants.
Hearing Date:
Attorneys:

May 17,2007
Plaintiff-Donald J. Farley (Hall Farley)
Defendants-Phillip J. Collaer (Anderson, Julian, & Hull)

Hearinn Purpose:

Defendant Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment

Before the court for decision is Defendant Northland's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

I.

FACTSANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND:

This case arises out of an insurance coverage dispute.

The central controversy arises

from a lawsuit filed in Federal Court by Donald M. Paradis against various Idaho Counties Risk
Management Program Underwriters' ("ICRMP) insureds, including Kootenai County, and other
individuals. During the relevant periods, ICRMP purchased what it is calling reinsurance from
Defendant Northland' ("Northland). ICRMP defended its insureds in the Paradis lawsuit under
a reservation of right's. Northland has denied coverage, taking the position that the Northland
policy does not cover the occurrence in question.
ICRMP was created in 1985 and sold insurance to its member insureds. During that
from ~ o r t h l a n d .In
~ 2003, Donald
period ICRMP purchased what it describes as "rein~urance"~
Paradis filed a complaint in the Federal District Court for the District of Idaho alleging, inter
alia, false arrest, false imprisonment, detention, and negligence, all of which were alleged
violations of his federally protectedcivil rights and state law. Following the filing of the Paradis
Complaint, Kootenai County forwarded the Complaint to ICRMP for its review and
determination on a duty to defend. Upon review of the Complaint, ICRNlP determined that
based on the facts and legal theories alleged there was a legal duty to defend on the claims of
negligent and intentional inflictions of emotional distress and failure to train. The duty to defend
was held with a reservation of rights which was forwarded to Northland.

'

Northland Insurance Company is also identified as Northfield Insurance Company. For purposes of this motion,
the Court will use Northland to reference both in keeping with the symmetry of the pleading caption.
2
ICRMP describes the supplemental insurance as reinsurance while Northland would characterize the insurance
olicy as reimbursement insurance.
'ICRMP argues that this insurance was purchased from its inception while Northlaud argues that company records
indicate that policies were issued to ICRMP for 1986-1988 and 1994-2001.

After ICRMP undertook the defense of the Paradis litigation, motions to dismiss were
filed and granted in part in that case. The Court therein declined, however, to dismiss the
constitutional claims and the state law claims which were based upon continuing torts. Soon
thereafter, Mr. Paradis filed an amended complaint clarifying the legal theories and factual
allegations against the ICRMP insureds. ICRMP's determination that it had a duty to defend did
not change.4
Before the Court is Defendant Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a
determination that there was no "occurrence" during the Northland Policy period and as such, no
duty to indemnify f i r either the settlement or defense. This Court has previously deteimined on
summary judgment that ICRMP had a duty to defend in the Paradis action..

11.

DEFENDANT'S
ARGUMENTS:

In bringing the motion for summary judgment, Northland's focus is on the alleged lack of
coverage for the ICRMP Paradis settlement and the costs incurred in the defense of that action.
Specifically, Northland argues the claims in Paradis which were resolved by settlement - Count

I ($1983: Failure to Train re: Brady) against Kootenai County; Count X(1) (Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress) against Haws; and Counl X(2) (Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress) against Haws- are not covered under either Section I1 or Section IV~ of the Northland
Policy. Northland also argues the defense costs incurred by ICRMP are not covered under the
Northland Policy, either for the period following the filing of the first Paradis Complaint or the

P

ICRMP found that a duty to defend resulted only on three of the surviving claims, Count I (5 1983: Failure to Train
re: Brady) against Kootenai County; Count X(1)(Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) against Haws; and
Count X(2) (Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress) against Haws. These are the only Counts considered by the
Court.
During oral arguments all parties agreed that Section IV is not at issue and therefore the Court will not address
whether Section IV was triggered or the impact of that Section on this action.

period following the filing of the First Amended Complaint in Parudis. Finally, Northland
attempts to characterize the policy as a reimbursement policy because the Northland Policy lacks
the hallmarks of reinsurance, in that it does not contain follow-the-form, or follow-the-fortunes
clauses of the ICRMP policy, so claims made against it must instead be analyzed under the
Northland Policy's own coverage terms and conditions.

PLAINTIFF'S
ARGUMENTS:

111.

Initially, ICRMP reiterates the duty it had to defend Kootenai County against the

Paradis complaint!

ICRMP then argues that the Amended Complaint describes an occurrence

which caused personal injury during the Northland and ICRMP policy periods. Specifically,
ICRMP argues that the resulting injuries were continuing torts which are covered "occurrences"
as defined in the general liability insuring agreement. Finally, ICRMP argues that the Northland
policy contains all of the classic hallmarks of reinsurance. That is, that the policy achieved
concurrency between the coverage's afforded by the primary and reinsurance policy, that
Northland policy required ICRMP to "investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses."
(Northfield Policy, p. 5).

IV.

LEGAL
STANDARD:

Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings,
affidavits, and discovery documents ..., read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002)
During the course of the hearing, Northland conceded that it would withdraw the defense of ICRMP2sduty to
defend in the Purndis case. This stipulation has been reduced to an Order Granting Plaintiff's Partial Motion f o ~
Summary Judgment dated May 29,2007.

(quoting I.R.C.P. 56). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the
nonmoving party has failed to show an element essential of her case as to which the nonmoving
party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986).~
The burden of proving the absence of material fact is placed upon the moving party.
Thoinas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002);
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452 P.2d 362, 365 (1969);
Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572,577.97 P.3d 439,444 (1969); Thomson, 137 Idaho at 476,

50 P.3d at 491. In Celotex, the U.S. Supreme Couri held that there is no need to negate the
nonmoving party's case; instead, the moving party's burden is discharged when she shows there
is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Meanwhile, the
adverse party may not rest on "mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must respond, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). See Thomas, 138 Idaho at 205; Thomson, 137 Idaho at
476, 50 P.3d at 491; Blickenstaff, 140 Idaho at 577, 97 P.3d at 444. The adverse party must
make more than just "conclusory assertions" and, indeed, a mere scintilla of evidence is not
enough. Blickenstafi 140 Idaho at 577,97 P.3d at 444.
In making its determination, the court must consider all affidavits, depositions, and
interrogatories in conjunction with the pleadings and, in effect, "pierce the formal allegations."
Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 868. Evidence should be considered in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party (Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)), meaning
7

Summary judgment, as a procedural mechanism, is not to be regarded as a "disfavored procedural shortcut," hut
instead an "integral" component of the rules of civil procedure, "designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."' Celotex, 477 U.S.at 327 (citing F.R.C.P. 1). This is equally true for
summary judgment as found in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which is an identical procedural mechanism and
is intended to serve the same role as its federal counterpart.

summary judgment is improper "if conflicting inferences could be drawn from the record and
reasonable people might reach different conclusions." Thomas, 138 Idaho at 205. If the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains on which the
court may then enter summary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho,
138 Idaho 443,445,65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003).

V.

ANALYSIS:

Three issues have been raised by the Parties. First, the Court will address whether there
was an occurrence under the Northland Policy and the date of the occurrence. Second, the Court
will determine whether there is a duty to indemnify ICRMP for its' defense of the Paradis suit.
Finally, the Court will address the issue of whether the Northland Policy can be classified as
reinsurance.
The court will note at the outset lhat the legal questions are complex and the law unclear.
It is understandable that two excellent attorneys are in disagreement on the legal interpretations
of these issues.

A.

"Occurrence" Under the Northland Policy:
At issue is Northland's occurrence policy covering the period from October 2000,

through October 2001. "An 'occurrence' policy protects the policy holder from liability for any
act done while the policy is in effect." St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438
U.S. 531, 535 n.3, 98 S.Ct. 2923,2927 n.3 (1978). The Northland policy provides under Section
I1 as follows:

This Section applies only to bodily injury, personal injury or property damage
which occur during the policy period and arise out of an occurrence which takes
place within the territorial scope of the Policy.
A. COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY: Underwriters hereby
agree, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions hereunder
mentioned, to indemnify the Assured for all sums, including expenses, all
as more fully defined by the term ultimate net loss, which the Assured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages imposed by law because
of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury, advertising injury,
products liability and or completed operations hostlliquor liability or
incidental malpractice which result from an occurrence and which occur
during the policy period.

C. LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY: Underwriters hereby agree,
subject to the limitations, terms and conditions hereunder mentioned, to
indemnify the Assured for all sums which the Assured shall be obligated
to pay by reason of errors, omissions or negligent acts arising out of the
performance of the Assured's duties while acting as a law enforcement
official or officer in the regular course of public employment as
hereinafter defined, arising out of any occurrence from any cause on
account of Personal Injury, Bodily Injury, Property Damage, Violation of
Civil Rights or First Aid, happening during the period of this insurance
except as covered under Section I1 A and B.
(Northland Policy, p. 13). The policy goes on to further define an "occurrence" as:
For Section 11, "occurrence" means an accident or a happening or event or a
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in personal injury or
damage to property during the policy period. All personal injuries to one or more
persons andlor property damage arising out of an accident or a happening or event
or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one
occurrence.

(Northland Policy, p. 6).
Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law, which this Court freely
reviews. AMCO Iizs. Co. v. Tri-Spur Inv. Co., 140 Idaho 733, 739, 101 P.3d 226, 232 (2004). A
policy "is ambiguous if 'it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations."'

Cascade Auto

Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660,663, 115 P.3d 751,754 (2005). Any
ambiguities in an insurance policy must be construed against the insurer; however, a court should
not torture the language to create an ambiguity where none exists. Farmers Itzs. Co. of Idaho v.
Talbot, 133 Idaho 428,435,987 P.2d 1043,1050 (1999). However, where the policy language is
clear and unambiguous, "coverage must be determined in accordance with the plain meaning of
the words used." Mutual of Enurnclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235, 912 P.2d 119,
122 (1996). Only where reasonable intelligent men, considering the word in the context of the
entire policy, would honestly differ as to its meaning, will an ambiguity be found. Id.
Here, the Northland policy is clearly an occurrence policy based on the unambiguous
language and the applicable policy provisions, considered in their entirety. No ambiguity exists

in the policy language and it is clear that only acts done while the policies were in effect were
covered. Each policy specifically focuses on the act causing injury as the coverage "trigger" and
specifically requires this injury to occur during the applicable policy period.
Of central focus is when did the tortious conduct "occur" for purposes of insurance
coverage? Much has been made about the difference between claim accrual for purposes of the
statute of limitation and an occurrence for purposes of insurance coverage. The distinction is
important and has been more fully discussed by other courts:
Reliance on the commencement of the statute of limitation is not dispositive in
determining when a tort occurs for insurance purposes. Statutes of limitation and
triggering dates for insurance purposes service distinct functions and reflect
different policy concerns. Statutes of limitation function to expedite litigation and
discourage state claims. But when determining when a tort occurs for insurance
purposes, courts have generally sought to protect the reasonable expectations of
the parties to the insurance contract. Because of this fundamental difference in
purpose, courts have consistently rejected the idea they are bound by the statutes
of limitation when seelung to determine when a tort occurs for insurance
purposes.

City of Erie, Pennsylvania v. Guaranty Nut. Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 156, 161-62 (3rd Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted). As indicated by other courts, it is irrelevant to the analysis whether aclaim is
preserved for purposes of pursuing the claim. At issue here, is who will cover the tortious
conduct based on the insurance contract.
In order for the Court to establish whether there was an occurrence within the policy
period, as such, the Court must first, identify the occurrence and then, determine when it took
place. Generally, an occurrence is determined by the cause or causes of the tortious conduct.
That is, the Court is to determine if there was "but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing
cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damage." Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3rd Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). In applying this test, the Court finds
that there was only one proximate cause for the wrongful imprisonment of Mr. Paradis and the
damages that resulted from it; the failure to make the Brady disclosures and therefore, the failure
to train properly regarding the Brady disclosures. It was this failure that caused the errors that
led to the wrongful imprisonment in Idaho and the resulting infliction of emotional distress
claims. Had the Brady training occurred, the exculpatory evidence should have been disclosed
preventing the imprisonment of Mr. Paradis in Idaho and accordingly, his emotional distress
claims. For that reason, the Court views the occurrence as being the failure to train regarding
Brady requirements.
However, the crucial issue is determining when the occurrence took place because only if
it took place within the policy period is Northland required to cover the Paradis suit. While the
law is less than clear on the issue, the Court has reviewed other cases that can be applied by
analogy to determine that the occurrence here was about 1980 to 1981, that is when the failure to
train regarding Brady disclosures occurred. The Court will set forth the reasoning below.

In Appalachian Insurance Co., the court was faced with a similar determination of the
time period in which an occurrence had resulted leading to the injury. There the injury of
discriminatory employment policies were first adopted in 1965 but the results of the policies
were not felt until some years later, with the injury being a continuous one. The timing of the
occurrence was important as multiple insurance policies could be triggered. In addressing when
the injury had occurred, the Court adopted the "effect" test ultimately holding that "the
occurrence [took] place when the injur[y] first manifest [itself]." Id. at 63. The Court reasoned
that the injuries to the employees occurred immediately upon the promulgation of the
discriminatory policies not when the impact of those illegal policies was felt or the damage
resulted. Id.
In Kootenui County v. Western Cus. and Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908,750 P.2d 87 (1988), the
Idaho Supreme Court faced the question of whether an improper execution sale which occurred
about six months prior to the effective date of an occurrence policy was a covered occurrence
because the effects or damages were realized during the insurance policy period. In Kootenai

County, the sheriff negligently conducted an execution sale without complying with the statutory
requirements concerning notice. The dispute arose because two policies could potentially be at
risk to cover the injury because a second policy was secured about six months after the sheriff's
failures but during the period of time when the damages became apparent. In determining when
the event occurred for purposes of coverage, the Idaho Supreme Court held "[aln insurer is not
liable 'for claims arising out of an event or accident which occurred prior to the effective date of
the insurance coverage, even though damages and claims continue to accrue from this cause
during the later period of coverage."' Id. at 915, 750 P.2d at 94 (citing Appalachian Ins. Co. v.

Liberty Mutual Ins. Corp., 507 F.Supp. 59, 62 (W.D.Pa. 1981) (aff'd, 676 F.2d 56 (3rd Cir.

1982).
It is these two cases that the Court finds most persuasive in holding that the occurrence
here happened when Kootenai County initially failed to train its' employees regarding the Brady
disclosures. While the failures where alleged to have been on-going by Mr. Paradis, the fact
remains, that much like the Appalachian employment manual, the initial failure to train resulted
in the continuous injuries, this was the period when the injury was first manifest. The resultant

situation was that an injury was manifest in 1980 with damages and claims continuing to accrue
up until the release of Mr. Paradis from the penitentiary. Simply put, this is not a situation where
the cause of the injury is difficult to ascertain and would be properly applied using the
continuous torts doctrine. Rather, there was a single occurrence that had a continued and lasting
effect causing many years of damage. As such, the Court finds that no coverage exists for
ICRMP under the Northland policy because there was no occurrence during the policy period.
ICRMP advanced a theory that the Northland policy covered the tortious conduct because
the actions were continuous torts and the language within the policy states, ". . . an accident or
happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in personal
injury or damage to property during the policy period." (Northland Policy, p. 6). However, the

Court's reading of this provision acknowledges a continuous or repeated exposure but the
follows up with the modifier that the injury results "during the policy period." Id. The Court
finds that the continued exposure must occur during the policy period. Again, the focus is on
when the injury manifest itself not that the injury continued into the policy period. It is the
Court's view that coverage will be provided for a multitude of events, so long as they occur
while the policy is in effect.

B.

Indemnity for ICRMP's Defense:
The next issue which must be addressed is whether Northland was required to reimburse

ICRMP for defending against the Paradis suit. Similar to the above disc'ussion if there was no
coverage under the Policy, there would likewise be no duty to reimburse for defending against a
claim not covered by the policy. Again, Northland, when it issued the coverage, agreed to
"indemnify . . . for all sums, including expenses . . . which the Assured shall become legally

obligated to pay as damages imposed by law."

(Northland Policy, p. 13). If there is no

coverage, it follows that there can be no legal obligation to indemnify because there would be no
legal obligation to pay. As such, because the triggering occurrence happened outside the policy
period, there would be no legal obligation to indemnify or reimburse for defending against the

Paradis suit.

C.

Reinsurance Issue:
While the issue of whether the Northland Policy can be characterized as reinsurance or

reimbursement insurance, the distinction is irrelevant at this point in time. Upon a closer review
of Northland's papers, the Court would acknowledge that the issue, while discussed at length,
appears to be a discussion of the Policy in response to issues raised in ICRMP's prior partial
motion for summary judgment. Of note is the first line in Northland's opening brief wherein
they state, "Plaintiff has previously asserted that the Northfield Policy is 'reinsurance."'
(Northland Memo in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 47). The discussion appears to be
directed at illustrating the distinction but not for purposes of summary judgment. This is true
especially in light of the conclusion of the discussion where no request for summary judgment is

made. This finding is further bolstered by the [act that the Conclusion makes no attempt to have
a finding made regarding the classification of the insurance. While significant lip service was
given to the issue, it does not appear to be an issue raised on summary judgment. Accordingly,
the issue of whether the Northland Policy is reinsurance can be left for another day.

VI.

CONCLUSION:

Based on the above discussion, the Court finds that there was no "occurrence" within the
Northland Policy period and therefore, there is no duty to indemnify for either the settlement or
the defense costs. Also', the Court will not address whether the Northland Policy is reinsurance.
Accordingly, Defendant Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in full.

Dated this 61hday of June, 2007

Darla Williamson, District Judge

I hereby certify that on this date I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to
Phillip J. Collaer
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, Deputy Court Clerk

Donald J. Farley
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,

Case No. CV OC 06171 12

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

VS.

NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES,
Defendant.
BASED UPON the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants'
,:

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 11,2007, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs complaint is
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice in its entirety.

Any request for attorney fees and costs sought by defendant will be addressed by the
Court following submission of a memorandum of costs and attorney fees in accordance with the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

&'

@.

day of

District Judge

-

JUDGMENT 1
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ORIGINAL

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

a

day o n w , 2007, I caused to be
served a true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, by the method indicated below, and addressed
to each of the following:
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON,
JULIAN
& HULL,LLP
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700
P. 0. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-55 10
Donald J. Faley
Bryan A. Nickels
HALL,FARLEY,
OBERRECHT
& BLANTON
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
P. 0. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 395-8585

-

-

-

-

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

CLERK OF THE COURT
A

-

JUDGMENT 2

Phillip J. Collaer, ISB No. 3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
2 5 0 South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, ldaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-551 0
E-Mail: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS,
Case No. CV OC 061 71 1 2

NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.

NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES,
a Minnesota corporation,

TO

:

Fee Category: T
Fee: $95.00

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.
The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named Respondent t o
the ldaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment issued on June 11, 2007, the
Honorable Darla Williamson presiding.

ORIGINAL
NOTICE OF APPEAL

-

1

2.
Said Appellant has a right t o appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgment and order described in Paragraph 1, above, is an appealable order under
and pursuant t o IAR II( a ) ( l ) .

3.

A preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
(a)

Whether the District Court erred by granting the Respondent's
(Northland insurance Companies) Motion for Summary Judgment.

4.
The Appellant requests the preparation of the standard Reporter's Transcript
relating to the hearing conducted May 17, 2007.
5.
The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's
Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, IAR:
(a)

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed November 17,
2006;

(b)

Affidavit of Lynnette McHenry in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment filed November 17, 2006.

(c)

Affidavit of Brian R. Martens in Support of Defendant's Response to
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed December 11,
2006;

(d)

Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Furtherance of Defendant Northland's
Rule 56(f) Motion and in Opposition t o Plaintiff ICRMP's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment filed December II,2006;

(e)

Defendant Northland lnsurance Companies' Motion for Summary
Judgment filed March I,2007;

(f)

Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Support of Defendant Northland
lnsurance Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 1,
2007;

(g)

Affidavit of Bryan A. Nickels in Support of Defendant Northland
lnsurance Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 1,
2007;

(h)

Affidavit of Brian R . Martens i n Support of Defendant Northland
lnsurance Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 1,
2007;

NOTICE

OF APPEAL - 2

6.

(i)

Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson in Opposition to ICRMP's Motion for
Summary Judgment filed April 23, 2007;

(j)

Order Granting Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment dated
June 6, 2007;

(k)

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment dated June 11, 2007.

1 certify:
(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)
(el

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;
That the reporter has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of
the transcript;
That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's Record has been
paid;
That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20, IAR.

DATED this

5 day of

, 2007.
ANDERSON. JULIAN & HULL LLP

B
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of
, 2007, 1 served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF PP AL by delivering the same
to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Donald J. Farley
Bryan A. Nickels
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht &
Blanton, PA
7 0 2 W. Idaho, Suite 7 0 0
PO Box 1271
Boise. Idaho 83701-1 271

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Delivery

,b

Phillip J. Collaer

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

NO.

~ ; 28
) 2

A.M

F ' L E ~ ~

JUL 1 6 20G7
9. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
Bv A-iOONE
DEPUN

Donald J. Farley
ISB #1561; djf@hallfarley .com

Bryan A. Nickels
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W:\ZV-241.14Kequesf for Additional Records on Appeal.doc

Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies,
Properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS ON APPEAL

PlaintiffIAppellant,
VS.
NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES,
Defendant/Respondent.
COMES NOW DefenddRespondent Northland Insurance Companies, properly
identified as Northfield Insurance Company (hereinafter "Northfield"), pursuant to I.A.R. 28(c),

-

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ON APPEAL 1

and hereby requests additional documents to be included in the Clerk's Record on Appeal, in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, IAR, and otherwise identified in
plaintifflappellant's Notice of Appeal. Specifically defendantlrespondent Northfield requests the
following documents be added:
1.

MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORTOF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONFOR PARTIALSUMMARY
JUDGMENT,
filed November 17,2006;

2.

DEFENDANT'S
RESPONSETO PLAINTIFF'SMOTIONFOR PARTIALSUMMARY
JUDGMENT,
filed December 12,2006;

3.

AFFIDAVIT
OF BRIANR. MARTENS
IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S
RESPONSE
TO
PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONFOR PARTIALSUMMARY
JUDGMENT,
filed December 12,
2006;

4.

REPLY~~E.MORANDUM
IN SUPPORT
OF ICRMP'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT,
filed December 19,2006;

5.

DEFENDANT
NORTHLAND
INSURANCE
COMPANIES'
REPLYBRIEFIN SUPPORT
OF
RULE5 6 ( ~I.R.C.P.
)
MOTION
RE: IDAHOCOUNTIES
RISKMANAGEMENT
PROGRAM
JUDGMENT,
filed January 17,
UNDERWRITERS'
MOTIONFOR PARTIALSUMMARY
2007;

6.

AFFIDAVIT
OF DONALD
J. FARLEY
IN FURTHERANCE
OF DEFENDANT
NORTHLAND'S
ICRMP'S MOTIONFOR
RULE56(F) M OTION AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT,
filed Jan~ary17,2007;

7.

MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT
NORTHLAND
INSURANCE
COMPANIES'
JUDGMENT,
filed March 1,2007;
MOTIONFOR SUMMARY

8.

ORDERGRANTING
DEFENDANT
NORTHLAND
INSURANCE
COMPANIES'
MOTION
5,2007;

FOR OVERLENGTH
BRIEFAND MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT,
filed March

9.

PLAINTIFF'SRESPONSETO NORTHLANDNORTHFIELD
INSURANCE
COMPANIES'
MOTIONFOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT,
filed April 23,2007;

10.

OF DEFENDANT
NORTHLAND
INSURANCE
COMPANIES'
MOTION
REPLYIN SUPPORT
FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT,
filed May 7,2007; and

1 1.

JUDGMENT,
filed June 22,2007.

Additionally, defendant/respondant requests the preparation of the standard Reporter's Transcript
relating to the hearing conducted on January 25,2007.

-

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ON APPEAL 2

. 000210

(L~

DATED this -day of July, 2007.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

as Northfield

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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A

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of July, 2007, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Phillip J. Collaer
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700
P. 0. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-55 10

-

-

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS ON APPEAL - 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,
Case No. CV-oc 06171 12

Plaintiff.
VS.

NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTION TO COSTS

Defendant.
The Court heard argument on Plaintiff's Objection to Costs on September 12,2007..
Appearing on behalf of Plaintiff was Mark Sebastian, and Bryan A. Nickels appeared on behalf
of the Defendants.

FACTSAND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND:
This case was a breach of indemnity contract claim against Defendant ~orthland.'
Plaintiff ICRMP sought to enforce a contract clause that obligated Northland to "indemnify
[ICRMP] for all sums which [it] shall be obligated to pay by reasons . . . of negligent acts arising

1.
Northland Insurance Company is also identified as Northfield Insurance Company. The Court will use
Northland to reference both in keeping with the symmetry of the pleading caption.

out of [ICRMPI's duties . . . ." during the policy period.2 The issues discussed before dismissal
were: 1) whether ICRMP was required to defend Kootenai County in the Paradis lawsuit;' and
2) whether the Paradis settlement and related defense costs were covered by Northland's policy
with ICRMP. On May 15, 2007, the Court granted ICRMP's partial motion for summary
judgment and determined that ICRMP was required to defend Kootenai County in the Paradis
lawsuit. On June 11, 2007, the Court granted Northland's motion for summary judgment and
determined that the Paradis lawsuit was not covered by the Northland policy because no
"occurrence" happened during the policy period, and thereby dismissed the complaint.
Before the court is Northland's request for fees and costs in the amount of $1,524.23.
Northland filed a memorandum of costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d) supported by an affidavit on
June 25, 2007. Northland claims $58 in filing fees and $173.40 for the costs of exhibitsspecifically six affidavits-as

costs as of right.4 The affidavits were calculated at .10 per page,

with one copy for the Court and one for opposing counsel. Northland further requests $1,292.83
in discretionary costs, including: photocopies/scanning at $854.10,' FedEx at $37.63, PACER
records regarding the Paradis lawsuit at $108, Westlaw at $292.04, and $1.06 in long distance
phone calls. Northland has included the affidavit of Bryan A. Nickels in support of these costs,
and also Exhibit A in camera, which includes an itemized billing summary.

LEGALSTANDARD
& ANALYSIS:
The determination of costs is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare v. Southfork Lumber Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149,845 P.2d 564,

2.
(Martens Aff., Ex. A, at 17., Dec. 12,2006) Clause "A-Comprehensive General Liability" provided that
Northland agreed to "indemnify the Assured for all sums, including expenses . . . which the Assureds shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages imposed by law. . . ." Id.
3.
Northland specifically denied this: "Plaintiff undertook the defense of Kootenai County and its employees
and settled with Paradis without contractual obligation to do so [therefore] Defendant has no obligation to indemnify
or reimburse Plaintiff." (Answer 6.)
4.
Affidavits in support of Defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion: 1) Donald J. Farley on December 11,2006 (15
pages) and; 2) on January 17,2007 (8 pages). Affidavits in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment: 1) Donald J. Farley on March 1,2007 (460 pages); 2) Bryan A. Nickels on March 1,2007 (74 pages)
and; 3) Brian R. Martens on and March 1,2007 (155 pages). Affidavit in support of Defendant's Objection to
PlaintifF's Motion for Summary Judgment: 1) Brian R. Martens on December 12,2006 (155 pages).
5.
8,541 copies @ .10 per page.

567 (1993). The burden is on the party opposing the award to demonstrate an abuse of the
court's discretion and absent an abuse of discretion, the court's award of costs will be upheld.
Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420,425,987 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1999);
Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70,72,785 P.2d 634,636 (1990).

A.

Costs as a Matter of Right:

When costs are awarded to a prevailing party, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) (1)
(C) allows certain costs to be recovered as a matter of right.

1. $58.00 filing fee. ICRMP concedes the $58.00 in filing fees.
2. Exhibit costs
Included in this category of costs as a matter of right are "Reasonable costs of the
preparation of . . . exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a hearing. . ."
Northland states that the Exhibit costs of $173.40 (copying costs) were necessary and not
incurred for purposes of harassment or increasing the costs of litigation. Northland asserts that
exhibits must be attached to an affidavit when no live testimony is allowed at a hearing and that
affidavits in summary judgment proceedings are on par with trial exhibits.
ICRMP argues that "exhibits" include demonstrative items or materials used by a witness
to explain or enhance histher testimony, but does not include affidavits, which are the direct
testimony of an individual witness.

By ICRMP's reasoning, costs would be recoverable if a

witness testified in person, but not if the witness provided testimony in writing. ICRMP further
argues that photocopies are only allowable as discretionary costs. This argument fails, because
I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1) (C) (10) allows charges for one copy of any deposition. To construe the rule
to disallow exhibits attached to affidavits would remove the most obvious meaning of the rule,
and would render the phrase "or other exhibits" a nullity. Therefore, the Court holds that
exhibits attached to affidavits are "exhibits" for purposes of I.C.R.P. 54(d) (1) (C) (6).
Although Northland claims costs for two copies of each exhibit, the Court will analogize
to depositions and only allow costs for one copy. The rule allows costs for the preparation of an
exhibit, and does not mention the costs of copies made for the other party. Northland will be

allowed costs as a matter of right in the amount of $68.90 for one copy of each of the three
affidavit exhibits filed with the Court in support of its motion for summary judgment.6

B.

Discretionary Costs:

The Court may in its discretion award a prevailing party discretionary costs where there
has been "a showing that the costs are necessary and exceptional, reasonably incurred, and
should in the interests of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1) (D).
When ruling upon objections to discretionary costs, the Court is required to make express
findings as to whether the costs are reasonable, necessary, and exceptional and should be
awarded against the adverse party in the interests of justice. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D); Perry v.

Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 60, 995 P.2d 816, 830 (2000) (where trial court
failed to describe the circumstances giving rise to its allowing or disallowing certain costs the
reviewing court could not determine if the trial court had applied the correct legal standard).
Northland argues that the discretionary costs claimed are exceptional because it had to
address ICRMP's partial summary judgment motion that ICRMP had a duty to defend Kootenai
County under its own policy, which had no bearing on the decisive issue of the case, which was
whether coverage existed under the Northfield policy. Northland argues that the costs were
exceptional because the action was not a routine insurance matter, but instead a situation where
ICRMF' sought coverage for an occurrence dating back two decades before the inception of the
policy. Further, Northland argues that the underlying Paradis lawsuit required Northland to pay
for access to federal records via PACER, and that an award of discretionary costs serves the
interests of justice because it provides a small recovery for the expenses incurred by Northland in
defending against matters arising 25 years ago, and required addressing matters unrelated to the
ultimate issue of the litigation.
ICRMP argues that discretionary costs should be denied because Northland failed to
show that the costs were necessary and exceptional and should be imposed against ICRMP in the

6.
Affidavits in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment: 1) Donald J. Farley on March 1,
2007 (460 pages); 2) Bryan A. Nickels on March 1,2007 (74 pages) and; 3) Brian R. Martens on and March 1,2007
(155 pages). 689 pages @ .I0 per page.

interest of justice. Computerized research costs should not be allowed because they are a form
of attorney's fees rather than costs.
The Court will now address each discretionary cost item requested.

1. Photocopieslscans
Northland's rationale for requesting photocopying costs is that the case was exceptional
because it had to defend against ICRMP's motion for summary judgment. As discussed above,
that fact does not render the case exceptional. Northland provides no other basis for deeming its
photocopying costs exceptional. Although thousands of copies were made and more than
$800.00 in costs are claimed, in an indemnity case such as this one involving complicated case
law and an uncertain outcome, high copy costs are common. The photocopying costs are not
exceptional because they exist in most lawsuits, and therefore the $854.10 in photocopying
charges is denied.

2. FedEx
Although the FedEx charges may have been both necessary and reasonable, such costs
are not exceptional. Litigation of all types commonly requires express mail service, and
therefore the Northland's request for FedEx charges of $37.63 is denied.

3. PACER records access
Northland argues that because it had to access federal records while defending a state
case, the costs to access PACER were exceptional. Referencing various documents from other
jurisdictions, including the federal courts, is commonplace and not exceptional in litigation.
Therefore Northland's request for PACER costs of $108 is denied. Further, fees paid for
computer assisted research are akin lo Westlaw charges, and are not recoverable as costs.

4. Westlaw
I.R.C.P. 54(e) (3) (K) provides that the court will consider the reasonable cost of
computer assisted legal research when determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded.
Because Westlaw charges fall under the category of attorney's fees and not costs, Northland's
request for Westlaw costs of $292.04 is denied.

5. Long Distance phone calls
Although the long distance phone calls may have been both necessary and reasonable,
they are not exceptional. Litigation of all types commonly requires long distance phone calls,
and therefore Northland's request for long distance charges of $1.06 is denied.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objection to Costs is GRANTED in part and
DENJED in pan. Defendant is awarded costs of right of $120.90. Requested discretionary costs
are disallowed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 13 day of September, 2007.
A

District Judge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of C k 4 d w 2008, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the
manner indicated below:

X U.S. Mail

Mark Sebastian, Attorney
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

H a n d Delivery

-Federal Express
Facsimile Transmission

X U.S. Mail

Brian A. Nickels, Attorney
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

Dated:

7/26/07

Hand Delivery
-Federal Express
-Facsimile Transmission

Signed:
Deputy Court Clcrk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS,

Supreme Court Case No. 34375
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS.
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES,
a Minnesota corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

..

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed
November 17,2006.
2. Affidavit of Lynnette McHenry in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, filed November 17,2006.
3. Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Company's
Rule 56(0 I.R.C.P. Motion Re: Plaintiff ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
filed December 11,2006.
4. Affidavit of Brian R. Martens in Support of Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, filed December 12,2006.

5. Reply Memorandum in Support of ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed
December 19,2006.
6. Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Furtherance of Defendant Northland's Rule 56(f) Motion
and in Opposition to Plaintiff ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed
January 17,2007.
7. Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Reply Brief in Support of Rule 56(0 I.R.C.P.
Motion Re: Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, filed January 17,2007.
8. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed March 1,2007.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

9. Affidavit of Brian R. Martens in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
March 1,2007.
10. Affidavit of Bryan A. Nickels in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Company's
Motion for Sumary Judgment, filed March 1,2007.
11. Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Company's
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 1,2007.
12. Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson iq Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed April 23,2007.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this IS'day of October, 2007.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF EXHLBITS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS,

I

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 34375

I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES,
a Minnesota corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
PHILLIP J. COLLAER

DONALD J. FARLEY

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

Date of Service:

JAh 0 8 2008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 34375
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

VS.

NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES,
a Minnesota corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 3rdday of July, 2007.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

JAM 2 2 aj;
,J. DAVID I\jAVV4RR0.Clark
Sy A'iCONE
DEPLJIV

Donald J. Farley
ISB #1561; djf@hallfarley.com

Bryan A. Nickels
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W:\2\2-241.l4\Tnanscript - Stip.doc
Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies,
Properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,

STIPULATION RE: ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

vs.
NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES,
DefendanURespondent.
COME NOW DefendanURespondent Northland Insurance Companies, properly
identified as Northfield Insurance Company (hereinafter "Northfield"), and PlaintifUAppellant

STIPULATION RE: ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 1

00223

-"

B5

12:35 FAX 2083445.*"*
01/22.108, , W V U
,a. '
3
&t,X
Car
a j h l a u . corn
*,-;-'4!!,91/2008 15:24 PAX 2085

. ,

ANDERSON, JULIAN.

moo2

HI'--

J

BBLLFWY

+

AJH Law Fakes

Idaho Countic~Risk Mmgemont P m m Underwriters (hereinafter ''1CTrMP7'), pmsuant to
1.A.R 29(a), and hereby stipulate to the addition to the transcript on apppl. SpeciBcatly, only

the transcript for the May 17, 2007 hearing was prepared; however, defdanffrespondent
N o M c l d also requestad the preparation of the standard Repcuter's Transcript relating to the

h d g conducted on January 25, 2007, as per its Request for Additional Documents on
Appeal, Bled July 26,2007.

Accordingiy, Northfield and ICRMP stipdate that the kansoript on appeal further include
Ihetmwcript ofthe hearing conducted on January 25,2007.
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Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies,
Properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,

Case No. CV OC 0617112
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION
RE: ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT ON
APPEAL

Plaintiff.
VS.
NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES,
Defendant.

I

BASED UPON written stipulation and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation Re: Additional Transcript on Appeal is
granted. The Clerk shall cause a transcript of the January 25,2007 hearing in this matter to be
prepared and submitted with the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript on appeal in this
matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

." I

DATED this&)day

of January, 2008.
,'

,<

HON. DARLA WILLIAMSON
District Judge

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of January, 2008, 1 caused to be served a
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
Donald J. Farley
Bryan A. Nickels
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Fax: (208) 395-8585
Phillip J. Collaer
Anderson, J u l i i & Hull, LLP
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700
P. 0 . Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-5510
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